{"id":66416,"date":"2005-05-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-05-15T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/15\/limperialisme-bureaucratique-du-pentagone-par-la-prise-de-controle-de-forces-armees-non-us-le-cas-italien\/"},"modified":"2005-05-15T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-05-15T00:00:00","slug":"limperialisme-bureaucratique-du-pentagone-par-la-prise-de-controle-de-forces-armees-non-us-le-cas-italien","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/15\/limperialisme-bureaucratique-du-pentagone-par-la-prise-de-controle-de-forces-armees-non-us-le-cas-italien\/","title":{"rendered":"L’\u201cimp\u00e9rialisme bureaucratique\u201d du Pentagone par la prise de contr\u00f4le de forces arm\u00e9es non-US: le cas italien<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’imp\u00e9rialisme bureaucratique du Pentagone par la prise de contr\u00f4le de forces arm\u00e9es non-US: le cas italien<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tLe texte que nous reproduisons ci-dessous est \u00e9difiant. Il est \u00e9difiant, d’abord, par son apparente innocence (un texte qui se cantonne dans l’imbroglio des proc\u00e9dures techniques appara\u00eet toujours comme tel, innocent parce qu’incompr\u00e9hensible \u00e0 la plupart des lecteurs, par cons\u00e9quent politiquement innocent). Il est \u00e9difiant, ensuite, parce qu’il n’est nullement critique de la perversion de la souverainet\u00e9 nationale qu’il d\u00e9crit. Nous observons des gens, y compris des experts italiens, qui s’affirment manifestement tr\u00e8s satisfaits du processus qu’ils d\u00e9crivent, qui est celui d’un encha\u00eenement bureaucratique et m\u00e9canique, automatique dans le sens de l’automation, dans une force aveugle et d\u00e9cha\u00een\u00e9e qui est la bureaucratie am\u00e9ricaniste. Il s’agit d’un exemple convaincant de l’application du v\u00e9ritable imp\u00e9rialisme am\u00e9ricaniste, qui est un imp\u00e9rialisme bureaucratique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe texte, publi\u00e9 par Defense News le 2 mai dernier<\/a>, d\u00e9crit le processus d’int\u00e9gration des forces italiennes, particuli\u00e8rement a\u00e9riennes, dans les m\u00e9canismes de contr\u00f4le et de commandement de la bureaucratie am\u00e9ricaine. L’incident que d\u00e9crit l’article, d’un F-16 italien d\u00e9collant le 8 avril, jour de l’enterrement de Jean-paul II, pour intercepter un avion inconnu, un LearJet<\/em> soup\u00e7onn\u00e9 de pr\u00e9parer une attaque terroriste, est particuli\u00e8rement r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 de la situation et de l’\u00e9tat d’esprit r\u00e9gnant. Le texte note : \u00ab The Italian Air Force scrambled an F-16 fighter, which intercepted and diverted the aircraft. The report of the bomb turned out to be a false alarm. One American defense official called it a perfect operation.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe texte de Defense News<\/em> ne pr\u00e9cise pas certaines conditions r\u00e9gnant autour de cette op\u00e9ration. Il parle d’informations venues de services de renseignement \u00e0 propos du chargement suppos\u00e9 de l’avion (\u00ab Intelligence reports indicated there was a bomb on board.<\/em> \u00bb). Ces conditions sont les suivantes, selon des sources militaires europ\u00e9ennes que nous avons consult\u00e9es:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Les informations sur le chargement suppos\u00e9 de l’avion venaient des services de renseignement US.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Ce sont les Am\u00e9ricains eux-m\u00eames qui ont d\u00e9clench\u00e9 l’alerte et donn\u00e9 l’ordre au F-16 italien de d\u00e9coller. Il semble qu’ils en avaient techniquement les moyens, sinon l’autorisation politique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• \u00ab Tout s’est pass\u00e9 comme si c’\u00e9taient les Am\u00e9ricains qui, ce jour-l\u00e0, \u00e9taient en charge de la d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne italienne<\/em> \u00bb, constatent nos sources, qui attribuent cette situation \u00e0 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 des processus techniques mis en place et laissent entendre qu’il n’est nul besoin pour cela d’une d\u00e9cision formelle, politique ou autre, qui serait \u00e9videmment malais\u00e9e et tr\u00e8s risqu\u00e9e. \u00ab Stricto sensu, il n’y avait pas d’autorisation politique, selon nos estimations. Disons que la situation a \u00e9t\u00e9 telle, dans l’urgence d\u00e9clench\u00e9e par l’alerte, que ce sont effectivement les Am\u00e9ricains qui ont assur\u00e9 la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 du commandement et du contr\u00f4le de la d\u00e9fense a\u00e9rienne italienne.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Les conditions de cet incident sont telles qu’une hypoth\u00e8se pourrait \u00eatre avanc\u00e9e selon laquelle l’ensemble de cette op\u00e9ration, y compris le vol de l’avion et l’alerte qui fut d\u00e9clench\u00e9e par son entr\u00e9e dans l’espace a\u00e9rien italien, pourrait avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 mont\u00e9 par les Am\u00e9ricains eux-m\u00eames pour tester la fiabilit\u00e9 de leur contr\u00f4le technique des Italiens, et affirmer politiquement ce contr\u00f4le. C’est en cela que l’op\u00e9ration d’interception est d\u00e9crite comme une op\u00e9ration parfaite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn aspect remarquable de ce texte, qui se voudrait politiquement neutre gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 son aspect technique, est qu’il ne l’est pas du tout. Des passages indiquent au contraire qu’il y a une intention politique d’affirmer ce contr\u00f4le am\u00e9ricain, m\u00eame dans des situations politiques o\u00f9 l’Italie voudrait affirmer une orientation europ\u00e9enne. On citera cette phrase: \u00ab Analysts said the increased interoperability would underpin Italo-U.S. military relations even if a more pro-EU, center-left government came to power here.