On cite aujourd’hui, par ailleurs dans notre rubrique F&C<\/a>, diverses remarques du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral des Marines Sattler, \u00e0 propos de l’effort technologique anti-voitures-suicide des Am\u00e9ricains. (En fait ce terme est obsc\u00e8ne, impropre et pas tr\u00e8s propre: les voitures-suicide, ce sont des Improvised Explosive Devices<\/em> [IED]). De facto<\/em>, Sattler est donc un des experts en lutte anti-terroriste au sein des forces arm\u00e9es US. C’est normal : c’est lui qui a gagn\u00e9 la guerre d’Irak \u00e0 Falloujah, en novembre 2004.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSattler, c’est John Wayne<\/a> vainqueur \u00e0 Falloujah<\/a> en novembre dernier. Dans l’extrait du m\u00eame article d’Aviation Week<\/a> sur la politique hig tech<\/em> anti-IED, la parole est donn\u00e9e \u00e0 Sattler sur le th\u00e8me : clamer la victoire \u00e0 Falloujah, n’\u00e9tait-ce pas exag\u00e9r\u00e9? Mais non, un Marine ne recule jamais. Ses explications, notamment sur la mesure du succ\u00e8s en Irak (c’est-\u00e0-dire : la victoire, non?) qui est devenue de plus en plus sophistiqu\u00e9e, vaut son pesant de bombes guid\u00e9es \u00e0 haute pr\u00e9cision.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab Sattler became a target for critics when he said the battle of Falluja last year broke the back of the Iraqi insurgency. He stands behind his proclamation by pointing to the elimination of the city as a safe haven for insurgents and remnants of the former regime of Saddam Hussein. Sattler points to the end there of the production of vehicle-borne improvised explosives and the training and equipping of suicide bombers. He also notes they found up to 600 caches of weapons, bomb-making materials and chambers where torture was being filmed. After the town was cleaned up, the Marines noticed that the effectiveness and number of insurgent attacks declined because the A-team and trainers are gone, Sattler says. However, he admits the insurgents are making the attempt to regain some presence.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The measures of success in Iraq have grown more sophisticated as the conflict goes on, Sattler asserts. About the time of the Falluja offensive, he wrongly thought success was the number of Iraqi security forces in uniform standing in formation in the morning, Sattler says. The metric was how many do we have. We weren’t focusing on capability at that point. When the fighting started in April in the first Falluja fight, we [had] not set them up for success [with proper training and equipment]. They were a brand-new force. As anybody who was pragmatic would do, they said this is not going to work and they laid their weapons down and evaporated.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n