{"id":66385,"date":"2005-05-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-05-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/04\/le-coup-de-santiago\/"},"modified":"2005-05-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-05-04T00:00:00","slug":"le-coup-de-santiago","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/04\/le-coup-de-santiago\/","title":{"rendered":"Le coup de Santiago<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le coup de Santiago<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t4 mai 2005 Les Etats-Unis ont connu une d\u00e9faite historique avec la nomination d’un nouveau secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’Organisation des \u00c9tats Am\u00e9ricains qui n’\u00e9tait manifestement pas leur candidat, bien qu’ils s’y soient ralli\u00e9s in extremis<\/em>. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’organisation WSWS.org<\/em> pr\u00e9sente de fa\u00e7on compl\u00e8te l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement<\/a>, ce jour.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\t\u00ab For the first time in its 57-year history, the Organization of American States Monday elected a secretary general whose candidacy had initially been opposed by Washington.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The Bush administration found itself compelled to back down from a standoff over the election and accept the installation of Chilean Interior Minister Jose Miguel Insulza. The vote was indicative of Washington’s waning power and influence in Latin America, where US capitalism has faced increasing competition from its global economic rivals in Europe and Asia.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Both the US State Department and the majority of the Latin American governments tried to put the best face on the decision, describing Insulza as a consensus candidate and insisting that there had been no winners or losers. Insulza himself embraced this view. After meeting with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the Chilean minister declared, Secretary Rice has supported a consensus, and therefore the candidate of the United States is now me. For that reason, no one should feel defeated.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This pretense of consensus, however, was marred by the failure of three of the organization’s 34 member states to cast ballots for Insulza. Bolivia explained that it could not back a Chilean because of a 130-year-old border dispute involving the land-locked country’s access to the sea. Peru cast a blank ballot. President AlejandroToledo took the vote as an opportunity to engage in a bit of nationalist demagogy, hoping to generate popular support for his crisis-ridden government. He claimed that denying the Chilean Peru’s vote was a matter of national honor because of Chile’s alleged sale of arms to Ecuador during a 1995 border war.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Also abstaining was Mexico, whose Foreign Minister Luis Ernesto Derbez had Washington’s backing to become OAS president until it became apparent that he would not be approved. Mexican officials expressed bitterness over the outcome and insisted that Insulza was not a consensus candidate, merely the only candidate.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The real humiliation, however, was that of the Bush administration, which had dispatched first Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and then Secretary of State Rice to Latin America in an attempt to bring the region’s governments into line.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb When the OAS top office became vacantformer Costa Rican president Miguel Angel Rodr\u00edguez was forced to resign over corruption charges that led to his imprisonment in his own countrythe Bush administration sought to reward one of its most faithful stooges with the post. It tapped El Salvador’s former President Francisco Flores, who headed the only Latin American government currently participating in the US occupation of Iraq, having sent 380 troops.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In the face of overwhelming opposition to placing such an open stooge of the State Department in the post, however, Washington shifted its backing to Derbez. Then, on April 11, the OAS deadlocked during five rounds of voting, with the Chilean and the Mexican candidate each getting 17 votes. In previous contested elections at the OAS1975 and 1991Washington was able to bribe or strong-arm smaller countries to get its candidate elected. This time, however, its efforts proved counter-productive, and it became clear that it would lose the vote.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tIl y a eu beaucoup de sp\u00e9culations pour d\u00e9terminer ce que ferait le nouveau secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’OEA \u00e0 propos de Hugo Chavez, d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment la b\u00eate noire de Washington en Am\u00e9rique Latine. Pour rassurer les Am\u00e9ricains, le nouveau secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’OEA a indiqu\u00e9 qu’il serait tr\u00e8s vigilant quant \u00e0 la fa\u00e7on d\u00e9mocratique de gouverner des membres de l’Organisation. Le New York Times du 3 mai<\/a> en a aussit\u00f4t conclu : \u00ab In his acceptance statement on Friday, Mr. Insulza stressed that elected governments that do not govern democratically should be held accountable to the O.A.S., a clear allusion to Venezuela.