\t4 ao\u00fbt 2005 La spirale est entam\u00e9e et nous ne la verrons plus cesser. Le JSF est entr\u00e9 dans la zone du tous les coups sont permis, et les hypoth\u00e8ses vont d\u00e9sormais bon train. Bien s\u00fbr, hypoth\u00e8ses de r\u00e9duction, d’abandon de telle ou telle version, etc. Parfois, comme dans cet article d’Aviation Week & Space Technology du 8 ao\u00fbt<\/a> que nous citons aujourd’hui, le journaliste ajoute, par sympathie pour les amis : \u00ab Terminating <\/em>[this version of the JSF] could jeopardize relationships with partner countries.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCe m\u00eame article consacre ces passages au JSF:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab A slew of options to find funding for Fiscal 2007 and beyond are zipping through the Pentagon, including a significant retooling of the $245-billion Joint Strike Fighter program that would radically change USAF’s buy and affect the plans of foreign partners…<\/em> […]<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The Pentagon’s civilian leadership has begun to float a proposal to kill the conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) portion of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, forcing USAF to buy the Navy’s carrier version, according to Loren Thompson, chief operating officer for the Washington-based Lexington Institute think tank. Thompson has also done some consulting work for Lockheed Martin, the JSF prime contractor. The Pentagon is planning to buy more than 2,400 JSFs, 1,763 of them for the Air Force. The CTOL variant accounts for about 72% of the domestic buy. Terminating it would alter pricing for the entire program and could jeopardize relationships with partner countries.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The Navy and Marines have also offered a proposal in the Quadrennial Defense Review to fly Air Force F-35s off of Navy carriers to access areas outside the reach of strike aircraft at land bases. USAF, however, rejects both ideas. We don’t want the Navy version, because it costs about 38% more and the performance isn’t what we’d like, Jumper says. Only an extreme situation, he adds, would require USAF to operate from a carrier. The need to do that would be if somehow there wasn’t enough volume in the Navy and Marine Corps to do the job. Now, I can’t picture why that would be.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDans un autre article du m\u00eame num\u00e9ro, AW&ST c\u00e9l\u00e8bre les b\u00e9n\u00e9fices consid\u00e9rables du dernier trimestre des soci\u00e9t\u00e9s US d’armement, au premier rang desquelles on trouve Lockheed Martin, le ma\u00eetre d’uvre du JSF. (\u00ab Net income was up 56% from a year earlier, to $461 million ($1.02 a share), profit margins rose, and the company increased its earnings estimate for the full year. What a quarter, marveled JSA Research analyst Peter J. Arment. Way above expectations.<\/em> \u00bb) Mais l’optimisme s’arr\u00eate l\u00e0, et c’est justement la caract\u00e9ristique de l’article: les perspectives s’assombrissent brusquement et, dans ce cas \u00e9galement, on retrouve le JSF (avec l’in\u00e9vitable F\/A-22, \u00e9galement candidat certain \u00e0 des r\u00e9ductions) comme cause principale des d\u00e9boires probables de Lockheed Martin: \u00ab Lockheed Martin faces even more exposure to budget cuts. It derives nearly one-fifth of its sales from two fighter programs that could be targeted: the F\/A-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe m\u00eame analyste d\u00e9j\u00e0 cit\u00e9 plus haut (Loren Thompson), est \u00e0 nouveau cit\u00e9 pour exposer la gravit\u00e9 de la situation mena\u00e7ant tous les programmes de l’Air Force, au premier rang desquels se trouve le JSF : \u00ab The Pentagon cannot figure out how to match up its military requirements with the budgetary resources it’s expecting to get. Where that leads is to some draconian cuts in existing investment programs. Every Air Force airframe in sight is a potential bill payer for other priorities.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl semble que tous les facteurs concourent en multipliant leurs effets pour rendre la situation budg\u00e9taire dramatique, avec des effets imm\u00e9diats \u00e0 pr\u00e9voir sur le budget de l’ann\u00e9e fiscale 2007. Le th\u00e8me conjoncturel de l’article de AW&ST qui pr\u00e9sente les diverses hypoth\u00e8ses de r\u00e9duction est l’effet de l’augmentation du co\u00fbt du p\u00e9trole sur le budget du Pentagone: \u00ab Defense Dept. planners are now estimating fuel costs may add as much as $4 billion to what was already expected to be a shortfall of nearly $6 billion in Fiscal 2007 and each year following. This nearly doubles the predicted annual deficit of about $10 billion.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tIl est remarquable de constater avec quelle rapidit\u00e9 l’hypoth\u00e8se de restriction et de compression du programme JSF est entr\u00e9e dans le champ g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des sp\u00e9culations pour les r\u00e9ductions budg\u00e9taires. C’est une r\u00e9volution psychologique qui touche tout l’establishment<\/em> de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale \u00e0 Washington. Le cas de Loren Thompson peut \u00eatre suivi \u00e0 la trace \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard, de m\u00eame que d’autres analystes ; au d\u00e9but de cette ann\u00e9e encore (voir un F&C du 14 janvier<\/a>), il \u00e9tait admis que le JSF restait intouchable, au contraire du F\/A-22 dont le chiffre de production projet\u00e9 \u00e9tait r\u00e9duit. Nous-m\u00eames jugions qu’au contraire le JSF n’\u00e9tait plus intouchable, tandis que l’USAF, sans doute avec le soutien de Lockheed Martin, devrait tenter d’\u00e9carter les r\u00e9ductions propos\u00e9es pour le F\/A-22.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCes hypoth\u00e8ses s\u00e9lectives sont balay\u00e9es. La situation, depuis janvier, s’est d\u00e9t\u00e9rior\u00e9e avec une rapidit\u00e9 extr\u00eame. Ce sont d\u00e9sormais les deux programmes qui sont menac\u00e9s de r\u00e9ductions importantes, dans le cadre d’une situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale o\u00f9 tous<\/strong> les programmes en cours de d\u00e9veloppement sont menac\u00e9s : il n’est m\u00eame plus question de tactique, de mesures et d’hypoth\u00e8ses comparatives, de savoir qui va \u00eatre sacrifi\u00e9 et qui ne le sera pas, parce que l’effondrement en cours est g\u00e9n\u00e9ral. Les avis des experts, rendent compte de cette tr\u00e8s grave d\u00e9t\u00e9rioration (dans ce cas, les experts sont de tr\u00e8s bons indicateurs du climat g\u00e9n\u00e9ral parce qu’ils diffusent des informations et des \u00e9valuations qui leur sont volontairement fournies, pour pr\u00e9parer les cercles plus larges de l’establishment<\/em> washingtonien aux mesures \u00e0 venir). Il y a aujourd’hui autour du Pentagone, et, par cons\u00e9quent, autour du JSF, une atmosph\u00e8re de panique.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le JSF dans la cur\u00e9e g\u00e9n\u00e9rale 4 ao\u00fbt 2005 La spirale est entam\u00e9e et nous ne la verrons plus cesser. Le JSF est entr\u00e9 dans la zone du tous les coups sont permis, et les hypoth\u00e8ses vont d\u00e9sormais bon train. Bien s\u00fbr, hypoth\u00e8ses de r\u00e9duction, d’abandon de telle ou telle version, etc. Parfois, comme dans… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[629,464,250,3473,3474],"class_list":["post-66664","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-a-22","tag-f","tag-jsf","tag-loren","tag-thompson"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66664","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66664"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66664\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66664"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66664"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66664"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}