24 mai 2005 — Nous aurions pu pr\u00e9senter le texte ci-dessous, du Dr. P.R. Kumaraswamy, de PINR<\/a>, comme ce qu’il est d’abord : une analyse des relations entre les USA et Isra\u00ebl en fonction des liens entre Isra\u00ebl et la Chine dans le domaine de l’armement (l’activit\u00e9 importante d’Isra\u00ebl comme fournisseur de syst\u00e8mes d’armement de technologies avanc\u00e9es \u00e0 la Chine). Nous pensons que l’approche bas\u00e9e sur la souverainet\u00e9 nationale est plus enrichissante : il faut lire ce texte avec \u00e0 l’esprit ce qu’il nous dit du probl\u00e8me de la souverainet\u00e9 nationale, — et, pour ce probl\u00e8me, Isra\u00ebl est un bon exemple, peut-\u00eatre le meilleur, avec la question qui s’impose aussit\u00f4t : Isra\u00ebl n’est-il pas en train de sacrifier sa substance, son \u00ab\u00a0\u00eatre\u00a0\u00bb (sa souverainet\u00e9 nationale) au profit d’une s\u00e9curit\u00e9 qui n’est alors plus qu’un leurre peut-\u00eatre mortel? Nous croyons savoir que certains parmi les dirigeants isra\u00e9liens se posent aujourd’hui tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieusement cette question, notamment devant l’activisme interventionniste de Washington (du Pentagone) qui veut le d\u00e9part de l’actuel ministre isra\u00e9lien de la d\u00e9fense.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n L’analyse nous montre, d’une part l’importance de ces relations de fourniture de syst\u00e8mes d’armement entre Isra\u00ebl et la Chine ; d’autre part, l’importance de cette question dans les relations entre les USA et Isra\u00ebl. On observe aussit\u00f4t que, d’une part, ces relations portant sur la livraison de ce qu’on consid\u00e8re comme de la \u00ab\u00a0quincaillerie\u00a0\u00bb d\u00e9terminent l’essentiel des rapports d\u00e9licats mais importants entre Isra\u00ebl et la Chine ; que, d’autre part, c’est le seul domaine où l’influence d’Isra\u00ebl sur les USA est r\u00e9duite \u00e0 rien, où les \u00ab\u00a0relations sp\u00e9ciales\u00a0\u00bb entre Isra\u00e9liens et Am\u00e9ricains, si louang\u00e9es ou si d\u00e9cri\u00e9es c’est selon, mais si souvent consid\u00e9r\u00e9es comme devant passer par-dessus tout, en r\u00e9alit\u00e9 ne passent plus du tout \u00ab\u00a0par-dessus tout\u00a0\u00bb. On dira, si l’on se pique de r\u00e9alisme froid : c’est parce que l’int\u00e9r\u00eat national des USA est en jeu et que cet int\u00e9r\u00eat prime tout. Ce n’est pas compl\u00e8tement exact. Il y a des actes, des domaines, où Washington, sous la pression des lobbies<\/em> et des partisans d’Isra\u00ebl au sein de son establishment<\/em>, passe sur certaines d\u00e9cisions qui ne rencontrent pas son int\u00e9r\u00eat et qui favorisent Isra\u00ebl. Il s’agit donc du fait bien d\u00e9termin\u00e9 des armements et de la haute technologie d’une part, de la Chine d’autre part : sur ces deux points, effectivement, Washington ne le c\u00e8de \u00e0 rien ni \u00e0 personne, fût-ce Isra\u00ebl. C’est un enseignement d’une importance capitale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n [Les Isra\u00e9liens feraient bien de m\u00e9diter, ce qu’ils font sans doute, cette observation qu’on trouve dans l’article de Robert D. Kaplan, auquel nous nous r\u00e9f\u00e9rons dans deux \u00ab\u00a0blocs-notes\u00a0\u00bb, l’un du 20 mai<\/a> et l’autre du 24 mai<\/a> : « The Middle East is just a blip. The American military contest with China in the Pacific will define the twenty-first century. And China will be a more formidable adversary than Russia ever was.<\/em> » Autant pour l’importance d’Isra\u00ebl … Kaplan note d’ailleurs cela explicitement par rapport \u00e0 la question de l’influence d’Isra\u00ebl \u00e0 Washington lorsqu’il \u00e9crit dans le corps de son article, \u00e0 propos des \u00ab\u00a0avantages\u00a0\u00bb de faire une belle et bonne guerre dans le Pacifique plut\u00f4t qu’au Moyen-Orient : « Our actions in the Pacific will not be swayed by the equivalent of the Israel lobby; Protestant evangelicals will care less about the Pacific Rim than about the fate of the Holy Land.<\/em> »]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Dans ce domaine des relations avec la Chine et du transfert des syst\u00e8mes d’arme de hautes technologies, Isra\u00ebl exp\u00e9rimente ce que peuvent avoir d’insupportables et d’indignes les relations avec les USA. Effectivement, on voit combien la souverainet\u00e9 nationale (d’Isra\u00ebl) peut \u00eatre trait\u00e9e comme un chiffon de papier par les Am\u00e9ricains (et par tous les Am\u00e9ricains, y compris Douglas Feith, n\u00e9o-conservateur, juif am\u00e9ricain, d\u00e9crit quasiment par ses ennemis comme un \u00ab\u00a0agent d’Isra\u00ebl\u00a0\u00bb : c’est pourtant lui qui m\u00e8ne la charge contre le minist\u00e8re de la d\u00e9fense isra\u00e9lien dans l’affaire du drone Harpy<\/em>, dont les d\u00e9tails sont donn\u00e9s dans le texte ci-dessous ; comme c’est un juif am\u00e9ricain, rabbin de surcroît, Dov Zakheim, qui avait obtenu pour le Pentagone en 1986, \u00e0 l’aide de pressions consid\u00e9rables, l’abandon de l’avion de combat Lavi<\/em> par les Isra\u00e9liens, parce que cet appareil risquait de concurrencer le F-16). Plus rien n’existe devant les exigences du complexe militaro-industriel lorsqu’il