{"id":66661,"date":"2005-08-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-08-03T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/03\/un-rythme-revolutionnaire-en-amerique-latine\/"},"modified":"2005-08-03T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-08-03T00:00:00","slug":"un-rythme-revolutionnaire-en-amerique-latine","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/03\/un-rythme-revolutionnaire-en-amerique-latine\/","title":{"rendered":"Un rythme r\u00e9volutionnaire en Am\u00e9rique Latine<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Un rythme r\u00e9volutionnaire en Am\u00e9rique Latine<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t3 ao\u00fbt 2005 Le Dr. Michael A. Weinstein pr\u00e9sente (son Intelligence Brief: Caribbean Spheres of Influence<\/em>, sur PINR, le 2 ao\u00fbt<\/a>) une analyse de la situation dans les Cara\u00efbes apr\u00e8s deux \u00e9v\u00e9nements: le vote par la Chambre des repr\u00e9sentants US du trait\u00e9 de libre-\u00e9change avec la zone des Cara\u00efbes (CAFTA) le 24 juillet et la r\u00e9union le 25 juillet (plus une r\u00e9union minist\u00e9rielle les 27-28 juillet) de l’Association des \u00c9tats des Cara\u00efbes (Association of Caribean States, ou ACS).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes deux \u00e9v\u00e9nements sont mis en parall\u00e8le et en concurrence par Weinstein. Cet analyste fait de leur confrontation, fort justement, un chapitre important d’une confrontation nord-sud entre les deux Am\u00e9riques, celle que dominent les USA et celle qui, aujourd’hui, est entr\u00e9e en dissidence de l’influence am\u00e9ricaine (la quasi-unanimit\u00e9 de l’Am\u00e9rique du Sud, autour du Br\u00e9sil de Lula et du Venezuela de Chavez). C’est une analyse d’autant plus acceptable que les deux structures pr\u00e9sent\u00e9es sont de cr\u00e9ation r\u00e9cente (l’ACS a \u00e9t\u00e9 cr\u00e9\u00e9e en 1994, pour CAFTA cela va de soi puisque c’est un trait\u00e9 en discussion), donc qu’elles expriment parfaitement les th\u00e8ses actuellement d\u00e9battues et les situations en \u00e9volution. Weinstein constate que le sommet du 25 juillet a \u00e9t\u00e9 un succ\u00e8s \u00e9tourdissant pour Chavez et sa proposition, son plan PetroCaribe<\/em>‘ qui offre une alimentation en \u00e9nergie aux pays des Cara\u00efbes \u00e0 des conditions tr\u00e8s avantageuses. Le succ\u00e8s de Chavez est compl\u00e8tement symbolis\u00e9 par cette d\u00e9claration du dernier pays sud-am\u00e9ricain qui est class\u00e9 comme un alli\u00e9 tr\u00e8s proche de Washington, la Colombie, avec son pr\u00e9sident Alvara Uribe disant: \u00ab I can envision Venezuela playing a great leadership role.<\/em> \u00bb Le succ\u00e8s de GW Bush avec le vote de CAFTA reste un \u00e9v\u00e9nement interne \u00e0 la vie politique US et ne suffit pas, en lui-m\u00eame, \u00e0 proposer un rythme r\u00e9volutionnaire contre l’offensive ACS. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCes constats peuvent \u00eatre faits:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• On peut d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 parler d’affrontement entre nord et sud dans les deux Am\u00e9riques, ce qui repr\u00e9sente un extraordinaire prolongement politique: en deux-trois ann\u00e9es, un bloc du sud s’est form\u00e9, sans que Washington puisse le contrecarrer en aucune fa\u00e7on. Lorsqu’on se rappelle l’\u00e9tat de d\u00e9pendance (des USA) de la zone depuis le XIX\u00e8me si\u00e8cle et jusqu’\u00e0 la fin des ann\u00e9es 1990, on mesure la rapidit\u00e9 de l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement. Inutile d’ajouter quelle le\u00e7on de puissance, de courage et de dignit\u00e9<\/a> ce prolongement repr\u00e9sente pour l’Europe bavarde, irresponsable et soumise \u00e0 la ligne am\u00e9ricaniste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La r\u00e9gion des Cara\u00efbes (\u00e0 laquelle certains pays du bloc du sud appartiennent par le biais de leur appartenance \u00e0 l’ACS) semble \u00eatre le point de friction des deux blocs, mais avec des points r\u00e9gionaux en suspens, qui peuvent conduire \u00e0 un apport d\u00e9cisif \u00e0 l’\u00e9volution de la situation, c’est notamment le cas du Mexique malgr\u00e9 sa position de promoteur de CAFTA, avec l’\u00e9lection de l’ann\u00e9e prochaine qui peut aboutir \u00e0 un renversement de sa politique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Car l’enjeu est politique, certes. Il est d\u00e9j\u00e0 extraordinaire que le bloc du sud ait r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 faire la perc\u00e9e r\u00e9alis\u00e9e \u00e0 l’ACS, selon des termes \u00e9conomiques certes, mais dont la lecture politique doit \u00eatre imp\u00e9rative. M\u00eame dans la zone des Cara\u00efbes, et malgr\u00e9 CAFTA, Washington est sur la d\u00e9fensive.