War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tDans ce livre, Solomon rapporte une d\u00e9claration valant pour hier et pour aujourd’hui du s\u00e9nateur Wayne Morse, au cours d’une r\u00e9union de la Commission des relations internationales du S\u00e9nat, le 27 f\u00e9vrier 1968. Le sujet \u00e0 l’ordre du jour \u00e9tait la guerre du Vi\u00eat-nam, alors entr\u00e9e dans une phase critique avec l’offensive du Tet que venait de d\u00e9clencher le Vietcong. A la fin de la session du 27 f\u00e9vrier 1968, il d\u00e9clara : \u00ab We’re going to become guilty, in my judgment, of being the greatest threat to the peace of the world. It’s an ugly reality, and we Americans don’t like to face up to it. I hate to think of the chapter of American history that’s going to be written in the future in connection with our outlawry in Southeast Asia.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tMorse (s\u00e9nateur de l’Oregon), adversaire acharn\u00e9 de la guerre du Vi\u00eat-nam, \u00e9tait un de ces rares politiciens am\u00e9ricains qui se caract\u00e9risent, psuycholohiquement et politiquement, par l’\u00e9tiquette ind\u00e9pendant (apr\u00e8s avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 inscrit au parti r\u00e9publicain puis au parti d\u00e9mocrate). En 1964, Morse avait \u00e9t\u00e9 l’un des deux seuls s\u00e9nateurs \u00e0 voter contre la r\u00e9solution du Golfe du Tonkin donnant au pr\u00e9sident l’\u00e9quivalent de pouvoirs de guerre au Vi\u00eat-nam, \u00e0 partir d’un incident (la soi-disant attaque contre le destroyer USS Lennox<\/em>) qui s’est av\u00e9r\u00e9 depuis \u00eatre un montage du Pentagone. Il d\u00e9clara \u00e0 la t\u00e9l\u00e9vision en 1964 : \u00ab I don’t know why we think, just because we’re mighty, that we have the right to try to substitute might for right. And that’s the American policy in Southeast Asia just as unsound when we do it as when Russia does it.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tDans son livre, Solomon d\u00e9crit comment les guerres sont devenues plus faciles \u00e0 faire pour les Etats-Unis, entre l’\u00e9poque du Vi\u00eat-nam et aujourd’hui. Pour autant, ni l’\u00e9tat d’esprit, ni les m\u00e9thodes ne sont nouvelles. La seule diff\u00e9rente entre aujourd’hui et hier, c’est qu’il n’y a plus de s\u00e9nateur Morse.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 4 juin 2005 \u00e0 13H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
L’excellent auteur, sp\u00e9cialiste am\u00e9ricain des m\u00e9dias et dissident c\u00e9l\u00e8bre Norman Solomon, publie un livre disponible \u00e0 partir de la mi-juin, War Made Easy: How Presidents and Pundits Keep Spinning Us to Death. Dans ce livre, Solomon rapporte une d\u00e9claration valant pour hier et pour aujourd’hui du s\u00e9nateur Wayne Morse, au cours d’une r\u00e9union de la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4597,1376,4400],"class_list":["post-66477","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-morse","tag-solomon","tag-wayne"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66477","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66477"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66477\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66477"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66477"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66477"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}