Apocalypse Soon<\/em>, des angoisses discr\u00e8tes mais tr\u00e8s profondes de l’ancien (1961-68) secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense de Kennedy-Johnson et du Viet-n\u00e2m devant la situation pr\u00e9sente. Depuis cette p\u00e9riode de 1961-68, McNamara a fait un long chemin, avec 13 ans \u00e0 la t\u00eate de la Banque mondiale en m\u00eame temps qu’une longue et p\u00e9nible \u00e9volution intellectuelle l’amenant \u00e0 d\u00e9noncer les errements de la politique militaire qu’il \u00e9labora et dont il dirigea l’application au Viet-n\u00e2m.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tAngoisses discr\u00e8tes mais tr\u00e8s profondes, disons-nous, devant les risques pr\u00e9sents de l’utilisation d’armes nucl\u00e9aires. McNamara est aussi le p\u00e8re de la th\u00e9orie dite MAD (Mutual assured Destruction), qu’il pr\u00e9senta en public \u00e0 Ann Harbor en 1962. MAD pr\u00e9tendait codifier et institutionnaliser un \u00e9quilibre nucl\u00e9aire USA-URSS et ainsi interdire l’utilisation de ces armes sous peine de suicide r\u00e9ciproque.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tL’exercice (d’aujourd’hui) est difficile. Il est probable que McNamara a autant \u00e0 l’esprit les imprudences de l’administration GW Bush qu’une hypoth\u00e9tique attaque terroriste nucl\u00e9aire sur les USA. Cette hypoth\u00e8se repose sur la psychologie et l’exp\u00e9rience de McNamara, marqu\u00e9es par une profonde m\u00e9fiance de la bureaucratie militaro-strat\u00e9gique US, de ses tendances d\u00e9j\u00e0 montr\u00e9es dans les ann\u00e9es 1950 et 1960 \u00e0 envisager avec enthousiasme l’utilisation de l’arme nucl\u00e9aire. Il base donc une argumentation destin\u00e9e \u00e0 l’administration GW Bush, en pr\u00e9textant la crainte d’une attaque terroriste nucl\u00e9aire \u00e0 la suite de la prolif\u00e9ration, et en se basant sur une argumentation type-Guerre froide. La conclusion le conduit tout de m\u00eame \u00e0 effleurer le cur du probl\u00e8me. (Bien entendu, si l’attitude de Robert S. McNamara m\u00e9rite tout le respect d\u00fb aux esprits \u00e9lev\u00e9s capables de se mettre en cause, elle n’a, dans les buts que nous d\u00e9crivons, aucune chance d’aboutir. En face, c’est l’administration GW, c’est-\u00e0-dire un bloc de certitude.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab The Bush administration’s nuclear program, alongside its refusal to ratify the CTBT, will be viewed, with reason, by many nations as equivalent to a U.S. break from the treaty. It says to the nonnuclear weapons nations, We, with the strongest conventional military force in the world, require nuclear weapons in perpetuity, but you, facing potentially well-armed opponents, are never to be allowed even one nuclear weapon.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb If the United States continues its current nuclear stance, over time, substantial proliferation of nuclear weapons will almost surely follow. Some, or all, of such nations as Egypt, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Taiwan will very likely initiate nuclear weapons programs, increasing both the risk of use of the weapons and the diversion of weapons and fissile materials into the hands of rogue states or terrorists. Diplomats and intelligence agencies believe Osama bin Laden has made several attempts to acquire nuclear weapons or fissile materials. <\/em>[…] Indeed, just last summer, at a meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry said, I have never been more fearful of a nuclear detonation than now. There is a greater than 50 percent probability of a nuclear strike on U.S. targets within a decade. I share his fears.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb We are at a critical moment in human historyperhaps not as dramatic as that of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but a moment no less crucial. Neither the Bush administration, the congress, the American people, nor the people of other nations have debated the merits of alternative, long-range nuclear weapons policies for their countries or the world. They have not examined the military utility of the weapons; the risk of inadvertent or accidental use; the moral and legal considerations relating to the use or threat of use of the weapons; or the impact of current policies on proliferation. Such debates are long overdue. If they are held, I believe they will conclude, as have I and an increasing number of senior military leaders, politicians, and civilian security experts: We must move promptly toward the elimination or near elimination of all nuclear weapons. For many, there is a strong temptation to cling to the strategies of the past 40 years. But to do so would be a serious mistake leading to unacceptable risks for all nations.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 9 mai 2005 \u00e0 12H00<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Le long article de Robert S. McNamara dans Foreign Policy, num\u00e9ro mai-juin 2005, nous instruit, sur le th\u00e8me de Apocalypse Soon, des angoisses discr\u00e8tes mais tr\u00e8s profondes de l’ancien (1961-68) secr\u00e9taire \u00e0 la d\u00e9fense de Kennedy-Johnson et du Viet-n\u00e2m devant la situation pr\u00e9sente. Depuis cette p\u00e9riode de 1961-68, McNamara a fait un long chemin, avec… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1175],"class_list":["post-66399","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-viet-nam"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66399","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66399"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66399\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66399"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66399"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66399"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}