<\/em> \u00bb Puis, plus loin, citant Andrea Grazioso, un consultant du Centro Militare Studi Strategici du minist\u00e8re italien de la d\u00e9fense: \u00ab Analyst Grazioso envisaged little let-up in U.S. training in the event of a change of government. Italy plans to fly the Joint Strike Fighter until 2045, he said. How many governments will come and go before then?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes remarques posent la question \u00e9vidente de la souverainet\u00e9 du gouvernement italien, et les questions techniques cons\u00e9quentes de son contr\u00f4le sur ses propres forces, de la capacit\u00e9 de ce gouvernement de choisir une orientation militaire d\u00e9coulant d’une nouvelle politique d\u00e9cid\u00e9e par lui (dans ce cas europ\u00e9enne). Elles conduisent \u00e0 interpr\u00e9ter ce contr\u00f4le de la bureaucratie du Pentagone sur certains segments de forces militaires non-US comme une sorte de coup d’\u00c9tat permanent par le biais des proc\u00e9dures bureaucratiques et techniques. Elles tiennent pour \u00e9vident le choix italien d’acheter le Joint Strike Fighter, dont nul ne sait ce qu’il va devenir, le prix qu’il va co\u00fbter, etc., et elles confirment implicitement mais de fa\u00e7on convaincante dans le cas consid\u00e9r\u00e9, le caract\u00e8re compl\u00e8tement politique d’investissement des forces arm\u00e9es non-US de ce programme d’avion de combat.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIl s’agit bien de ce qu’on d\u00e9signe, de la part du Pentagone, comme un imp\u00e9rialisme bureaucratique. Il est conduit d’une fa\u00e7on aveugle, par le Pentagone en tant que tel, par la dynamique imp\u00e9rialiste de sa bureaucratie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tS’il peut \u00eatre consid\u00e9r\u00e9 comme servant objectivement les buts de la politique g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Etats-Unis, il est probable que ce type d’op\u00e9rations peut r\u00e9server des surprises, \u00e9ventuellement des revers pour l’imp\u00e9rialisme bureaucratique. La bureaucratie du Pentagone tient pour acquis son contr\u00f4le sur ces forces non-US parce qu’elle a mis en place les techniques et processus op\u00e9rationnels qui l’assurent. Elle \u00e9tablit ainsi un pr\u00e9suppos\u00e9 politique selon lequel les Italiens suivront la plupart des op\u00e9rations que les Etats-Unis entreprendront, alors que c’est le contraire qui est de loin le plus probable. Dans ce cas se trouvent \u00e9tablies des conditions o\u00f9 pourraient \u00e9clater des incidents graves entre le pouvoir politique et la bureaucratie militaire (italo-am\u00e9ricaine dans ce cas), puisque les processus d’utilisation, et donc l’utilisation implicite des forces italiennes seraient contraires \u00e0 la politique d\u00e9cid\u00e9e. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Italy Adapts U.S. Doctrine <\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Tom Kington, Defense News, 2 May 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn April 8, the day U.S. President George W. Bush and dozens of heads of state gathered for the funeral of Pope John Paul II, a Learjet entered Italian air space and headed for Rome. Intelligence reports indicated there was a bomb on board. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Italian Air Force scrambled an F-16 fighter, which intercepted and diverted the aircraft. The report of the bomb turned out to be a false alarm. One American defense official called it a perfect operation. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe official, who declined to be named, was doubly pleased because the Italian pilot of the leased F-16 had put to good use training he had received from the U.S. Air Force in Tucson, Ariz. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThat program is part of a massive increase in the stateside training of Italian military personnel, which officials say is smoothing cooperation between the United States and Italy, not only in hot spots like Iraq and Afghanistan, but also on the homeland security front. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tRight now there is close cooperation between the U.S. and Italian governments, and because of the increase in training this is reflected at the military level, with coherent doctrine also evident in civil-military work, said an Italian general based at the Ministry of Defense here. Sept. 11 was the spur, as well as the U.S. push on net-centric warfare. It is telling that Italy has adopted the same net-centric terminology as used by the U.S. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tItaly’s military chief of staff, Adm. Giampaolo di Paola, is a keen devotee of net-centric concepts. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tItaly spent an estimated $105 million on military training in the United States last year, an eightfold increase on the $12 million spent in 2000, according to documents released by the Pentagon. U.S. defense sources said the number of Italians heading across the Atlantic for military training has risen from about 350 a year in 1999 to 785 in 2004. