{"id":66609,"date":"2005-07-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-07-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/07\/19\/un-triste-spectacle-europeen-lue-face-a-liran-avec-les-usa-derriere-elle\/"},"modified":"2005-07-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-07-19T00:00:00","slug":"un-triste-spectacle-europeen-lue-face-a-liran-avec-les-usa-derriere-elle","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/07\/19\/un-triste-spectacle-europeen-lue-face-a-liran-avec-les-usa-derriere-elle\/","title":{"rendered":"Un triste spectacle europ\u00e9en: l’UE face \u00e0 l’Iran, avec les USA derri\u00e8re elle<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un triste spectacle europ\u00e9en: l’UE face \u00e0 l’Iran, avec les USA derri\u00e8re elle<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t19 juillet 2005 Nous publions ci-dessous un texte du sp\u00e9cialiste am\u00e9ricain des questions nucl\u00e9aires et de d\u00e9sarmement James Prather. Le texte, publi\u00e9 \u00e9galement sur le site LewRockwell.com le 15 juillet<\/a> donne une tr\u00e8s bonne appr\u00e9ciation critique sur l’\u00e9tat des n\u00e9gociations UE-Iran. Ci-apr\u00e8s, quelques indications sur Prather.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Physicist James Gordon Prather has served as a policy-implementing official for national security-related technical matters in the Federal Energy Agency, the Energy Research and Development Administration, the Department of Energy, the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Army. Dr. Prather also served as legislative assistant for national security affairs to U.S. Sen. Henry Bellmon, R-Okla. ranking member of the Senate Budget Committee and member of the Senate Energy Committee and Appropriations Committee. Dr. Prather had earlier worked as a nuclear weapons physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California and Sandia National Laboratory in New Mexico<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tPrather appuie son texte, notamment, sur la visite du ministre fran\u00e7ais Douste-Blazy \u00e0 Washington. La gentillesse bien connue du nouveau ministre fran\u00e7ais des affaires \u00e9trang\u00e8res n’a d’\u00e9gale que la nonchalance timide de son comportement dans les grandes affaires internationales. Rien pour \u00e9tonner: apr\u00e8s l’\u00e9pisode Barnier, l’\u00e9pisode Douste confirme que la diplomatie fran\u00e7aise elle-m\u00eame n’a plus aucune capacit\u00e9 d’affirmation. Le seul int\u00e9r\u00eat de cette situation est que le pr\u00e9sident fran\u00e7ais, \u00e9videmment ax\u00e9 sur les domaines r\u00e9serv\u00e9s et la politique ext\u00e9rieure, le sait bien, Douste, de m\u00eame que Barnier, ne trompant personne \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans tous les cas, le spectacle que nous pr\u00e9sente Prather nous rappelle la position g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de l’Europe vis-\u00e0-vis des Etats-Unis. Ceux qui, \u00e0 Bruxelles, s’interrogent \u00e0 propos du peu de popularit\u00e9 de l’Europe chez les Europ\u00e9ens, trouveront peut-\u00eatre l\u00e0 un \u00e9l\u00e9ment de r\u00e9ponse. Mais sugg\u00e9rer cela, n’est-ce pas faire, comment dit-on? Ah oui, de l’antiam\u00e9ricanisme primaire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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The Meddling Rice<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\tBy Gordon Prather, 15 July 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEven after years of go-anywhere see-anything inspections, Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, continues to report to the IAEA Board of Governors that he can find no indication that Iran now has, ever had, or intends to have a nuclear weapons program. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNevertheless, last week Secretary of State Condi Rice \u00a0\u00bbdetermined\u00a0\u00bb pursuant to Presidential Directive 12938, as amended that the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran had engaged in activities or transactions that materially contributed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whereupon Treasury Secretary Snow immediately \u00a0\u00bbblocked\u00a0\u00bb all the Iranian agency’s U.S. assets. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOf course, it’s doubtful that the Atomic Energy Agency had any assets in the U.S. to seize. So, why did Bush-Rice-Snow bother to seize them? <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tApparently, so Bush could threaten this week to seize pursuant to Presidential Directive 12938, as amended all the U.S. assets of any foreign company that provides (or attempts to provide) financial, material, technological or other support to the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFrance’s new foreign minister, Philippe Douste-Blazy, was in Washington to \u00a0\u00bbreview\u00a0\u00bb with Condi the state of the \u00a0\u00bbParis negotiations\u00a0\u00bb between the European Union and Iran. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLast November, France, Germany and the United Kingdom as agents for the European Union began negotiations with Iran on \u00a0\u00bba mutually acceptable long-term arrangement\u00a0\u00bb that would a) provide \u00a0\u00bbobjective guarantees\u00a0\u00bb to the EU that Iran’s nuclear program was exclusively for peaceful purposes, b) guarantee future EU-Iranian nuclear, technological and economic \u00a0\u00bbcooperation\u00a0\u00bb as well as c) provide \u00a0\u00bbfirm commitments\u00a0\u00bb by the EU to Iran \u00a0\u00bbon security issues.