La destruction de l’h\u00e9licopt\u00e8re MC-47 Chinook<\/a> a \u00e9t\u00e9 un signal qui a attir\u00e9 l’attention g\u00e9n\u00e9rale sur la situation en Afghanistan. L’analyse s’est largement r\u00e9pandue, comme celle du New York Times d’aujourd’hui<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab Government and American forces are facing some of the worst violence they have seen in three and a half years in Afghanistan. The violence continued on Friday and Saturday, as Taliban insurgents mounted a series of attacks in southern Afghanistan, news agencies reported.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLa BBC, \u00e9galement aujourd’hui, \t\u00ab There is always an increase in fighting with the arrival of spring – which melts the snow in the high passes and narrow defiles the militants use to slip back and forth – in many cases from the Pakistani tribal areas just across the border. It was the same story in the 1980s during the Soviet occupation.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb But US commanders had been suggesting this one would be much quieter. That they finally had the militants on the run. Instead, it has turned out to be one of the bloodiest periods in the past three years.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSituation classique. Les Am\u00e9ricains, confiants dans leur dispositif, n’ont rien venir. Ces erreurs se r\u00e9p\u00e8tent ad nauseam<\/em> et n’am\u00e8nent aucun commentaire particulier. Ce qui importe ici est de se demander comment, apr\u00e8s une victoire \u00e9crasante, une simili stabilisation, un simili passage \u00e0 la souverainet\u00e9 avec tout le processus habituel jusqu’\u00e0 l’\u00e9lection d’un pr\u00e9sident, avec la pr\u00e9sence de l’OTAN, de l’UE et de l’ONU, comment la situation d\u00e9bouche tout de m\u00eame sur une r\u00e9surgence de l’activit\u00e9 des talibans qu’on pensait marginalis\u00e9s en tant que force structur\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn savait que le pays \u00e9tait laiss\u00e9 aux seigneurs de la guerre, ce qui \u00e9tait une stabilisation par d\u00e9faut : aucune l\u00e9galit\u00e9 d\u00e9mocratique mais l’ordre assur\u00e9 par la force et le tribalisme. Par contre, les talibans constituent un \u00e9l\u00e9ment d\u00e9stabilisateur parce qu’ils n’ont pas leur place dans le sch\u00e9ma corruption-stabilisation \u00e9tabli par les USA en Afghanistan. D’o\u00f9 la question de savoir si l’Afghanistan ne va pas (r)ouvrir un second front tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieux, apr\u00e8s l’Irak, dans le dispositif am\u00e9ricain totalement incapable d’anticiper les coups malgr\u00e9 (ou \u00e0 cause de ?) sa puissance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 3 juillet 2005 \u00e0 15H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" La destruction de l’h\u00e9licopt\u00e8re MC-47 Chinook a \u00e9t\u00e9 un signal qui a attir\u00e9 l’attention g\u00e9n\u00e9rale sur la situation en Afghanistan. L’analyse s’est largement r\u00e9pandue, comme celle du New York Times d’aujourd’hui: \u00ab Government and American forces are facing some of the worst violence they have seen in three and a half years in Afghanistan. The… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66558","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66558","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66558"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66558\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66558"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66558"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66558"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}