{"id":66569,"date":"2005-07-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-07-06T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/07\/06\/tout-pour-le-petrole\/"},"modified":"2005-07-06T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-07-06T00:00:00","slug":"tout-pour-le-petrole","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/07\/06\/tout-pour-le-petrole\/","title":{"rendered":"Tout pour le p\u00e9trole.."},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>L&rsquo;affaire du rachat \u00e9ventuel de la firme californienne Unocal par le consortium public chinois CNOOC peut \u00eatre envisag\u00e9e sous diff\u00e9rents angles. Certes, tous ces angles peuvent \u00eatre pr\u00e9sents en m\u00eame temps, mais l&rsquo;essentiel est de distinguer celui qui pr\u00e9vaudra.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe site <em>WSWS.org<\/em> privil\u00e9gie l&rsquo;explication p\u00e9troli\u00e8re, comme \u00e9tant  <a href=\"http:\/\/www.wsws.org\/articles\/2005\/jul2005\/chin-j06.shtml\" class=\"gen\">la principale explication<\/a> capable de rendre compte de l&rsquo;importance de cette affaire. (L&rsquo;explication qui, justement, donne toute son importance \u00e0 cette affaire.) L&rsquo;analyse place cette affaire dans une perspective plus large, d&rsquo;affrontement entre des puissances concurrentes pour garantir leur approvisionnement en \u00e9nergie.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;analyse termine m\u00eame en rappelant la situation dans le Pacifique dans les ann\u00e9es 1935-41, les manuvres d&#8217;embargo des mati\u00e8res premi\u00e8res, menant jusqu&rsquo;\u00e0 l&rsquo;attaque de Pearl Harbor et la guerre du Pacifique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Whether or not the CNOOC bid for Unocal succeeds, the issue underscores the sharpening tensions over oil between all the major powers. At a certain point these frictions will spill over into military conflict. It is worth recalling that World War II in the Pacific was provoked by sharp rivalry between the US and Japan over economic interests in China. Washington imposed an oil blockade on Japan in 1941, confronting Tokyo with a blunt choice: complete capitulation or war. Months later, the Japanese military struck Pearl Harbour.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCette analyse est int\u00e9ressante, quoique cela ne soit pas celle que nous privil\u00e9gierons. Il n&rsquo;est bien entendu pas question de nier cette dimension p\u00e9troli\u00e8re (de tension p\u00e9troli\u00e8re), il est question de savoir la place qu&rsquo;on lui attribue dans cette affaire, et les perspectives \u00e0 envisager. Nous pr\u00e9senterons prochainement notre appr\u00e9ciation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 6 juillet 2005 \u00e0 16H32<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>L&rsquo;affaire du rachat \u00e9ventuel de la firme californienne Unocal par le consortium public chinois CNOOC peut \u00eatre envisag\u00e9e sous diff\u00e9rents angles. Certes, tous ces angles peuvent \u00eatre pr\u00e9sents en m\u00eame temps, mais l&rsquo;essentiel est de distinguer celui qui pr\u00e9vaudra. Le site WSWS.org privil\u00e9gie l&rsquo;explication p\u00e9troli\u00e8re, comme \u00e9tant la principale explication capable de rendre compte de&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3977,4626,4625],"class_list":["post-66569","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-chine","tag-cnooc","tag-unocal"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66569","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66569"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66569\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66569"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66569"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66569"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}