<\/em> \u00bb On reconna\u00eet le commentaire am\u00e9ricaniste habituel, assur\u00e9 de ses certitudes; apr\u00e8s tout, certains esprits rebelles pourraient aussi bien y voir une allusion aux USA…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa m\u00e9thode employ\u00e9e contre Chavez, une constante pression, des accusations diverses, le soutien en sous-main de toutes les tentatives de d\u00e9stabilisation, pourrait aussi bien appara\u00eetre comme le cas o\u00f9 s’exercerait la vigilance de l’OEA, dans ce cas contre les Am\u00e9ricains. En m\u00eame temps, elle t\u00e9moigne d’une perception d\u00e9form\u00e9e de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, toujours conform\u00e9ment \u00e0 la suffisance am\u00e9ricaine. (\u00ab It’s counterproductive both to see what <\/em>[Rice] is saying on Venezuela and what they are doing at the O.A.S., but the U.S. just doesn’t seem to get the political and diplomatic reality, said Riordan Roett, director of the Western Hemisphere program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais l’enseignement plus large du revers de Santiago de Chili est bien plus significatif et remarquable. Il s’inscrit dans un mouvement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral dont Tom Engelhardt d\u00e9veloppe l’analyse sur son site, le 2 mai<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab …it’s remarkable what the Bush administration can’t do today in its own backyard. It can’t fully isolate Cuba; it can’t create a regional \u00a0\u00bbcoalition of the willing\u00a0\u00bb against Venezuela; it can’t simply impose its version of economics on the continent; it can’t stop a number of countries in the region from making energy deals of one sort or another with China, Iran, India, and other potential energy competitors. (And if, for a moment, you were to glance north, rather than south, you might notice that it was recently unable to impose its pet boondoggle, the Star Wars anti-missile system, on our recalcitrant northern neighbor. Another small sign of the times.)<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb There is perhaps no area of the world where the Bush administration has been less successful in fostering the military-to-military relations that are seen are crucial to its plans. Part of this has been due to its tunnel-vision unilateralism. In an attempt to prevent U.S. soldiers or officials from ever ending up in a foreign or international court on any kind of war crimes charges, it sent the American Service Members Protection Act (ASPA) winging through Congress. This prohibits U.S. security assistance funds and most military cooperation unless a country rejects the U.N.-backed ICC [International Criminal Court] or signs a bilateral immunity agreement with the United States. It then pursued such agreements with just about every nation on the planet. As it happens, 11 of the nations that have ratified the ICC agreement and refused to grant the United States bilateral immunity are in Latin America. Another sign of the times.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tLa situation dans cette zone est une consid\u00e9rable surprise strat\u00e9gique et, certainement la situation la plus significative de la vuln\u00e9rabilit\u00e9 de Washington. Si tout s’est ordonn\u00e9 autour de la r\u00e9bellion de Chavez, il appara\u00eet que cette r\u00e9bellion n’est qu’un \u00e9l\u00e9ment parmi d’autres. Le tournant de l’\u00e9volution actuelle est sans aucun doute le coup d’\u00c9tat manqu\u00e9 anti-Chavez, en avril 2002, mais l’important est qu’\u00e0 la suite de cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement s’est d\u00e9velopp\u00e9 un mouvement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de r\u00e9sistance aux pressions US, bient\u00f4t traduit dans des r\u00e9sultats \u00e9lectoraux significatifs. Tout cela s’est produit sans qu’on r\u00e9alise, \u00e0 Washington, l’ampleur potentielle du mouvement. Engelhardt met justement en \u00e9vidence la myopie strat\u00e9gique de Washington, sa vision d\u00e9form\u00e9e, l’esp\u00e8ce d’auto-d\u00e9sinformation d\u00e9sormais habituelle dans le monde virtualiste qu’on conna\u00eet.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEngelhardt met en \u00e9vidence le r\u00f4le particuli\u00e8rement mal\u00e9fique de l’Irak dans la perception strat\u00e9gique de Washington: \u00ab With no end in sight, the draining Iraq War has already trumped much of the rest of the Bush administration’s aggressive foreign policy (especially in Asia) and has left the administration thoroughly distracted when it comes to whole regions of the world.<\/em> \u00bb Quant au near abroad<\/em> de Washington, ou la soi-disant arri\u00e8re-cour, la certitude suffisante d’en assurer par tradition le complet contr\u00f4le et l’absence de vigilance qui va avec ont permis \u00e0 toute cette r\u00e9gion de s’\u00e9manciper de ce contr\u00f4le et de pr\u00e9senter son \u00e9volution comme un fait strat\u00e9gique accompli. L’Am\u00e9rique Latine repr\u00e9sente d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 un bloc strat\u00e9gique r\u00e9gional quasiment form\u00e9, marqu\u00e9 pour le moins par une volont\u00e9 d’autonomie tr\u00e8s forte, au pire pour Washington par une affirmation anti-am\u00e9ricaniste. Il para\u00eet logique d’avancer que, d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0, les Am\u00e9ricains ont perdu toute possibilit\u00e9 s\u00e9rieuse de renverser cette puissante tendance, qui restera une des grandes surprises strat\u00e9giques de l’apr\u00e8s-9\/11.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’Empire, faussement assur\u00e9 de ses arri\u00e8res, s’est lanc\u00e9 dans des aventures exp\u00e9ditionnaires lointaines. Il a jou\u00e9 une partie qui pourrait se solder par un r\u00e9sultat dit lose-lose<\/em> : perdant son pari de l’investissement des r\u00e9gions essentielles outre-mer (la situation au Moyen-Orient, voire la situation en Asie), tout en se d\u00e9couvrant menac\u00e9 sur ses flancs r\u00e9gionaux par un puissant bloc strat\u00e9gique potentiellement hostile. L’\u00e9lection du nouveau secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’Organisation des \u00c9tats Am\u00e9ricains en est la marque symbolique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le coup de Santiago 4 mai 2005 Les Etats-Unis ont connu une d\u00e9faite historique avec la nomination d’un nouveau secr\u00e9taire g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’Organisation des \u00c9tats Am\u00e9ricains qui n’\u00e9tait manifestement pas leur candidat, bien qu’ils s’y soient ralli\u00e9s in extremis. L’organisation WSWS.org pr\u00e9sente de fa\u00e7on compl\u00e8te l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement, ce jour. \u00ab For the first time in its… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4547,3304],"class_list":["post-66385","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-arriere-cour","tag-chavez"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66385","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66385"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66385\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66385"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66385"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66385"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}