voire la d\u00e9gradation catastrophique<\/a> de la puissance am\u00e9ricaine en Irak. C’est ce que nous nommerions l’effet la souris a accouch\u00e9 d’une montagne si caract\u00e9ristique d’une \u00e9poque o\u00f9 les communications et les cloisonnements des forces disponibles multiplient les effets d’une fa\u00e7on exponentielle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tOn mentionnera surtout deux faits tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressants, qui nous semblent assez peu connus et nous paraissent extr\u00eamement significatifs.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t• Le premier touche compl\u00e8tement \u00e0 la personnalit\u00e9 obsessionnelle de GW et place, chronologiquement, son intention d’attaquer Saddam bien en-de\u00e7\u00e0 de l’attaque du 11 septembre et m\u00eame de son accession \u00e0 la pr\u00e9sidence. Cole \u00e9crit ceci : \u00ab I was in the studio with Arab-American journalist Osama Siblani on Amy Goodman’s Democracy Now’ program on March 11, 2005, when Siblani reported a May 2000 encounter he had with then-candidate Bush in a hotel in Troy, Mich. He told me just straight to my face, among 12 or maybe 13 Republicans at that time here in Michigan at the hotel. I think it was on May 17, 2000, even before he became the nominee for the Republicans. He told me that he was going to take him out, when we talked about Saddam Hussein in Iraq. According to Siblani, Bush added that he wanted to go to Iraq to search for weapons of mass destruction, and he considered the regime an imminent and gathering threat against the United States. Siblani points out that Bush at that point was privy to no classified intelligence on Iraqi weapons programs and had already made up his mind on the issue.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t• Le deuxi\u00e8me point int\u00e9ressant est la rencontre entre Blair et Bush le 20 septembre 2001, o\u00f9 Blair s’employa \u00e0 convaincre GW de ne pas attaquer l’Irak au lieu de l’Afghanistan. Cole cite l’ambassadeur britannique \u00e0 Washington \u00e0 cette \u00e9poque, Sir Christopher Meyer, parlant \u00e0 Vanity Fair<\/em> en mai 2004 : \u00ab When British Prime Minister Tony Blair arrived in Washington on Sept. 20, 2001, he was alarmed. If Blair had consulted MI6 about the relative merits of the Afghanistan and Iraq options, we can only imagine what well-informed British intelligence officers in Pakistan were cabling London about the dangers of leaving bin Laden and al-Qaida in place while plunging into a potential quagmire in Iraq. Fears that London was a major al-Qaida target would have underlined the risks to the United Kingdom of an Iraq first’ policy in Washington.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb Meyer told Vanity Fair, Blair came with a very strong message don’t get distracted; the priorities were al-Qaida, Afghanistan, the Taliban. He must have been terrified that the Bush administration would abandon London to al-Qaida while pursuing the great white whale of Iraq. But he managed to help persuade Bush. Meyer reports, Bush said, I agree with you, Tony. We must deal with this first. But when we have dealt with Afghanistan, we must come back to Iraq.’ Meyer also said, in spring 2004, that it was clear that when we did come back to Iraq it wouldn’t be to discuss smarter sanctions. In short, Meyer strongly implies that Blair persuaded Bush to make war on al-Qaida in Afghanistan first by promising him British support for a later Iraq campaign.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 20 mai 2005 \u00e0 16H30<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Il faut signaler ici un des meilleurs articles parus \u00e0 ce jour sur le cheminement d’un fait fondamental de la pr\u00e9sidence GW Bush : l’obsession du pr\u00e9sident \u00e0 l’encontre de Saddam Hussein. Il s’agit d’un article de Juan Cole, sp\u00e9cialiste ind\u00e9pendant incontest\u00e9 de l’Irak aux Etats-Unis, publi\u00e9 hier sur le site Salon.com. A partir du… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1087,981],"class_list":["post-66429","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-cole","tag-saddam"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66429","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66429"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66429\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66429"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66429"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66429"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}