{"id":66439,"date":"2005-05-24T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-05-24T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/24\/les-obligations-de-lotan-et-de-leurope-selon-robert-d-kaplan-ii\/"},"modified":"2005-05-24T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-05-24T00:00:00","slug":"les-obligations-de-lotan-et-de-leurope-selon-robert-d-kaplan-ii","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/05\/24\/les-obligations-de-lotan-et-de-leurope-selon-robert-d-kaplan-ii\/","title":{"rendered":"Les obligations de l&rsquo;OTAN et de l&rsquo;Europe, selon Robert D. Kaplan (II)"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Puisque <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1580\" class=\"gen\">nous y sommes<\/a>, poursuivons \u00e0 propos de <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lanuevacuba.com\/nuevacuba\/notic-05-05-1003.htm\" class=\"gen\">l&rsquo;article de Robert D. Kaplan<\/a>, d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tNous nous attachons \u00e0 deux paragraphes \u00e0 la fin de ce long article, o\u00f9 Kaplan sugg\u00e8re ce que pourrait \u00eatre le r\u00f4le de l&rsquo;OTAN dans la perspective g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du changement du centre de gravit\u00e9 des int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques vitaux des USA qu&rsquo;il \u00e9voque, du Moyen-Orient vers le Pacifique. Pour Kaplan, l&rsquo;Europe n&rsquo;a de chance (?) de rester \u00e0 une bonne place dans les pr\u00e9occupations washingtoniennes que si elle fournit, non pas des bataillons suppl\u00e9tifs, mais des escadres navales suppl\u00e9tives aux ambitions US dans le Pacifique. Donc, l&rsquo;OTAN, regroupant les Europ\u00e9ens selon les vux washingtoniens, doit changer vite fait, passer de son statut actuel de dinosaure fossilis\u00e9 \u00e0 celui d&rsquo;une alliance navale aux ordres de PACOM (Pacific Command).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tBien : au moins, Kaplan ne se cache pas derri\u00e8re son petit doigt pour dire aux Europ\u00e9ens ce qu&rsquo;on attend d&rsquo;eux. Plus int\u00e9ressant encore, dans le registre des confidences : il nous dit ce qu&rsquo;il faut penser des efforts des Europ\u00e9ens pour former une d\u00e9fense europ\u00e9enne. Et il ne prend pas de gants, ce qui est bienvenu: cette initiative doit \u00eatre absolument liquid\u00e9e. Kaplan met les points sur les i: \u00ab <em>Let me be even clearer about something that policymakers and experts often don&rsquo;t want to be clear about.<\/em> \u00bb,  suit la prescription de liquidation des ambitions europ\u00e9ennes. Si l&rsquo;on prend en compte ce qu&rsquo;on a dit <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1580\" class=\"gen\">dans notre bloc-notes pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent<\/a> du cr\u00e9dit qu&rsquo;il faut accorder \u00e0 Kaplan, la confidence vaut de l&rsquo;or.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa voici (nous nous permettons de souligner de gras le passage le plus abruptement int\u00e9ressant pour nous autres, Europ\u00e9ens):<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>&#8230; The sea may be NATO&rsquo;s and Europe&rsquo;s best chance for a real military future. And yet the alliance is literally and symbolically weak. For it to regain its political significance, NATO must become a military alliance that no one doubts is willing to fight and kill at a moment&rsquo;s notice. That was its reputation during the Cold War and it was so well regarded by the Soviets that they never tested it. Expanding NATO eastward has helped stabilize former Warsaw Pact states, of course, but admitting substandard militaries to the alliance&rsquo;s ranks, although politically necessary, has been problematic. The more NATO expands eastward, the more superficial and unwieldy it becomes as a fighting force, and the more questionable becomes its claim that it will fight in defense of any member state. Taking in yet more substandard militaries like Ukraine&rsquo;s and Georgia&rsquo;s too soon is simply not in NATO&rsquo;s interest. We can&rsquo;t just declare an expansion of a defense alliance because of demonstrations somewhere in support of democracy. Rather, we must operate in the way we are now operating in Georgia, where we have sent in the Marines for a year to train the Georgian armed forces. That way, when a country like Georgia does make it into NATO, its membership will have military as well as political meaning. Only by making it an agile force that is ready to land on, say, West African beaches at a few days&rsquo; or hours&rsquo; notice can we save NATO.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>And we need to save it. NATO is ours to lead unlike the increasingly powerful European Union, whose own defense force, should it become a reality, would inevitably emerge as a competing regional power, one that might align itself with China in order to balance against us.<\/em> <strong><em>Let me be even clearer about something that policymakers and experts often don&rsquo;t want to be clear about. NATO and an autonomous European defense force cannot both prosper. Only one can and we should want it to be the former, so that Europe is a military asset for us, not a liability, as we confront China.<\/em><\/strong> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 24 mai 2005 \u00e0  10H15<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Puisque nous y sommes, poursuivons \u00e0 propos de l&rsquo;article de Robert D. Kaplan, d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment tr\u00e8s int\u00e9ressant. Nous nous attachons \u00e0 deux paragraphes \u00e0 la fin de ce long article, o\u00f9 Kaplan sugg\u00e8re ce que pourrait \u00eatre le r\u00f4le de l&rsquo;OTAN dans la perspective g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du changement du centre de gravit\u00e9 des int\u00e9r\u00eats strat\u00e9giques vitaux des&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66439","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66439","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66439"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66439\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66439"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66439"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66439"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}