article de Defense News<\/a> sur ce sujet du budget 2006.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t• \u00ab During subcommittee markup sessions last week, members decried the rising costs and technological troubles of some of the U.S. military’s most prized weapons, including the Navy’s DD(X) destroyer, the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS), the multiservice F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and even the Marine Corps’ VXX future presidential helicopter. <\/em>[…] Other programs the services have pushed despite immature technologies include the JSF and the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS)… The Air and Land Forces subcommittee cut $150 million from Lockheed’s JSF not a major reduction to the $5.6 billion requested for 2006, a subcommittee aide conceded.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tC’est la premi\u00e8re fois que le Congr\u00e8s prend une mesure structurelle officielle pour punir le JSF en lui \u00f4tant une partie de sa dotation budg\u00e9taire (une faible partie puisque le $150 millions valent pour \u00e0 peu pr\u00e8s 3% du budget 2006 du JSF : mesure symbolique, rien d’autre). C’est la d\u00e9marche habituelle, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral sans grande efficacit\u00e9 sinon le fait de servir d’avertissement, lorsque les parlementaires commencent \u00e0 s’inqui\u00e9ter des probl\u00e8mes rencontr\u00e9s par un programme ; mais c’est une bonne mesure des difficult\u00e9s que rencontre le programme JSF qui, elles, sont d\u00e9sormais s\u00e9rieuses et potentiellement d\u00e9stabilisantes. D\u00e9sormais, la crise du JSF est, pourrait-on dire, officialis\u00e9e. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t• Parlant d’une d\u00e9cision du Projection Force Subcommittee de la Chambre, Defense News<\/em> rapporte les d\u00e9tails suivants: \u00ab [T]he subcommittee voted to establish a $100 million Shipbuilding Industrial Base Improvement Program under which the U.S. government would buy advanced shipbuilding technology for shipyards. <\/em>[ Rep. Gene Taylor, D-Miss] said subcommittee members were taken aback when they visited European shipyards and found they were more technically advanced than U.S. yards. It should not be that way, he said. But U.S. shipyard owners do not want to invest in advanced technology because of the year-to-year uncertainty of the shipbuilding budget of the U.S. government. So the government will buy advanced equipment and provide it to the shipyards, Taylor said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tIl s’agit d’un constat important, m\u00eame s’il semble accessoire \u00e0 cause du domaine concern\u00e9, selon lequel l’industrie d’armement US joue de plus en plus selon la logique du profit et refuse les investissements technologiques n\u00e9cessaires. Cons\u00e9quence : c’est le pouvoir public qui r\u00e8gle la facture, en un exemple manifeste et manifestement ironique de la puret\u00e9 de l’application du dogme lib\u00e9raliste du c\u00f4t\u00e9 US. Cela ne r\u00e9soudra nullement le probl\u00e8me parce que la logique du profit infecte tout, y compris le travail de Recherches & D\u00e9veloppements quand les fonds sont disponibles. Accessoirement, on a une mesure de plus de la fiction totale qu’est l’affirmation de la sup\u00e9riorit\u00e9 US en mati\u00e8re de technologie sur l’Europe, en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral mesur\u00e9e \u00e0 plusieurs g\u00e9n\u00e9rations. Ce deuxi\u00e8me point renforce les remarques du premier sur le JSF, puisque ce programme est \u00e9galement soumis \u00e0 cette sorte de situation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 31 mai 2005 \u00e0 06H30<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 un coup d’oeil approfondi sur le budget du Pentagone pour l’ann\u00e9e 2006, tel que la Chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants vient de le voter le 25 mai, on trouve des d\u00e9tails r\u00e9v\u00e9lateurs d’une situation que les chiffres seuls n’expriment pas (au contraire, ils suscitent les exclamations admiratives des commentateurs europ\u00e9ens bien mal avis\u00e9s, comme \u00e0… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3285,250,4588,1205],"class_list":["post-66459","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-congres","tag-jsf","tag-technolopie","tag-transatlantique"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66459","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66459"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66459\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66459"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66459"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66459"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}