New Map<\/em> impliquait plusieurs crises simultan\u00e9es, avec l’Iran et la Cor\u00e9e du Nord principalement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tConnaissant l’administration GW, on pouvait s’attendre \u00e0 des initiatives radicales, des offensives d\u00e9cid\u00e9es, \u00e9ventuellement le feu nucl\u00e9aire qui semble tous les d\u00e9manger. Rien de semblable. Un des arbitres de ce jeu de guerre (War Game<\/em>) eut ce commentaire : \u00ab Astonishing. They are reacting like the Senate: talk, talk, talk, and letting China walk all over them.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tFinalement, la situation a pu \u00eatre contenue, tant il est \u00e9crit qu’\u00e0 Washington aucun exercice de crise ne se termine compl\u00e8tement au d\u00e9savantage de Washington. Apr\u00e8s que la Chine et l’Iran (et le Br\u00e9sil !) aient pris le dessus sur Washington, tout cela sans affrontement militaire (autre surprise), la diplomatie US r\u00e9ussit \u00e0 refaire le terrain perdu, cela sans plan particulier, en agissant simplement selon les normes diplomatiques. Finalement, Washington termina second de l’exercice (autre surprise, tout de m\u00eame), derri\u00e8re la Chine, mais, cette seconde place consid\u00e9r\u00e9e comme une victoire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab But ultimately China’s and Iran’s internal weaknesses put a brake on their ambitions. China was awarded first place in the game’, but only just, and America came a close second. So was the US losing? asked Mr Barnett, who believes in conciliating and not confronting China. From the point of view of the American people the presidents [in the game] would be pretty popular. Americans are not getting killed in a war and are not ‘meddling’. No major wars this is the definition of a happy ending. America was losing to win.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tL’Am\u00e9rique \u00ab was losing to win<\/em> \u00bb? Difficile de croire que la formule plaira aux n\u00e9o-conservateurs. Si cette formule semble renvoyer \u00e0 une \u00e9volution des capacit\u00e9s et des ambitions US (notamment en raison du revers irakien et l’\u00e9rosion de la puissance militaire US), la description de l’exercice montre surtout de la confusion, une domination grandissante des processus paralysants de la bureaucratie et l’action politique am\u00e9ricaine laiss\u00e9e aux habitudes retrouv\u00e9es de la diplomatie du d\u00e9partement d’\u00c9tat, sans consigne ni plan particuliers, simplement pour limiter les d\u00e9g\u00e2ts.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 5 juin 2005 \u00e0 13H10<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Dans ses \u00e9ditions du 4 juin, le Daily Telegraph de Londres d\u00e9crit un exercice de simulation de crise et de situation de guerre qui vient d’impliquer la direction am\u00e9ricaine (Maison-Blanche, d\u00e9partement d’\u00c9tat, Pentagone, etc). L’exercice New Map impliquait plusieurs crises simultan\u00e9es, avec l’Iran et la Cor\u00e9e du Nord principalement. Connaissant l’administration GW, on pouvait s’attendre… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3977,3299],"class_list":["post-66479","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chine","tag-coree"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66479","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66479"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66479\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66479"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66479"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66479"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}