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt has become easier to operate alongside Italy because of joint training, said one U.S. defense official here. The change we’re seeing has strategic significance. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSome of that increase comes because Italy has in recent years acquired more U.S. defense equipment for example, leasing F-16s and buying C-130J airlifters and more Italian troops have headed to the U.S. for instruction. U.S. officials also pointed to an increasing number of Italians passing through U.S. staff colleges. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIt is those links forged in the classroom, said officials, that are helping Italians gel better with Americans when they meet during desert, mountain and naval operations around the world. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tYou can plug an Italian Navy vessel into a battle group with no problem now, the U.S. official said. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnalysts said the increased interoperability would underpin Italo-U.S. military relations even if a more pro-EU, center-left government came to power here. This month, the pro-U.S., center-right government of Silvio Berlusconi took a pounding in regional elections, part of the run up to national elections next year. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tTraining Up<\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMuch of the training is run through the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program. The 1999 numbers appeared in the department’s annual Section 655 report to the U.S. Congress. Numbers for 2004 training are early estimates given by a Pentagon source. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe recent increase has owed much to Italy’s lease of 34 F-16s to fill the gaps before Eurofighter squadrons arrive at full strength. The U.S. official said Italy had spent about $24 million on F-16 training in 2003. More than 100 technicians headed to the United States for training alongside pilots. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut even before the F-16s arrived, Italian Navy AV-8 Harrier pilots were training with the U.S. Marines, and all Italian Air Force student pilots undertake some of their general training in the United States. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe AV-8 training was a success, with Italian pilots going on to fly them in missions during Desert Storm and Enduring Freedom, said one American officer here. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFor the Air Force there has been no huge change, since it has been sending a sizeable number of regular pilots to the U.S. for 50 years, said Gregory Alegi, an airpower lecturer at the Italian Joint Staffs College. The pilots come back with a broader perspective which makes them better officers. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tItalian defense budget documents say overall Italian spending on Air Force formation and training, grew by 63.7 percent in 2005 to 209.8 million euros ($272.7 million), while Army and Navy training spending dropped along with overall spending. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Air Force training rise covers not only U.S. training but Eurofighter training, as the new European aircraft enters service. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe U.S. training boost is in part a consequence of Italy purchasing U.S. products it then needs to learn to use. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFollowing the F-16 training, Italy will send six Predator ground crew members and three Predator pilots for U.S. training this year, as well as the first of four boom operators for Italy’s four new Boeing KC-767 tankers. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tU.S. training is benefiting more than just the Air Force. Italians involved in the formation of a new Psychological Operations battalion have been training at the U.S. Army’s Fort Bragg. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tItaly’s fourth military service, the Carabinieri military police, has recently entered a Foreign Military Sales program for the first time, sending helicopter pilots to train in the United States. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA growing number of officers from all services are studying at U.S. staff colleges. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis increase is a reflection of the changing global situation, said Andrea Grazioso, a consultant to the Centro Militare Studi Strategici, Rome, part of Italy’s Ministry of Defense. Sending more Italians to staff colleges goes hand-in-hand with sending more Italians to work in the United States, such as on Enduring Freedom in Tampa, Fla.. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe fact that net-centric war has been a good sell in Italy is possibly due to so much joint training with the U.S., the American officer said, while the simple fact that English is more widely spoken helps a lot in operations. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe benefits of shared doctrine in the field were evident when Italian forces came under attack in Nassiryah, Iraq in May last year, said retired Italian Army Lt. Gen. Carlo Cabigiousu. