{"id":66667,"date":"2005-08-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-08-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/04\/la-pathetique-balade-de-limpuissance-de-victor-davis-hanson-au-bout-du-compte-dieu-reconnaitra-son-amerique\/"},"modified":"2005-08-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-08-04T00:00:00","slug":"la-pathetique-balade-de-limpuissance-de-victor-davis-hanson-au-bout-du-compte-dieu-reconnaitra-son-amerique","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/04\/la-pathetique-balade-de-limpuissance-de-victor-davis-hanson-au-bout-du-compte-dieu-reconnaitra-son-amerique\/","title":{"rendered":"La path\u00e9tique balade de l’impuissance de Victor Davis Hanson: au bout du compte, Dieu reconna\u00eetra son Am\u00e9rique<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La path\u00e9tique balade de l’impuissance de Victor Davis Hanson: au bout du compte, Dieu reconna\u00eetra son Am\u00e9rique<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tVictor Davis Hanson est connu. C’est un historien am\u00e9ricaniste muscl\u00e9, de la droite belliciste, proche des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, un amateur de Thucydide et des guerres du P\u00e9loponn\u00e8se, un conseiller ext\u00e9rieur de GW qu’il a rencontr\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises pour lui donner des avis sur ses entreprises militaires. Certaines de ses interventions peuvent \u00eatre int\u00e9ressantes, comme celle \u00e0 laquelle nous nous r\u00e9f\u00e9rions le 5 avril 2004<\/a>. Dans d’autres cas, son enthousiasme belliciste et pro-Bush l’emm\u00e8ne aux marches du ridicule, comme lorsqu’il se demande si GW n’est pas un nouveau Lincoln<\/a> et si l’Irak de l’\u00e9t\u00e9 2003 n’est pas au bord d’une \u00e9tourdissante victoire, comme la victoire nordiste de la prise d’Atlanta par Sherman le 2 septembre 1864 apr\u00e8s un mois d’ao\u00fbt 1864 de d\u00e9faitisme et de sp\u00e9culation. D’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, Hanson est un partisan forcen\u00e9 et convaincu de la vertu et du triomphe de l’Am\u00e9rique et de l’am\u00e9ricanisme. Il en perd toutes les vertus de l’historien, y compris celle de la conviction bien fond\u00e9e, tant ses plaidoiries pro domo<\/em> sonnent faux et parfois ridicules. En voici une<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAujourd’hui, Hanson a l’humeur sombre. Il est bien oblig\u00e9 d’admettre que le triomphe am\u00e9ricain n’est plus ce qu’il \u00e9tait. Il \u00e9voque m\u00eame un global shift of power<\/em>, qui a tout de m\u00eame l’avantage de donner \u00e0 l’effacement am\u00e9ricain une explication qui soit plus l’apparition d’une force concurrente brutale et tra\u00eetresse contre la vertueuse Am\u00e9rique qu’une faiblesse am\u00e9ricaine. Tout de m\u00eame, comme dans les westerns<\/em>, d’ailleurs comme tout \u00e0 Hollywood, c’est le gentil qui gagne, la cavalerie qui intervient, l’Am\u00e9rique qui revient. En d’autres termes: la Chine s’appr\u00eate \u00e0 contester la place de premi\u00e8re puissance de l’Am\u00e9rique, pratiquement \u00e0 n’\u00eatre pas loin d’y r\u00e9ussir, et alors \u00ab [t]he world will soon better appreciate the United States<\/em> \u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn d’autres termes (bis repetitat<\/em>), il est temps de s’interroger sur ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne qu’une puissance de la trempe des Etats-Unis, qui se targue d’une culture \u00e9blouissante, qui est unanimement estim\u00e9e comme l’ind\u00e9passable mod\u00e8le par les \u00e9lites am\u00e9ricanis\u00e9es des pays non-US, essentiellement les europ\u00e9ens si cultiv\u00e9s, puisse pr\u00e9senter comme l’un de ses principaux historiens, senior fellow<\/em> \u00e0 Hoover Institution et Stanford University, un Hanson qui propose de tels commentaires. Ou bien, dit encore diff\u00e9remment : s’agit-il de la m\u00eame plan\u00e8te? S’agit-il de la m\u00eame psychologie?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est \u00e0 propos de ce texte de commentaire \u00ab The Global Shift<\/em> \u00bb, du 10 juin 2005 sur NationalReview Online<\/a>, que nous reprenons ci-dessous pour une lecture d\u00e9taill\u00e9e, que nous proposons notre commentaire. L’entr\u00e9e en mati\u00e8re montre la maestria bien connue de Hanson pour donner une synth\u00e8se claire et percutante des grands mouvements historiques, dans ce cas celui des \u00ab [r]adical global power shifts<\/em> \u00bb d’un empire \u00e0 un autre, ou d’une force dominante \u00e0 une autre. (On s’\u00e9tonnera simplement qu’il inclut, dans la r\u00e9volution industrielle, la France comme \u00c9tat europ\u00e9en nordique, \u00e9ventuellement caract\u00e9ris\u00e9e par une population protestante importante, ce qui est le cas pour ce dernier point mais n’a certainement pas l’implication philosophique et politique que Hanson veut lui donner : \u00ab The northern European states of England, France, and Germany, products of the Enlightenment, with sizable Protestant populations, outpaced both the old classical powers of the Mediterranean and the Spanish empire.