s’agit de deux domaines qui lui sont si chers jusqu’\u00e0 \u00eatre sa propre substance: la prochaine guerre, la \u00ab\u00a0vraie de vraie\u00a0\u00bb ; et puis le caract\u00e8re absolument sacr\u00e9, absolument intouchable des technologies de l’armement. Ces id\u00e9es nous conduisent \u00e0 la confirmation de l’\u00e9valuation que nous avons d\u00e9j\u00e0 faite de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 profonde des relations entre les USA et Isra\u00ebl : Isra\u00ebl est devenu (depuis l’abandon du Lavi<\/em> justement, impliquant un abandon massif de sa souverainet\u00e9 nationale), un appendice strat\u00e9gique et avanc\u00e9 du complexe militaro-industriel US, avec une structure politique fortement militaris\u00e9e<\/a> ; il d\u00e9pend du complexe, il n’a fondamentalement aucun v\u00e9ritable cadeau \u00e0 attendre du complexe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Nous r\u00e9p\u00e9tons qu’il existe aujourd’hui, — c’est un fait nouveau et important, — une inqui\u00e9tude forte en Isra\u00ebl \u00e0 ce propos et l’on trouve chez certains dirigeants ou experts, et chez certains industriels, la conviction qu’\u00e0 terme l’arrangement de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 qu’Isra\u00ebl devra mettre en place dans la r\u00e9gion devra se nouer hors de l’intervention continuellement d\u00e9structurante des USA. C’est admettre in fine<\/em> que la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 d’Isra\u00ebl, \u00e0 terme, ne d\u00e9pend pas de ses liens avec les USA mais, au contraire, de la rupture, ou, dans tous les cas, de la transformation profonde de ses liens avec les USA.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n D’une fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, nous voyons dans cette affaire la confirmation de trois faits :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • Les relations avec les USA mettent automatiquement en cause la souverainet\u00e9 nationale du partenaire non-US de l’association. Nous pensons que c’est un cas in\u00e9luctable, qui n’a rien \u00e0 voir avec un projet, un plan, un complot. C’est un cas quasiment de nature : le syst\u00e8me s\u00e9cr\u00e8te cette agression d’une fa\u00e7on naturelle.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • L’antagonisme des USA avec la Chine est d’une profondeur inou\u00efe. Il est difficile d’envisager qu’une telle tension d\u00e9bouchera sur autre chose qu’une crise majeure, presque in\u00e9luctablement de type militaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n • Les syst\u00e8mes d’arme, aujourd’hui, sont les porteurs fondamentaux, les symboles et les images de la souverainet\u00e9 nationale. S’en priver, pour ceux qui en produisent, revient \u00e0 un moment ou l’autre \u00e0 abdiquer leur souverainet\u00e9. C’est, par exemple, une le\u00e7on pour la France et, surtout, pour les adversaires de l’am\u00e9ricanisme qui croient judicieux d’ajouter \u00e0 cette position l’exigence de l’abandon de la puissance militaire et de la production de syst\u00e8mes d’arme pour leur propre pays. Un tel raisonnement implique d’accepter de se mettre \u00e0 la merci de l’am\u00e9ricanisme.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n By Dr. P.R. Kumaraswamy, PINR, 23 May 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n After months of hiatus, U.S.-Israel tension over China has returned. This time the dispute is over Israel’s desire to upgrade the Harpy assault drone that it had sold to China in the mid-1990s. The drones are capable of destroying radar stations and anti-aircraft batteries and the U.S. fears that they could upset the delicate strategic balance between China and Taiwan as well as its interests in the Asia-Pacific region.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n What was initially described as \u00ab\u00a0repairing\u00a0\u00bb later turned out to be \u00ab\u00a0upgrading\u00a0\u00bb thereby igniting a new controversy in bilateral relations. Citing a breach of trust and incomplete disclosure, the U.S. reacted strongly against Israel’s work on the drone. As the controversy continued, Chinese State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan visited Israel in December and invited Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to visit Beijing. This was the highest visit from China in nearly five years. There were even suggestions that contrary to American fears and misgivings, the deal would not only consolidate Sino-Israeli ties but also further American intelligence capabilities vis-\u00e0-vis China.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Israel, however, eventually bowed to American dictates. After weeks of wrangling, pressure tactics and behind the scene negotiations, the issue was resolved. While China was keen to upgrade the Harpy assault drone, the U.S. demanded Israel \u00ab\u00a0confiscate\u00a0\u00bb it. Israel settled for a compromise and, according to a senior Chinese official, returned the drone without upgrading.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n This, however, was not the first occasion when U.S.-Israel relations floated into rough waters over China. Since the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union, bilateral relations between the United States and Israel have been marked and marred by periodic controversies over Israel’s military relations with China.