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La zone des Cara\u00efbes est d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 divis\u00e9e elle-m\u00eame en deux blocs (les adh\u00e9rents \u00e0 CAFTA et ceux qui acceptent la proposition du Venezuela), avec certains pays ayant un pied dans chaque bloc. Le vote de CAFTA par la Chambre, in extremis<\/em> (217 voix contre 215), contient pour l’instant le danger pour Washington, mais d’une fa\u00e7on d\u00e9fensive et sur des bases fragiles (le soutien int\u00e9rieur \u00e0 CAFTA est lui-m\u00eame, aux USA, extr\u00eamement al\u00e9atoire). Finalement, cette mesure de containment<\/em> \u00e9conomique d\u00e9fensif (un paradoxe pour un trait\u00e9 de libre-\u00e9change par nature offensif) a un impact politique en exacerbant justement la dimension politique de l’affrontement, l\u00e0 o\u00f9 les arguments du sud (autonomie et coop\u00e9ration politiques) sont beaucoup plus populaires que ceux du nord (soumission \u00e0 la ligne am\u00e9ricaniste).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDans le texte ci-dessous, Weinstein pr\u00e9sente cet \u00e9pisode de la fin juillet, d’une situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale dont la rapidit\u00e9 d’\u00e9volution est \u00e9tonnante.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

Caribbean Spheres of Influence<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Michael A. Weinstein, PINR, 2 August 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWidening and deepening competition for spheres of influence in the Western Hemisphere became evident during the week of July 25 with the summit meeting of the Association of Caribbean States (A.C.S.) and the passage of legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives approving the Central American Free Trade Agreement (C.A.F.T.A.).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThrough the election of center-left governments pledged to implementing social welfare and import substitution models of economic development, in place of the neo-liberal free trade paradigm, in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay, in addition to the election of Hugo Chavez, who promotes a more radical model of cooperativism, to Venezuela’s presidency, Washington’s leadership in the hemisphere has been credibly challenged over the past several years.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe rise of the center-left and populist left in South America has opened up a north-south split and a resulting competition between the two sides that reaches its flash point in Central America and the Caribbean the border between the two power blocs where they contend for dominant influence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWith their high poverty and unemployment rates, and their lack of military power, the states of Central America and the Caribbean are dependent upon more prosperous and stronger outside powers for their economic sustenance and development, and their security. In turn, the powers of the north and south of the hemisphere bid for the allegiance of the weaker states in the center.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIn part, the north-south competition is a normal development of power politics the rise of Brazil’s economic power and the use by Caracas of Venezuela’s petroleum-created wealth for geostrategic purposes inexorably leads to a rebalancing of hemispheric power. The general tendency toward multipolarity is compounded by clashing models of economic development that reflect conflicts generated by domestic and national interests of the contending sides.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tA.C.S. Summit<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tFounded in 1994 and including 25 states in and bordering the Caribbean Sea, the A.C.S. is committed to fostering consultation, cooperation and concerted actionamong its members. One of the maze of regional organizations that have sprung up around the world since the fall of the Soviet Union and the consequent collapse of the bipolar configuration of world power, the A.C.S. has functioned as a consultative forum and has made only small steps toward integration and none toward concerted action.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe A.C.S. has remained a forum because of the divergent interests of its members that reflect the pushes and pulls of the north-south split. The north projects itself into the organization through Mexico, a partner in the Washington-led North American Free Trade Agreement (N.A.F.T.A.). The south is present through Venezuela, which pursues an assertive policy of oil diplomacy. The weaker states in the middle have divided allegiances, with market-oriented center-right governments primarily in Central America supporting Washington, and the Caribbean islands and Panama leaning toward Caracas because of its provision of subsidized oil to them.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAlthough the A.C.S. cannot be expected to be a vehicle of concerted action, it is politically significant as an arena in which the competing powers can bid for influence among the member states. