{"id":66690,"date":"2005-08-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-08-11T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/11\/une-revolution-americaniste\/"},"modified":"2005-08-11T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-08-11T00:00:00","slug":"une-revolution-americaniste","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/11\/une-revolution-americaniste\/","title":{"rendered":"Une r\u00e9volution am\u00e9ricaniste?"},"content":{"rendered":"

Une r\u00e9volution am\u00e9ricaniste?<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

11 août 2005 — En mars 1983, quelques jours apr\u00e8s le jour (23 mars) du discours de Ronald Reagan annon\u00e7ant la SDI (Star War<\/em>), le mar\u00e9chal Ogarkov, chef d’\u00e9tat-major de l’Arm\u00e9e Rouge, fait une promenade avec le journaliste am\u00e9ricain Leslie Gelb, ancien haut fonctionnaire du d\u00e9partement d’État durant la pr\u00e9sidence Carter. La sc\u00e8ne se passe \u00e0 Gen\u00e8ve, où se poursuivaient, sans grand espoir de r\u00e9ussite alors, les n\u00e9gociations sur la limitation des engins \u00e0 port\u00e9e interm\u00e9diaire et \u00e0 capacit\u00e9s nucl\u00e9aires, — ceux-l\u00e0 que les Am\u00e9ricains appel\u00e8rent successivement LRTNF, puis TNF (Theater Nuclear Forces) tout court, qui \u00e9taient surnomm\u00e9s les euromissiles, — SS-20 du c\u00f4t\u00e9 sovi\u00e9tique, Pershing<\/em> II et Glicom<\/em> (missiles de croisi\u00e8re terrestre) du c\u00f4t\u00e9 am\u00e9ricain. Gelb garda secret le contenu de cet entretien pendant pr\u00e8s de 10 ans, avant d’en publier la substance dans un article, dans le New York Times<\/em> le 20 août 1992, sous le titre « Foreign Affairs: Who Won the Cold War?<\/em> ». On est frapp\u00e9 par la franchise du mar\u00e9chal Ogarkov, exposant les difficult\u00e9s consid\u00e9rables des Sovi\u00e9tiques. Voici un passage de cet article, nous livrant une confidence du Mar\u00e9chal (nous soulignons en gras le passage qui est essentiel pour notre propos):<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\n

« We cannot equal the quality of U.S. arms for a generation or two. Modern military power is based on technology, and technology is based on computers. In the US, small children play with computers…. Here, we don’t even have computers in every office of the Defense Ministry. And for reasons you know well, we cannot make computers widely available in our society. We will never be able to catch up with you in modern arms until we have an economic revolution. And the question is whether we can have an economic revolution<\/em> without a political revolution.<\/em><\/strong> »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

En fait, ce que pr\u00e9conisait Ogarkov, c’est ce que Gorbatchev tenta d’appliquer (et ceci explique cela: les r\u00e9formistes de l’arm\u00e9e, autour d’Ogarkov, \u00e9taient du c\u00f4t\u00e9 de Gorbatchev) : la r\u00e9volution \u00e9conomique (perestro\u00efka<\/em>) rendue possible par la r\u00e9volution politique (glasnost<\/em>).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Pourquoi rappeler cette rencontre fort peu connue, et pourtant si r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice? Parce que nous sommes dans une circonstance extraordinaire où la situation am\u00e9ricaine pourrait aujourd’hui \u00eatre proche de, voire similaire \u00e0 la situation sovi\u00e9tique, mais invers\u00e9e quant aux priorit\u00e9s. Le constat serait alors: les Am\u00e9ricains sont prisonniers de la technologie (militaire dans ce cas) et de la bureaucratie (centralis\u00e9e) de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale qui la contr\u00f4le alors que la situation militaire et strat\u00e9gique requiert paradoxalement d’y avoir beaucoup moins recours, notamment pour modifier l’action, les tactiques, les conceptions, la psychologie, etc., — l’efficacit\u00e9 en un mot. William S. Lind, cit\u00e9 dans l’article de Defense News<\/a> sur lequel nous avons appuy\u00e9 notre \u00ab\u00a0Faits & Commentaires\u00a0\u00bb de mardi<\/a>, exprime ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne de la sorte:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

« A belief in technological superiority is why Goliath always loses. The more you make yourself look like Goliath, the more you say how superior you are, the more you guarantee your own defeat<\/em>. »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Le m\u00eame William S. Lind, de plus en plus reconnu comme le leader des \u00ab\u00a0r\u00e9formistes-r\u00e9volutionnaires\u00a0\u00bb de la structure militaire am\u00e9ricaine en crise \u00e0 l’heure où seules des mesures r\u00e9volutionnaires semblent pouvoir faire esp\u00e9rer des r\u00e9sultats pour sortir de cette crise, a publi\u00e9 r\u00e9cemment un article qui a fait grand bruit<\/a>: « Bring Back Milicia<\/em> ». Cet article du 4 août rapportait les r\u00e9sultats d’un s\u00e9minaire qui venait d’avoir lieu dans le Maine, \u00e0 l’initiative d’un ancien colonel des Marines<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\n