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Long before formal diplomatic relations were established in January 1992, both countries forged close military ties. Despite public acrimony and criticism over Israel’s policy vis-\u00e0-vis the Palestinians, China found Israel to be an important player in its drive for military modernization. The U.S.-led sanctions following the Tiananmen controversy merely enhanced Israel’s role as the proverbial \u00ab\u00a0backdoor\u00a0\u00bb to Western technology.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Likewise, Israel found China to be a prime customer, especially in the 1980s, when its lucrative arms markets in Latin America and South Africa were either drying up or becoming politically untenable. Strategically, the military sales to China smoothed the political differences between the countries and eventually paved the way for Sino-Israeli normalization in January 1992. Thus, both Israel and China benefited from increased military relations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n For its part, the U.S. was also an indirect player in the military saga. While demanding its European allies to continue military sanctions against China, it was indifferent toward the Sino-Israeli arms trade. Seeing the military route as a means of promoting the interests of the Jewish State, Washington was not concerned about Israel upgrading the Chinese military.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The end of the Cold War, however, altered erstwhile American indifference toward Sino-Israeli ties. It no longer needed Beijing as a counterweight to Moscow and Washington began to perceive Sino-Israeli relations, especially the military deals, as a threat to its interests in the Pacific region. The looming prospect of China emerging as a global player that could one day threaten American influence in Asia resulted in the U.S. becoming concerned over the entire development.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n One could argue over the rationale or logic behind the new American obsession with the Chinese threat. Given its strong economic interests and involvement in China, one could even question its wisdom in provoking an emerging power. It is, however, undeniable that Beijing occupies a prime position in American global interests, especially its policy toward the Asia-Pacific region.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n As a result, since the end of the Cold War both Republicans and Democrats started viewing Sino-Israeli military ties with suspicion and periodically sought to slowdown, contain and if possible scuttle any military deals between Israel and China. Unlike the past, mainstream American leadership, including those committed to strong U.S.-Israel relations began to disapprove of Sino-Israeli military ties.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n In early 1992, Israel was accused of the unauthorized transfer of American technology to China; the Washington Times argued that Israel had given China technological details on the Patriot anti-missile system that was deployed in Israel during the Kuwait crisis. Despite it being a strong ally, an official team was sent to Israel to verify the allegations. While the team was unable to confirm the allegations, the political damage was significant.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n This was followed by charges that Israel had retransferred U.S. technology from the Lavi fighter program to China. The Lavi fighter plane, that was to have been developed by Israel, depended heavily upon American funding and technology. Having eventually canceled the project under intense American pressure, Israel was later accused of seeking to export the Lavi-technology to China.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Then came the Phalcon controversy when Israel agreed to install the advanced early warning systems aboard a Russian platform. Under the deal, estimated at a billion dollars, Israel was to supply four such planes to China. This raised alarms in Washington, and Israel once again came under pressure. The Clinton administration, despite its friendliness toward Israel over the peace process, argued that the Phalcon would adversely affect American strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific. At one time, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak was even warned that annual American aid would be cut to express American anger and displeasure over his refusal to heed.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Eventually Barak buckled, and in July 2000, right in the middle of the Camp David talks with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Israel canceled the deal, apologized to Beijing and agreed to pay huge financial compensation for reneging on its commitment. In response, the U.S. agreed to Israel’s decision to sell the Phalcon to India. For its part, Israel agreed to exercise caution and exhibit transparency in its military dealings with China.