{"id":66482,"date":"2005-06-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-06-06T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/06\/06\/lambassade-us-a-bagdad-ou-lobsession-de-la-force-protection\/"},"modified":"2005-06-06T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-06-06T00:00:00","slug":"lambassade-us-a-bagdad-ou-lobsession-de-la-force-protection","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/06\/06\/lambassade-us-a-bagdad-ou-lobsession-de-la-force-protection\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;ambassade US \u00e0 Bagdad, ou l&rsquo;obsession de la \u201cForce Protection\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Sur les $2,3 milliards que vont co\u00fbter en principe <a href=\"http:\/\/www.uruknet.info\/?p=12309&#038;hd=0&#038;size=1&#038;l=e\" class=\"gen\">l&rsquo;ambassade US en Irak<\/a> ($990 millions d\u00e9j\u00e0 d\u00e9pens\u00e9s, le reste \u00e0 venir), $690 millions sont pr\u00e9vus sous la rubrique \u00ab <em>logistical and security costs<\/em> \u00bb, soit pr\u00e8s d&rsquo;un tiers d&rsquo;un co\u00fbt d\u00e9j\u00e0 pharamineux. En fait, cette rubrique implique tous les co\u00fbts de protection de l&rsquo;ambassade, ce qu&rsquo;on appelle en jargon de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale : <em>Force Protection<\/em>. (Ce budget ne comprend pas les \u00e9quipements en \u00e9lectronique, \u00e9coute, espionnage, etc., qui sont distribu\u00e9s dans d&rsquo;autres rubriques.) Ce budget est sup\u00e9rieur au co\u00fbt global de l&rsquo;ambassade des Etats-Unis \u00e0 P\u00e9kin ($434 millions).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDans les ann\u00e9es 1960, y compris \u00e0 Sa\u00efgon o\u00f9 l&rsquo;ambassade \u00e9tait un v\u00e9ritable camp retranch\u00e9, les co\u00fbts de ce qui n&rsquo;\u00e9tait pas encore nomm\u00e9 <em>Force Protection<\/em> atteignait au maximum 10% du co\u00fbt g\u00e9n\u00e9ral, et se situait en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral autour de 5-6%.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tD&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, une estimation ind\u00e9pendant indique qu&rsquo;autour de 30-40% des mille Am\u00e9ricains (en plus de 400 Irakiens) stationn\u00e9s \u00e0 l&rsquo;ambassade sont affect\u00e9s \u00e0 cette m\u00eame t\u00e2che de s\u00e9curit\u00e9, dans tous les domaines possibles. L&rsquo;effectif global de l&rsquo;ambassade lorsque celle-ci se termin\u00e9e devrait atteindre 4.000 personnes dont autour de 3.000 Am\u00e9ricains. L&rsquo;ambassade am\u00e9ricaine de Bagdad est l&rsquo;arch\u00e9type des conceptions et de l&rsquo;action US dans ce pays : un espace retranch\u00e9, ultra-s\u00e9curis\u00e9, sans aucun rapport avec l&rsquo;ext\u00e9rieur, dont le travail concerne l&rsquo;activit\u00e9 des seuls Am\u00e9ricains dans le pays. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 6 juin 2005 \u00e0 14H00<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Sur les $2,3 milliards que vont co\u00fbter en principe l&rsquo;ambassade US en Irak ($990 millions d\u00e9j\u00e0 d\u00e9pens\u00e9s, le reste \u00e0 venir), $690 millions sont pr\u00e9vus sous la rubrique \u00ab logistical and security costs \u00bb, soit pr\u00e8s d&rsquo;un tiers d&rsquo;un co\u00fbt d\u00e9j\u00e0 pharamineux. En fait, cette rubrique implique tous les co\u00fbts de protection de l&rsquo;ambassade, ce&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66482","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66482","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66482"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66482\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66482"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66482"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66482"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}