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAujourd’hui, dit Hanson, nous semblons assister \u00e0 un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne similaire de basculement de la puissance \u00e0 l’\u00e9chelle globale, mais \u00e0 une extraordinaire rapidit\u00e9. L’apparition dans les rangs des puissances capitalistes de l’Inde et de la Chine est le fait du jour. (Hanson avertit pourtant : ces deux puissances, qui passent directement du XVIII\u00e8me au XXI\u00e8me si\u00e8cles, comme on vous le dit, vont \u00eatre progressivement affect\u00e9es des contradictions d’une transition brutale vers le capitalisme, dont l’Am\u00e9rique a \u00e9t\u00e9 elle-m\u00eame affect\u00e9e et au travers desquels elle est pass\u00e9e. Cette phrase est confondante puisqu’elle exon\u00e8re d\u00e9sormais l’Am\u00e9rique de GW de tous ces maux dont elle aurait triomph\u00e9 : \u00ab we have also already passed through all the contradictions of a breakneck capitalist transition the dislocation of rural people, industrial pollution, unionization, suburban blues, ubiquitous graft, and petty bribery that will increasingly plague both India and China as they leave the 18th century and enter the 21st.<\/em> \u00bb) Pour en venir au principal, c’est-\u00e0-dire justifier la vertu de la politique am\u00e9ricaine, l’Inde est mise de c\u00f4t\u00e9 puisque, effectivement, l’Am\u00e9rique l’a r\u00e9cemment autoris\u00e9e \u00e0 devenir son alli\u00e9<\/a> : \u00ab We mostly welcome the new India nuclear, law-abiding, and English-speaking onto the world stage. It deserves a permanent seat on the Security Council and a close alliance with the United States.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tReste donc la Chine, qui est une horrible menace, et en plus une menace qui se moque de l’Am\u00e9rique et de ses efforts de paix : \u00ab China could rein in Kim Jong Il tomorrow. But it derives psychological satisfaction from watching Pyongyang’s nuclear roguery stymie Japan and the United States.<\/em> \u00bb La Chine qui ricane devant la paralysie am\u00e9ricaine et japonaise face \u00e0 l’horrible Cor\u00e9e du Nord, mena\u00e7ant elle-m\u00eame les deux oiseaux de paradis (USA et Japon) \u00e9gar\u00e9s…<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa peinture de la situation devient alors compl\u00e8tement surr\u00e9aliste. On peut parler, chez l’historien, d’une \u00e9trange affection, dont le fondement est de grossir d\u00e9mesur\u00e9ment la menace chinoise, d’aggraver jusqu’\u00e0 la caricature le comportement chinois, de fa\u00e7on \u00e0 justifier in fine>D> le recul am\u00e9ricain : en m\u00eame temps, l’absence de vertu des Chinois, leur c\u00f4t\u00e9 extraordinairement diabolique, style p\u00e9ril jaune ou docteur Fu Manchu, tr\u00e8s d\u00e9but du XX\u00e8me si\u00e8cle, permettent d’attendre avec ravissement le retour de la vertu am\u00e9ricaine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t… Une appr\u00e9ciation semblable, pour qui conna\u00eet la perception qu’on a des comportements (impr\u00e9visible pour les US, mesur\u00e9 et prudent pour les Chinois), et qui conna\u00eet les comportements respectifs des Chinois et des Am\u00e9ricains vis-\u00e0-vis de l’UE et de l’ONU, est tellement incroyable et tellement l’exact contraire de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 qu’elle touche au comique involontaire: \u00ab So far they have been given a pass on three grounds: the old Third World romance accorded to Mao’s Marxist legacy; the Chinese role as a counterweight to the envied power of the United States; and the silent admission that the Chinese, unlike the Americans, are a little crazy and thus unpredictable in their response to moral lecturing. Americans apologize and scurry about when an EU or U.N. official remonstrates; in contrast, a Chinese functionary is apt to talk about sending off a missile or two if they don’t shut up.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLes appr\u00e9ciations sur la puissance militaire chinoise sont de la m\u00eame eau: fabrication virtualiste de bout en bout. Les appr\u00e9ciations sur la moralit\u00e9 des uns et des autres \u00e9volue \u00e9galement dans la bulle commune de la faith-based communauty<\/a>. Il n’emp\u00eache qu’il nous conduit au happy end<\/em> in\u00e9vitable. Nous calomnions l’Am\u00e9rique parce que nous r\u00e9clamons trop de l’Am\u00e9rique: \u00ab This hysteria that the world’s hyper-power must be perfect or is it is no good is in dire contrast to the treatment given to China.