Apr\u00e8s l’excellent article de William Pfaff sur le sujet<\/a>, du 11 ao\u00fbt, un autre article, de Patrick J. Buchanan aujourd’hui<\/a>, aborde indirectement la m\u00eame question de la prolif\u00e9ration des armes nucl\u00e9aires, en la pr\u00e9sentant comme une chose dont le caract\u00e8re mal\u00e9fique et catastrophique est finalement loin d’\u00eatre \u00e9vident. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tBuchanan remarque \u00e0 propos de la crise iranienne, en exposant ce que deviendrait la situation dans la r\u00e9gion si l’Iran acqu\u00e9rait la Bombe : \u00ab If or when Iran goes nuclear, she has a deterrent to intimidation. U.S. freedom of action in the Persian Gulf comes to an end. We would have to behave as gingerly with the mullahs as we do with Kim Jong Il, something intolerable to our neoconservatives and President Bush. For the Israelis, an Iranian bomb would have the same impact as Stalin’s explosion of a bomb had on us in 1949. Israel’s invulnerability would come to an end. She would enter the world of Mutual Assured Destruction, like the one we had to live in during the Cold War.<\/em> \u00bb Dans les deux cas et que cela plaise ou non aux id\u00e9ologues, Buchanan d\u00e9crit une r\u00e9gion stabilis\u00e9e, s\u00e9curis\u00e9e, rendue plus stable par l’impossibilit\u00e9 d’une agression comme celle dont les Am\u00e9ricains menacent \u00e9pisodiquement l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPfaff remarquait en effet, dans son texte du 11 ao\u00fbt : \u00ab America’s determination to stop nuclear proliferation produces perverse results. At a period of mounting Middle Eastern instability and American engagement in two wars in Islamic countries, it increases the allure of nuclear weapons to governments that do not have them, and reinforces their perceived value as political assets and as deterrents against foreign attack.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Nuclear proliferation does not itself promote aggression. Take the alarmist scenarios routinely cited by American and Israeli officials. There is no imaginable way by which nuclear aggression by Iran against Israel could have other than catastrophic results for the attacker. The same is true for any attack by North Korea on an American base in East Asia, or by India on Pakistan, or Pakistan on India.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The existing nuclear states, on the other hand, could attack a non-nuclear nation and probably escape military retaliation, although not huge political and moral opprobrium. Since everyone sees this, it adds to the perceived injustice of the American position defending the nuclear monopoly of these states.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn avait coutume de dire, dans les ann\u00e9es 1980, lorsque certains (Gorbatchev, notamment) parlaient de l’\u00e9limination totale des armes nucl\u00e9aires, qu’on ne peut faire rentrer dans sa bouteille le diable nucl\u00e9aire, une fois qu’il en est sorti, ou encore : on ne d\u00e9sinvente pas le nucl\u00e9aire. Aujourd’hui, c’est autre chose qui est en train de sortir de sa bouteille, comme un diable, apr\u00e8s 60 ans d’appr\u00e9ciation officielle sur l’indiscutable vertu de la non-prolif\u00e9ration : l’id\u00e9e que la prolif\u00e9ration n’est pas n\u00e9cessairement cette calamit\u00e9 dont on nous parle. C’est l’\u00e9trange legs de la crise iranienne, avant qu’elle n’ait \u00e9clat\u00e9, si elle \u00e9clate d’ailleurs. Le d\u00e9bat est en train de s’ouvrir, et quel d\u00e9bat.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 15 ao\u00fbt 2005 \u00e0 17H15<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Apr\u00e8s l’excellent article de William Pfaff sur le sujet, du 11 ao\u00fbt, un autre article, de Patrick J. Buchanan aujourd’hui, aborde indirectement la m\u00eame question de la prolif\u00e9ration des armes nucl\u00e9aires, en la pr\u00e9sentant comme une chose dont le caract\u00e8re mal\u00e9fique et catastrophique est finalement loin d’\u00eatre \u00e9vident. Buchanan remarque \u00e0 propos de la crise… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3335,2773,1131],"class_list":["post-66704","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-buchanan","tag-iran","tag-pfaff"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66704","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66704"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66704\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66704"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66704"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66704"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}