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNow, the key to preventing nuke proliferation is the international control of the acquisition and chemical\/physical transformation of certain \u00a0\u00bbnuclear\u00a0\u00bb materials. In return for a promise not to acquire or seek to acquire nuclear weapons, the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons recognizes the \u00a0\u00bbinalienable right\u00a0\u00bb of all signatories to acquire and transform those materials, subject to oversight by the IAEA Safeguards regime. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe EU-Iran negotiating agreement reaffirmed Iran’s \u00a0\u00bbinalienable right\u00a0\u00bb under the NPT to acquire and operate subject to the IAEA Safeguards regime any and all nuclear fuel-cycle facilities. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHowever, as a \u00a0\u00bbconfidence building measure,\u00a0\u00bb Iran volunteered to temporarily suspend its IAEA Safeguarded fuel-cycle activities and invited the IAEA to \u00a0\u00bbverify\u00a0\u00bb to the EU that suspension. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHowever, the Iranians made it very clear that under no circumstances would they permanently suspend all nuclear fuel-cycle facilities. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo, at best the EU can hope the Iranians would agree to EU-Iranian co-production co-ownership arrangements for reactors and other fuel-cycle facilities. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHence, if the EU-Iranian talks are successful, numerous European entities many having substantial U.S. assets will be providing financial, material, technological and other support to the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNevertheless, at a joint press conference Douste-Blazy pledged to continue \u00a0\u00bbconsulting\u00a0\u00bb with Condi as the Europeans prepare a new proposal, which \u00a0\u00bbmight\u00a0\u00bb include security guarantees for Iran. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDouste-Blazy noted that for the EU to give Iran such \u00a0\u00bbsecurity guarantees\u00a0\u00bb which is Iran’s \u00a0\u00bbultimate objective\u00a0\u00bb in the negotiations it would be necessary for the U.S. to endorse those guarantees. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo, obviously, Condi had summoned Douste-Blazy to Washington to tell him that the success of the EU-Iranian negotiations was her \u00a0\u00bbultimate objective.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnd, that she had been mistaken when she \u00a0\u00bbdetermined\u00a0\u00bb just a few days before that the Iranians were using the Safeguarded nuclear programs at their Atomic Energy Agency to hide a secret nuke program.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnd, that President Bush had absolutely no intention of seizing the U.S. assets of any European entity public or private that was a party to any \u00a0\u00bbmutually acceptable long-term arrangement\u00a0\u00bb with the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tObviously! <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut then Douste-Blazy declared, \u00a0\u00bbOur ultimate objective is to insure that there is a suspension of the enrichment and reprocessing of hazardous nuclear material.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWhoa! Up until now, that hasn’t been the EU \u00a0\u00bbultimate objective.\u00a0\u00bb Re-establishment of normal banking and trade relations with Iran disrupted for more than 20 years by U.S. sanctions on European entities that have attempted to do business in Iran and with Iranians has been. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo, what did Condi actually tell Douste-Blazy? <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00a0\u00bbWell, the Paris agreement is initially about suspension. But ultimately, the world has to be assured that Iran cannot have this [nuclear fuel-cycle] capability. And that there will ultimately have to be objective guarantees, and we believe that means cessation.\u00a0\u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThat tears it. No EU offer that makes that voluntary suspension an enforced cessation will be acceptable to the Iranians. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo, thanks to Condi’s \u00a0\u00bbdetermination,\u00a0\u00bb there won’t be a EU-Iranian agreement. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un triste spectacle europ\u00e9en: l’UE face \u00e0 l’Iran, avec les USA derri\u00e8re elle 19 juillet 2005 Nous publions ci-dessous un texte du sp\u00e9cialiste am\u00e9ricain des questions nucl\u00e9aires et de d\u00e9sarmement James Prather. Le texte, publi\u00e9 \u00e9galement sur le site LewRockwell.com le 15 juillet donne une tr\u00e8s bonne appr\u00e9ciation critique sur l’\u00e9tat des n\u00e9gociations UE-Iran. Ci-apr\u00e8s,… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[1280],"class_list":["post-66609","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-douste-blazy"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66609","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66609"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66609\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66609"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66609"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66609"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}