<\/em> \u00bb \u00c9trange: il nous est reproch\u00e9 de r\u00e9clamer une quasi-perfection de l’Am\u00e9rique que celle-ci ne peut nous donner alors que Hanson nous a jusqu’alors enseign\u00e9 cette vertu comme \u00e9vidente, et alors que, dans sa chute, il nous d\u00e9crit une Am\u00e9rique n\u00e9cessairement quasi-parfaite, dans l’adversit\u00e9 aujourd’hui comme elle l’\u00e9tait dans la puissance triomphante hier.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEn effet, pass\u00e9e l’\u00e8re honteuse du \u00ab Pavlovian anti-Americanism<\/em> \u00bb, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 s’imposera \u00e0 nous de nouveau, dans toute sa splendeur lumineuse: \u00ab China is strong without morality; Europe is impotent in its ethical smugness. The buffer United States, in contrast, believes morality is not mere good intentions but the willingness and ability to translate easy idealism into hard and messy practice.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Most critics will find such sentiments laughable or na\u00efve; but just watch China in the years to come. Those who now malign the imperfections of the United States may well in shock whimper back, asking for our friendship. Then the boutique practice of anti-Americanism among the global elite will come to an end.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoil\u00e0, le tour est jou\u00e9. Lisez donc le texte de Hanson pour confirmation ; et dites-vous bien ceci : pour conduire \u00e0 son terme un tel raisonnement sans que la plume vous tombe des mains, par simple r\u00e9flexe de dignit\u00e9, il faut que ce croyant de la religion am\u00e9ricaniste soit bien mis sens dessus dessous \u00e0 propos de la puissance de l’Am\u00e9rique qu’il c\u00e9l\u00e9brait avec ivresse il y a peu encore. Ce texte extra-terrestre de l’historien Hanson, par ailleurs historien cultiv\u00e9 et d’une v\u00e9h\u00e9mence mesur\u00e9e lorsque le sujet s’\u00e9loigne de sa ch\u00e8re Am\u00e9rique, est une illustration convaincante du d\u00e9sarroi qui pr\u00e9vaut aujourd’hui \u00e0 Washington, et qui ne se r\u00e9sout de fa\u00e7on virtualiste, le temps d’un texte de cet acabit, que par l’empilement et le rench\u00e9rissement des illusions, des clich\u00e9s et des lieux communs hyperboliques et hollywoodiens.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

The Global Shift<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tBy Victor Davis Hanson, NationalReview Online, June 10, 2005<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tRadical global power shifts have been common throughout history. For almost a millennium (800-100 BC) the Greek East, with its proximity to wealthy Asia and African markets and a dynamic Hellenism, was the nexus of Western civilization before giving way to Rome and the western Mediterranean.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tYet by A.D. 300 the Greek-speaking half of the empire, more distant from northern European tribal attacks, proved the more resolute. It would endure for over 1,000 years while the fragmented West fell into chaos. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnd then yet again the pendulum shifted back. The Renaissance was the product of Florence, Venice, and Rome as the Byzantine East was worn out by its elemental struggles with Islam and straitjacketed by an increasingly rigid Orthodoxy and top-heavy imperial regime.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut by 1600 the galley states of the Western Mediterranean were to lose their restored primacy for good, as to the north the ocean-going galleons of the Atlantic port nations England, France, Holland, Portugal, and Spain usurped commerce and monopolized the new trans-oceanic trade routes to Asia and the New World. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBy the time of the industrial revolution, another radical shift had occurred in influence and power. The northern European states of England, France, and Germany, products of the Enlightenment, with sizable Protestant populations, outpaced both the old classical powers of the Mediterranean and the Spanish empire. And in early 20th century, the United States, benefiting from the Anglo tradition of transparency and the rule of law combined with a unique constitution, exploding population, and vast resources displaced the old European colonial empires and stood down the supposed new future of Soviet totalitarianism.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGlobalization and technology, of course, can speed up these shifts and accomplish in a few years what used to transpire over centuries. We are told that a third of the planet, the two billion in China and India, is now moving at a breakneck pace with market reforms to remake the world. The old idea of a population bomb of too many people and too few resources has been turned upside down: The key is not how many people reside in a country but rather what those people do. A billion under a Marxist regime leads to terrible human waste and starvation; a billion in a market economy is actually advantageous as seemingly endlessly active minds and arms flood the world with cheap consumer goods and rebuild a decaying infrastructure from the ground up.