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Yet, Israel could not avoid using the time-tested military means to regain the trust and confidence of China. Its ability to restore Sino-Israeli relations, especially against the background of growing international criticism and isolation due to the al-Aqsa Intifada, entirely depended upon the military route. Over the years, the military dimension has become the indicator to measure Israel’s relations with the outside world. For example, military sales play a pivotal role in the close ties that Israel maintains with Turkey and India. Hence, the Harpy upgrading; to avoid American suspicion, the deal was initially described as a \u00ab\u00a0repair\u00a0\u00bb rather than an \u00ab\u00a0upgrade.\u00a0\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Israel’s strategic decision to resume military deals with Beijing appears to have boomeranged. Israeli media admits that U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith, the third most senior official in the Pentagon, demanded the resignation of Amos Yaron, the top bureaucrat in Israel’s Defense Ministry, over the Harpy controversy. However, having learned from the Phalcon controversy, all parties decided to quietly resolve the dilemma.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The continuing nature of the Sino-Israeli-U.S. controversy underscores a number of important but often forgotten lessons. Astonishingly, Israel is yet to recognize and reconcile with the negative consequences of the end of the Cold War. It continues to dwell on the benefits of the new world order whereby countries like Syria were forced to seek a negotiated political settlement with the Jewish State.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n It is rarely recognized in Israel that the disappearance of the \u00ab\u00a0evil empire\u00a0\u00bb also meant Israel losing some of its relative importance to the U.S. This results in Israel not appreciating the new American concerns vis-\u00e0-vis China and its potential threats to American interests in the Pacific and elsewhere.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Moreover, by focusing on the non-American nature of its military exports to China, Israel is unable to comprehend the real issues involved. The problem is not whether they contain technology supported or funded by the U.S; indeed, both the Phalcon and Harpy programs do not appear to contain any American component or technology. Nevertheless, Israel’s dependence upon the United States has limited its foreign policy leverage when dealing with countries that Washington has strategic concerns over. This exposes Israel’s vulnerability.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n The controversies surrounding Sino-Israeli military ties and Israel eventually yielding to American demands also undermines Israel’s ability as a reliable arms supplier. At one level, Israel’s ability to promote its foreign policy vis-\u00e0-vis the rest of the world largely depends upon it being a reliable arms supplier. At the same, arms supplies to China bring Israel into a conflict situation vis-\u00e0-vis the U.S.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Israel is not the only country that faces growing American demands on strategic issues. Europe is facing the American music over the possible renewal of military sales to China, India over its bourgeoning energy ties with Iran, and China over its relations with North Korea.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n Israel, unfortunately, is more vulnerable than most. Therefore, so long as it depends upon Washington for political support, economic largess and strategic backing, Israel’s ability to pursue an independent arms export policy toward China will continue to be limited and circumspect.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n [Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, — \u00ab\u00a0Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only.\u00a0\u00bb.]<\/em><\/strong><\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La souverainet\u00e9 d’Isra\u00ebl face \u00e0 la menace US 24 mai 2005 — Nous aurions pu pr\u00e9senter le texte ci-dessous, du Dr. P.R. Kumaraswamy, de PINR, comme ce qu’il est d’abord : une analyse des relations entre les USA et Isra\u00ebl en fonction des liens entre Isra\u00ebl et la Chine dans le domaine de l’armement (l’activit\u00e9… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3343,4580,4338,4401],"class_list":["post-66440","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-feith","tag-harpy","tag-lavi","tag-zakheim"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66440","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66440"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66440\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66440"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66440"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66440"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}Return of the Red Card: Israel-China-U.S. Triangle<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n
Post-Cold War Chinese Fever<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Forgetting Lessons, Repeating History<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n
Conclusion<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n