{"id":66545,"date":"2005-06-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-06-27T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/06\/27\/comme-le-kgb-au-temps-de-brejnev\/"},"modified":"2005-06-27T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-06-27T00:00:00","slug":"comme-le-kgb-au-temps-de-brejnev","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/06\/27\/comme-le-kgb-au-temps-de-brejnev\/","title":{"rendered":"<strong><em>Comme le KGB au temps de Brejnev\u2026<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"common-article\">Comme le KGB au temps de Brejnev<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t27 juin 2005  Treize agents, ou contractants, sous mandat d&rsquo;arr\u00eat Ce n&rsquo;est pas Moscou-KGB, 1975, mais l&rsquo;Italie et ses juges en 2005. C&rsquo;est une situation \u00e9tonnante, contrastant \u00e9videmment avec toutes les bonnes paroles sans nombre que se dispense r\u00e9ciproquement la paire GW-Berlusconi depuis 2-3 ans. Cette affaire est particuli\u00e8rement significative, dans ses d\u00e9tails, des diff\u00e9rences de conceptions entre Europ\u00e9ens et Am\u00e9ricains (les Italiens \u00e9tant, dans ce cas, parfaitement europ\u00e9ens), et aussi significative de la diff\u00e9rence des perceptions du m\u00eame ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne : le terrorisme. Enfin, il y a la mise en \u00e9vidence du scandaleux comportement des Am\u00e9ricains, qui agissent d&rsquo;une fa\u00e7on compl\u00e8tement arbitraire, sans tenir aucun compte des accords pass\u00e9s, de la coordination n\u00e9cessaire, etc.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;article du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.iht.com\/articles\/2005\/06\/26\/news\/cia.php\" class=\"gen\">New York Times (repris dans l&rsquo;International Herald Tribune) d&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui<\/a> explique bien l&rsquo;affaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>The extraordinary decision by an Italian judge to order the arrest of 13 people linked to the CIA on charges of kidnapping a terrorism suspect here dramatizes a growing rift between American counterterrorism officials and their counterparts in Europe.<\/em>  <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>European counterterrorism officials have pursued a policy of building criminal cases against terrorism suspects through surveillance, wiretaps, detective work and the criminal justice system. The United States, however, has frequently used other means since Sept. 11, 2001, including renditions &#8211; abducting terror suspects from foreign countries and transporting them for questioning to third countries, some of which are known to use torture.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The two approaches seem to have collided for an Egyptian cleric, Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, or Abu Omar, accused of leading a militant mosque in Milan.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>By early 2003, the Italian secret police were aggressively pursuing a criminal terrorism case against Nasr, with the help of American intelligence officials. Italian investigators said they had told the Americans they had strong evidence that he was trying to build a terror recruitment network, possibly aimed for Iraq if the United States went forward with plans to topple Saddam Hussein. On Feb. 17, 2003, Nasr disappeared.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>When the Italians began investigating, they said, they were startled to find evidence that some of the CIA officers who had helped them investigate Nasr were involved in his abduction.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>&quot;We do feel quite betrayed that this operation was carried out in our city,&quot; a senior Italian investigator said. &quot;We supplied them information about Abu Omar, and then they used that information against us, undermining an entire operation against his terrorist network.&quot;<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>He and other senior Italian officials in the police and prosecutor&rsquo;s offices in Milan were angry enough to answer detailed questions about the case, but insisted on anonymity because the investigation was continuing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>&quot;This whole investigation has been very difficult because we&rsquo;ve been using the same methods we used against organized crime to trace the activities of people we considered to be our friends and colleagues,&quot; the senior Italian investigator said. &quot;It has been quite a troubling affair.&quot;<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The Italian warrants, requested by Milanese prosecutors after two years of investigations, accuse 13 people identified as CIA officers and operatives of illegally abducting Nasr from a Milan street and flying him to Egypt for questioning. The whereabouts of the 13 are unknown, but the charges are criminal. If convicted, they face a maximum penalty of 10 years and eight months in prison.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tAffaire extraordinaire et affaire qui ne sera pas sans suite,  outre l&rsquo;aspect judiciaire,  quant aux relations entre les Italiens (les Europ\u00e9ens) et les Am\u00e9ricains. C&rsquo;est la premi\u00e8re fois qu&rsquo;appara\u00eet de cette fa\u00e7on, si concr\u00e8te et pr\u00e9cise, l&rsquo;ab\u00eeme psychologique et strat\u00e9gique qui s\u00e9pare Europ\u00e9ens et Am\u00e9ricains sur la question du terrorisme. La r\u00e9action du juge italien montre que la situation \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard a atteint un point de rupture, un point de quasi-affrontement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe qui va \u00eatre mis en cause, c&rsquo;est non seulement la coop\u00e9ration entre Europ\u00e9ens et Am\u00e9ricains mais la fiabilit\u00e9 des Am\u00e9ricains en tant qu&rsquo;alli\u00e9s dans la coop\u00e9ration strat\u00e9gique, leur absence total de respect pour les int\u00e9r\u00eats de leurs alli\u00e9s, leur absence totale de respect pour la souverainet\u00e9 de leurs alli\u00e9s. L&rsquo;arrestation de treize personnes appartenant ou proches de la CIA est un cas pr\u00e9cis qui va d\u00e9cha\u00eener les passions et les comportements irrationnels. Les r\u00e9actions du c\u00f4t\u00e9 am\u00e9ricain vont \u00e9galement \u00eatre tr\u00e8s violentes, m\u00eame si elles sont infond\u00e9es. Un analyste europ\u00e9en, envisageant des cons\u00e9quences plus large, observait : \u00ab <em>Si les Italiens arr\u00eatent des gens de la CIA, comment voulez-vous qu&rsquo;une coop\u00e9ration, m\u00eame au niveau restreint o\u00f9 elle est actuellement, entre Italiens et Am\u00e9ricains dans le programme d&rsquo;avion de combat ultra-secret JSF ne provoque as une lev\u00e9e de bouliers au Congr\u00e8s?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Comme le KGB au temps de Brejnev 27 juin 2005 Treize agents, ou contractants, sous mandat d&rsquo;arr\u00eat Ce n&rsquo;est pas Moscou-KGB, 1975, mais l&rsquo;Italie et ses juges en 2005. C&rsquo;est une situation \u00e9tonnante, contrastant \u00e9videmment avec toutes les bonnes paroles sans nombre que se dispense r\u00e9ciproquement la paire GW-Berlusconi depuis 2-3 ans. Cette affaire est&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3104,4622,1267],"class_list":["post-66545","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-cia","tag-contreterrorisme","tag-terrorisme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66545","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66545"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66545\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66545"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66545"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66545"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}