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEurope high unemployment, layers of bureaucracy slow growth, unsustainable entitlements, ethnic and religious tensions, shrinking populations, unresponsive central governments is often juxtaposed with Asia, as if its sun is setting just as the East’s is once again rising. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo far the European Union’s decision not to spend on defense; its inherited infrastructure and protocols; and its commitment to the rule of law keep the continent seemingly prosperous. It has some breathing space to decide whether it will reemerge as a rising power or be relegated to a curious museum for cash-laden tourists from Asia and America.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSomewhere between these poles is the United States. Pessimists point out that we increasingly don’t create the cars we drive, the phones we used, or mirabile dictu, soon the food we eat. High budget deficits, trade imbalances, enormous national debt, and growing military expenditures will supposedly take their toll at last, as pampered Americans consume what by the new global rules they don’t quite earn. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOptimists counter with their own set of statistics and point out that immigration and religion have ensured a steady if not rising population. Unemployment, interest rates, and inflation are low, and alone in the world America has an amazing resiliency and flexibility to fashion citizens and a single culture out of diverse races and religions. It also, of course, enjoys a unique constitution and laws that provide freedom without license.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tWe seem to enjoy the best of both worlds, symbolized by our two coasts that look on both east and west. Our European traditions ensure the rule of law and the vibrancy of Western civilization. Yet decades ago, unlike the EU, we understood the Asian challenge and kept our markets open and our economy free, often requiring great dislocation and painful adjustment. The result is that for all our bickering, we continue to remain competitive and flexible in a way Europe does not. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tIf we have avoided the state socialism of Europe that stymies growth, we have also already passed through all the contradictions of a breakneck capitalist transition the dislocation of rural people, industrial pollution, unionization, suburban blues, ubiquitous graft, and petty bribery that will increasingly plague both India and China as they leave the 18th century and enter the 21st.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBut the real question is how both China and India, nuclear and arming, will translate their newfound economic clout and cash into a geopolitical role. If internal politics and protocols are any barometer of foreign policy, it should be an interesting show. We mostly welcome the new India nuclear, law-abiding, and English-speaking onto the world stage. It deserves a permanent seat on the Security Council and a close alliance with the United States.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tChina, however, is a very different story a soon-to-be grasping Soviet Union-like superpower without any pretense of Marxist egalitarianism. Despite massive cash reserves and ongoing trade surpluses, it violates almost every international commercial protocol from copyright law to patents. It won’t discuss Tibet, and it uses staged domestic unrest to send warnings to Taiwan and Japan that their regional options will increasingly be limited by Beijing.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tChina could rein in Kim Jong Il tomorrow. But it derives psychological satisfaction from watching Pyongyang’s nuclear roguery stymie Japan and the United States. China’s foreign policy in the Middle East, Central and South America, and Southeast Asia is governed by realpolitik of the 19th-century American stripe, without much concern for the type of government or the very means necessary to supply its insatiable hunger for resources. The government that killed 50 million of its own has not really been repudiated and its present successor follows the same old practice of jailing dissidents and stamping out freedom. When and how its hyper-capitalist economy will mandate the end of a Communist directorate is not known.