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWe enjoyed close cooperation with the U.S. Army and Air Force at the time, particularly when American air support was provided, said Cabigiousu, who worked as Italy’s chief military liaison with U.S. forces in Baghdad in 2003. A very good knowledge of the aircraft involved, of their capabilities and their procedures for target designation was required for us to work with them. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThere is a difference between training to use U.S. products and training to operate alongside American forces, and both are needed. This was exemplified by Italy’s deployment of its Predators to Iraq, U.S. officials said. The Italian Air Force initially sent its pilots to train with Predator maker General Atomics in the United States, rather than through a Foreign Military Sales program. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThey received flight training, but not mission training, which was needed for interoperability with the U.S. in Iraq, the American officer said. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis year, when the Predator crews and pilots return to the United States, they will train with the Pentagon. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tWar and Politics<\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe question of whether Italian and American troops can function smoothly together is overshadowed by a political question: Will the Italian government continue to send its military around the world in support of the United States? <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBerlusconi staunchly backed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and dispatched more than 3,000 peacekeeping troops to the Shiite south after the conflict. But support in Italy for keeping troops in Iraq has been lukewarm, and relations with the United States are currently strained over the shooting of Italian secret service agent Nicola Calipari in Iraq by American troops in Baghdad. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAfter Berlusconi’s governing coalition suffered heavy defeats in regional elections in April, one coalition partner withdrew its ministers from the government, forcing a vote of confidence in parliament. The episode was a prelude to national elections in 2006, when a center-left coalition led by former EU Commission President Romano Prodi is expected to present a strong challenge. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCenter-left politicians have criticized Italy’s role in Iraq. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA Prodi government would not be anti-U.S. per se almost no one is in Italy but it would be anti-Bush, said Alessandro Politi, an independent political analyst. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPossibly mindful of coming elections, Berlusconi has recently hinted he could bring troops home himself before the end of 2005. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut even without Iraq as a bone of contention, a Prodi government might not necessarily find common ground with Washington, Politi said. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNext up there is Iran, the Road Map as well as a balanced policy on Israel, he said. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tItaly’s commitment to global deployment may be a question mark, but its commitment to procuring U.S. defense products is more certain, and thus so is the continued flow of Italian troops to U.S. training classrooms. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFor decades, Italian governments had carefully balanced relations with America’s and Europe’s defense industries. While the Berlusconi government pulled out of the European A400M transport aircraft program, it was influenced in part by the decision of the previous left-wing government to buy 22 American C-130J aircraft. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFuture Italian governments, whether center-left or right, will also seek to sustain Italy’s defense industry and its heavily unionized labor force, partly through the industrial offset work Italy extracts when buying U.S. defense products. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnalyst Grazioso envisaged little let-up in U.S. training in the event of a change of government. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tItaly plans to fly the Joint Strike Fighter until 2045, he said. How many governments will come and go before then?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’imp\u00e9rialisme bureaucratique du Pentagone par la prise de contr\u00f4le de forces arm\u00e9es non-US: le cas italien Le texte que nous reproduisons ci-dessous est \u00e9difiant. Il est \u00e9difiant, d’abord, par son apparente innocence (un texte qui se cantonne dans l’imbroglio des proc\u00e9dures techniques appara\u00eet toujours comme tel, innocent parce qu’incompr\u00e9hensible \u00e0 la plupart des lecteurs, par… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[1015,250],"class_list":["post-66416","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notes-de-lectures","tag-f-16","tag-jsf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66416","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66416"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66416\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66416"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66416"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66416"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}