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe north-south split was starkly apparent at the A.C.S. summit of heads of government and top cabinet ministers held in Panama City on July 28-29. The major news from the summit was the push by Caracas of its PetroCaribe’ plan, which offers Central American and Caribbean states crude oil on favorable terms. Venezuelan Foreign Secretary Ali Rodriguez announced that Caracas was ready to expand its program by tailoring deals to the particular conditions and needs of each participating state: We can use methods from the most ancient to the most modern to achieve these types of exchanges. Those methods include credits, subsidized prices and barter exchanges.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCaracas’ oil diplomacy won wide support at the summit. Thirteen of the 15 island countries in the A.C.S. have already signed on to PetroCaribe, Panama is in negotiations and even Washington’s chief ally in South America, Columbian President Alvara Uribe, said: I can envision Venezuela playing a great leadership role.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMexico City’s response to Caracas came in Mexican President Vicente Fox’s call for a strategic alliance based on free trade and open markets, and investment protection accords that would give Mexican business interests in construction, manufacturing and telecom greater access to the region. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn balance, Caracas made headway at the summit at the expense of Mexico City and Washington. While the six C.A.F.T.A. states in the region Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic remained on the side of the north, the rest of the A.C.S. members solidified their ties with and support of the south on the basis of the tangible benefits provided by Caracas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tC.A.F.T.A.<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn the day before the A.C.S. summit convened, the U.S. House of Representatives approved U.S. membership in C.A.F.T.A. by a razor-thin majority of 217-215. The agreement, which lowers tariffs on U.S. agricultural goods, had run into determined opposition in Congress mounted by a coalition of sugar growers, textile manufacturers, labor unions, and human rights, labor rights and environmentalist groups.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWith the Central American and Caribbean members of C.A.F.T.A. already receiving favorable trade terms from Washington, formalizing the agreement has the economic consequence of helping domestic interests in the U.S. The Bush administration pushed hard for C.A.F.T.A. not only to reward those interests, but to lock the Central American and Caribbean members into a firm relation with Washington in order to ensure that regional trade remains geared to the U.S. and to forestall the spread of Caracas’ sphere of influence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tHad Congress failed to approve C.A.F.T.A., the center-right governments in the region that had signed on to the agreement would have suffered a loss of credibility and overall U.S. trade policy would have been placed in jeopardy. As it stands, growing economic nationalism in the U.S. probably means that C.A.F.T.A. will be the high watermark of Washington’s neo-liberal strategy.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tThe Bottom Line<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe inroads made by Caracas’ oil diplomacy at the A.C.S. summit and the passage of C.A.F.T.A. in the U.S. Congress have sharpened the divide in the Caribbean region between pro-north and pro-south states. With Washington seemingly unwilling to offer incentives to oil-dependent states in the region, Caracas is free to create its solidarity coalition, but will be blocked in efforts to expand it by the C.A.F.T.A. states as long as they retain governments favorable to Washington.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe outcome of the competition for spheres of influence in the Caribbean region will be in great part determined by the domestic politics of the region’s states whether the balance of power between center-right and center-left and left governments shifts appreciably. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Un rythme r\u00e9volutionnaire en Am\u00e9rique Latine 3 ao\u00fbt 2005 Le Dr. Michael A. Weinstein pr\u00e9sente (son Intelligence Brief: Caribbean Spheres of Influence, sur PINR, le 2 ao\u00fbt) une analyse de la situation dans les Cara\u00efbes apr\u00e8s deux \u00e9v\u00e9nements: le vote par la Chambre des repr\u00e9sentants US du trait\u00e9 de libre-\u00e9change avec la zone des Cara\u00efbes… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[2947,3304,3313],"class_list":["post-66661","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-amerique","tag-chavez","tag-latine"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66661","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66661"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66661\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66661"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66661"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66661"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}