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe world has been recently flooded with media accounts that U.S. soldiers may have dropped or at least gotten wet a few Korans. Abu Ghraib, we are told, is like the Soviet gulag the death camp of millions. Americans are routinely pilloried abroad because they liberated Iraq, poured billions into the reconstruction, and jumpstarted democracy there but were unable to do so without force and the loss of civilian life.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThis hysteria that the world’s hyper-power must be perfect or is it is no good is in dire contrast to the treatment given to China. Yet Pavlovian anti-Americanism may soon begin to die down as the Chinese increasingly flex their muscles on the global stage and the world learns better their methods of operation. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSo far they have been given a pass on three grounds: the old Third World romance accorded to Mao’s Marxist legacy; the Chinese role as a counterweight to the envied power of the United States; and the silent admission that the Chinese, unlike the Americans, are a little crazy and thus unpredictable in their response to moral lecturing. Americans apologize and scurry about when an EU or U.N. official remonstrates; in contrast, a Chinese functionary is apt to talk about sending off a missile or two if they don’t shut up.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tThe Patriot Act to a European is proof of American illiberality in a way that China’s swallowing Tibet or jailing and executing dissidents is not. America’s support for Saudi Arabia is proof of our hypocrisy in not severing ties with an undemocratic government, while few care that a country with leaders who traverse the globe in Mao suits cuts any deal possible with fascists and autocrats for oil, iron ore, and food.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tYes, we are witnessing one of the great transfers of power and influence that have traditionally changed civilization itself, as money, influence, and military power are gradually inching away from Europe. And this time the shake-up is not regional but global. While scholars and economists concentrate on its economic and political dimensions, few have noticed how a new China and an increasingly vulnerable Europe will markedly change the image of the United States.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAs nations come to know the Chinese, and as a ripe Europe increasingly cannot or will not defend itself, the old maligned United States will begin to look pretty good again. More important, America will not be the world’s easily caricatured sole power, but more likely the sole democratic superpower that factors in morality in addition to national interest in its treatment of others. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tChina is strong without morality; Europe is impotent in its ethical smugness. The buffer United States, in contrast, believes morality is not mere good intentions but the willingness and ability to translate easy idealism into hard and messy practice.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMost critics will find such sentiments laughable or na\u00efve; but just watch China in the years to come. Those who now malign the imperfections of the United States may well in shock whimper back, asking for our friendship. Then the boutique practice of anti-Americanism among the global elite will come to an end.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVictor Davis Hanson is a military historian and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. His website is victorhanson.com.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l’esprit, Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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La path\u00e9tique balade de l’impuissance de Victor Davis Hanson: au bout du compte, Dieu reconna\u00eetra son Am\u00e9rique Victor Davis Hanson est connu. C’est un historien am\u00e9ricaniste muscl\u00e9, de la droite belliciste, proche des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, un amateur de Thucydide et des guerres du P\u00e9loponn\u00e8se, un conseiller ext\u00e9rieur de GW qu’il a rencontr\u00e9 \u00e0 plusieurs reprises pour… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[1104],"class_list":["post-66667","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notes-de-lectures","tag-neocons"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66667","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66667"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66667\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66667"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66667"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66667"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}