(« I spent last week in Pittsfield, Maine, at a symposium on modern war called by Colonel Mike Wyly, USMC retired. Col. Wyly was one of the heroes of the maneuver warfare movement in the Marine Corps in the 1970s and 80s, and when he suggests it’s time for a new effort, people listen.<\/em> »)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

Lind esp\u00e9rait voir expos\u00e9 le probl\u00e8me de la \u00ab\u00a0nouvelle\u00a0\u00bb forme de guerre, la \u00ab\u00a0guerre de la 4\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration\u00a0\u00bb (4thGW<\/em>, ou 4GW), contre laquelle les Am\u00e9ricains sont si d\u00e9pourvus. M\u00eame si la question n’a pas \u00e9t\u00e9 enti\u00e8rement d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e, Lind a tout de m\u00eame trouv\u00e9 une mati\u00e8re essentielle qui y a \u00e9t\u00e9 d\u00e9velopp\u00e9e, avec la suggestion de son application dans le cadre de la situation de tension actuelle (lutte contre le terrorisme).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\n

« …what might a state armed service designed for 4GW look like?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» To address that question, we first had to answer another one: what would such a force’s mission be? Not being neo-Trotskyites, we derived our answer within the framework of a defensive grand strategy. The new service’s (and it should be a new armed service) primary mission would be to prevent outbreaks of Fourth Generation war on American soil. The focus must be on prevention, not \u00ab\u00a0first response,\u00a0\u00bb because if we are forced into a response mode the enemy has already won. And, the new service must be oriented not only to preventing imported 4GW, like that we saw on 9\/11, but also the home-grown variety such as London just experienced.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» But – and here was the kicker – the new service has to keep us safe without pushing America further toward Big Brother, the all-powerful, centralized, national security state represented by the Department of Homeland Security, the \u00a0\u00bbPatriot Act\u00a0\u00bb and much else coming out of Washington.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» So what should this new 4GW armed service be? The answer of our working group at the symposium was, \u00ab\u00a0a militia.\u00a0\u00bb<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» The militia was the basis of America’s defense through most of our history as a republic. More, there are two contemporary models. One is volunteer fire departments, which small town and rural America depend on and which almost always perform well. The other is community policing, where cops walk the same beat in the same neighborhood for a long time, long enough to understand the neighborhood and prevent crimes instead of just responding to them. Neither volunteer fire departments nor community police serve as control mechanisms for the federal government. They respond to their local communities, not to Washington.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

» The new militia’s most important function would be neighborhood watch. The only way to prevent 4GW attacks is to find out about them before they happen, and that means the militia, like community police, must know what is happening in their neighborhoods. But again, we don’t want to feed Big Brother. Almost all of what the militia knows should remain on the local level.<\/em> »<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

On voit ici la logique suivie, sans discuter encore du bien-fond\u00e9 du principe consid\u00e9r\u00e9 (le retour \u00e0 la milice). Cette logique implique, au-del\u00e0 des mesures techniques, militaires, structurelles, technologiques, etc, une rupture politique:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

• L’abandon de la politique ext\u00e9rieure expansionniste et h\u00e9g\u00e9moniste.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

• La rupture du mod\u00e8le f\u00e9d\u00e9raliste centralis\u00e9 avec un retour vers une pleine responsabilit\u00e9 des États constitutifs de l’Union dans la mati\u00e8re de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

Cette rupture politique est effectivement au moins aussi importante que celle qu’envisageait Ogarkov pour l’URSS en 1983. Il y a bien similitude des situations. La question est de savoir s’il y aura similitude des destins. (On sait que la r\u00e9forme Gorbatchev ne put \u00eatre contr\u00f4l\u00e9e, \u00e9chappa \u00e0 son initiateur et d\u00e9boucha sur l’effondrement de l’URSS.)<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Une r\u00e9volution am\u00e9ricaniste? 11 août 2005 — En mars 1983, quelques jours apr\u00e8s le jour (23 mars) du discours de Ronald Reagan annon\u00e7ant la SDI (Star War), le mar\u00e9chal Ogarkov, chef d’\u00e9tat-major de l’Arm\u00e9e Rouge, fait une promenade avec le journaliste am\u00e9ricain Leslie Gelb, ancien haut fonctionnaire du d\u00e9partement d’État durant la pr\u00e9sidence Carter. La… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3763,4481,2645,1012,4704,4703,4480],"class_list":["post-66690","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-gelb","tag-generation","tag-guerre","tag-lind","tag-milices","tag-ogarkov","tag-quatrieme"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66690","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66690"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66690\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66690"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66690"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66690"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}