A la suite des r\u00e9v\u00e9lations sur l’alerte qui ne fut pas donn\u00e9e<\/a> avant l’attaque 9\/11, des explications sont donn\u00e9es. Il y a notamment, chose la plus int\u00e9ressante, la r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la question: pourquoi le Pentagone n’a-t-il pas averti le FBI ? (Le Special Operations Command et son unit\u00e9 de renseignement Able Danger<\/em> avaient des informations en 2000 sur le groupe pr\u00e9parant l’attaque 9\/11.) Un article d’Audrey Hudson dans le Washington Times du 16 ao\u00fbt<\/a> nous apporte la r\u00e9ponse:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab The intelligence official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said Pentagon lawyers were afraid of a blow back similar to the public’s response to the FBI-led assault on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, which left more than 70 people dead and decided to withhold the information from the FBI.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The official said the decision was made at the Army’s Special Operations Command (SoCom) headquarters in Tampa, Fla.,which concluded that Atta, the ringleader of the September 11 hijackers, and the others were in the country legally and thus had the same legal protections as U.S. citizens. If something went wrong, SoCom felt it could get blamed, the official said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’explication est si candide et lumineuse qu’il n’y a aucune raison de douter de sa v\u00e9racit\u00e9. Il nous appara\u00eet \u00e9vident qu’une explication portant sur une question de communication, sur la crainte conformiste d’effets publics, sur la d\u00e9fense des int\u00e9r\u00eats partisans du Pentagone, \u00e9claire parfaitement la d\u00e9cision de ne rien communiquer au FBI ; on peut y ajouter, ce qui n’est pas dit par l’officiel cit\u00e9 mais qui tient \u00e9videmment son r\u00f4le, la concurrence entre factions de la bureaucratie de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale (celle du Pentagone et celle du FBI) conduisant \u00e0 garder pour soi les informations dont on dispose.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tAutre indication rappel\u00e9e en passant dans l’article: \u00ab Able Danger was created in 1999 by SoCom to track al Qaeda cells worldwide.<\/em> \u00bb Cela signifie que le Pentagone \u00e9tait convaincu du danger que repr\u00e9sentait al Qa\u00efda<\/em> au moins d\u00e8s 1999, avec la cr\u00e9ation de l’efficace unit\u00e9 de renseignement de Special Command, Able Danger<\/em>. En aucun cas, on ne peut arguer que l’attaque 9\/11 fut une surprise pour les Etats-Unis. L’\u00e9chec \u00e0 pr\u00e9venir l’attaque rel\u00e8ve du d\u00e9sordre d’un syst\u00e8me bas\u00e9 sur la concurrence des groupes de pression (donc sans imp\u00e9ratif r\u00e9galien de bien public) et sur l’attention port\u00e9e \u00e0 l’effet public v\u00e9hicul\u00e9 par le monde de la communication.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 18 ao\u00fbt 2005 \u00e0 07H42<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" A la suite des r\u00e9v\u00e9lations sur l’alerte qui ne fut pas donn\u00e9e avant l’attaque 9\/11, des explications sont donn\u00e9es. Il y a notamment, chose la plus int\u00e9ressante, la r\u00e9ponse \u00e0 la question: pourquoi le Pentagone n’a-t-il pas averti le FBI ? (Le Special Operations Command et son unit\u00e9 de renseignement Able Danger avaient des informations… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66713","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66713","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66713"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66713\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66713"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66713"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66713"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}