Il y a dans l’\u00e9valuation am\u00e9ricaine de la situation en Irak une constante recherche d’une situation qui leur permettrait d’afficher l’avis : tout va bien, mission accomplished<\/em>, nous rentrons chez nous. Il suffit donc que le rythme des attentats se r\u00e9duise pour qu’aussit\u00f4t on annonce que l’affaire est faite. Cette attitude touche m\u00eame des parties de l’Irak, sans tenir compte du reste de la situation du pays.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tBagdad, par exemple. Il y a eu moins d’attentats en juillet dans la ville. Du coup, les Am\u00e9ricains ont cru que la partie \u00e9tait gagn\u00e9e, dans tous les cas dans la capitale. Ils se sont pr\u00e9cipit\u00e9s pour l’annoncer (voir un article UPI\/Wasdhington Times du 9 juillet<\/a>). Un peu vite, un peu trop t\u00f4t, comme l’ont montr\u00e9 les attaques d’hier, dont un attentat \u00e0 la voiture pi\u00e9g\u00e9e qui a fait 33 morts. Voyez ce qu’en \u00e9crit le New York Times\/International Herald Tribune<\/a> du jour : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \t\u00ab For American hopes, the attack was a double blow. On Friday, the commander of U.S. troops in Baghdad, General William Webster of the 3rd Infantry Division, hailed the city’s relative calm in July, with only 10 car bombings, as a sign that a two-month crackdown by American and Iraqi troops had dealt the insurgents a major setback. Over the longer term, American commanders see reducing deaths among Iraqi recruits as crucial to building Iraqi forces’ morale and to advancing the moment when Iraqis can begin fighting the war on their own, and allow American troops to start withdrawing.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The scene at the recruiting center after the attack, shortly before 9 a.m., was a ghastly replay of earlier bombings that Iraqis working at Muthanna said have taken at least 100 lives. Witnesses spoke of bodies and severed limbs lying strewn about in pools of blood, panic-stricken survivors milling about shouting prayers to heaven, Iraqi soldiers firing into the air to drive back surging crowds, and American soldiers with leveled rifles pouring from Humvees in a desperate attempt to restore order.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tLe processus a une cause \u00e9vidente. Les Am\u00e9ricains ne songent qu’\u00e0 une chose : trouver une ouverture (une baisse de l’ins\u00e9curit\u00e9) pour proclamer la victoire, transmettre le fardeau de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 aux Irakiens et commencer leur \u00e9valuation (ou leur repli dans des bases-forteresses). L’inconv\u00e9nient du proc\u00e9d\u00e9, c’est la pr\u00e9cipitation, l’annonce pr\u00e9matur\u00e9e, l’occasion donn\u00e9e aux rebelles de relancer la violence en ridiculisant un peu plus la dialectique officielle am\u00e9ricaniste. C’est le cas une fois de plus, et, par cons\u00e9quent, un peu plus de perte de cr\u00e9dit pour les Am\u00e9ricains.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 11 juillet 2005 \u00e0 10H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Il y a dans l’\u00e9valuation am\u00e9ricaine de la situation en Irak une constante recherche d’une situation qui leur permettrait d’afficher l’avis : tout va bien, mission accomplished, nous rentrons chez nous. Il suffit donc que le rythme des attentats se r\u00e9duise pour qu’aussit\u00f4t on annonce que l’affaire est faite. Cette attitude touche m\u00eame des parties… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66587","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66587","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66587"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66587\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66587"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66587"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66587"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}