{"id":66657,"date":"2005-08-01T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-08-01T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/01\/maintenant-quon-a-signe-avec-moscou-us-go-home\/"},"modified":"2005-08-01T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-08-01T00:00:00","slug":"maintenant-quon-a-signe-avec-moscou-us-go-home","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/01\/maintenant-quon-a-signe-avec-moscou-us-go-home\/","title":{"rendered":"Maintenant qu&rsquo;on a sign\u00e9 avec Moscou, \u201cUS Go Home\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Rude coup pour les plans du Pentagone et de Washington. L&rsquo;Ouzbekistan a donn\u00e9 six mois aux USA pour quitter la grande base de Karshi-Khanabad, ou K2, \u00e9tablie peu apr\u00e8s l&rsquo;attaque du 11 septembre 2001 pour servir de support essentiel \u00e0 l&rsquo;offensive am\u00e9ricaine (avec les alli\u00e9s <em>ad hoc<\/em>, comme dit Rumsfeld) contre l&rsquo;Afghanistan.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPourtant, tout semblait marcher comme sur des roulettes. Certes le pr\u00e9sident Karimov \u00e9tait ce qu&rsquo;on sait qu&rsquo;il est, mais c&rsquo;\u00e9tait la version postmoderne de la fameuse phrase des ann\u00e9es cinquante concernant un dictateur sud-am\u00e9ricain attentif aux am\u00e9ricains (<em>He&rsquo;s a bastard but he&rsquo;s our bastard<\/em>). Puis, au mois de mai, Karimov a exag\u00e9r\u00e9: des massacres un peu trop voyants. Apr\u00e8s un moment d&rsquo;h\u00e9sitation, Washington s&rsquo;est souvenu que la d\u00e9mocratie et les droits de l&rsquo;homme constituaient son fond de commerce pr\u00e9f\u00e9r\u00e9. Washington a fronc\u00e9 les sourcils. Poutine en a profit\u00e9 pour pousser son avantage aupr\u00e8s de l&rsquo;affreux Karimov. <a href=\"http:\/\/news.independent.co.uk\/europe\/article302912.ece\" class=\"gen\">Badaboum !<\/a>:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>The United States has been given six months to shut its airbase in the central Asian state of Uzbekistan in an ultimatum that is a snub to Washington and a boost for Russia which has been deeply uneasy about the presence of the US military in an area it considers its back yard.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tQuant \u00e0 l&rsquo;accord que viennent de signer Russes et Ouzbecks, c&rsquo;est \u00e9galement dans l&rsquo;intention d&rsquo;\u00e9carter un peu les envahissants Am\u00e9ricains (et les Occidentaux), selon l&rsquo;ancien ambassadeur britannique \u00e0 Tachkent Craig Murray : \u00ab <em>This is about the Karimov regime&rsquo;s decision to turn to Gazprom and the Russians, not the US, to develop Uzbekistan&rsquo;s oil and gas. This deal was brokered between the President&rsquo;s daughter, Gulnara Karimova, and Alisher Usmanov, the Uzbek-born Russian who bought 27 per cent of Corus <\/em>[British Steel]. <em>They were concerned that Western companies could build centres of wealth not under their direct control. They have decided to turn to Russian and Chinese state companies for investment.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEn langage de la CIA, on nomme cela <em>Blowback<\/em>, ou bien coup de fouet en retour si vous voulez: lorsque les avantages saisis sans m\u00e9nagement, par le jeu de la force pure, deviennent impossibles \u00e0 maintenir sans vous exposer \u00e0 des contradictions insupportables,  et lorsque les autres, bouscul\u00e9s un instant, d\u00e9cident d&rsquo;en profiter pour tirer quelques marrons du feu \u00e0 votre d\u00e9savantage.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 1er ao\u00fbt 2005 \u00e0 15H40<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Rude coup pour les plans du Pentagone et de Washington. L&rsquo;Ouzbekistan a donn\u00e9 six mois aux USA pour quitter la grande base de Karshi-Khanabad, ou K2, \u00e9tablie peu apr\u00e8s l&rsquo;attaque du 11 septembre 2001 pour servir de support essentiel \u00e0 l&rsquo;offensive am\u00e9ricaine (avec les alli\u00e9s ad hoc, comme dit Rumsfeld) contre l&rsquo;Afghanistan. Pourtant, tout semblait&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66657","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66657","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66657"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66657\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66657"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66657"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66657"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}