{"id":66719,"date":"2005-08-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-08-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/19\/linsubordination-du-lieutenant-colonel-shaffer\/"},"modified":"2005-08-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-08-19T00:00:00","slug":"linsubordination-du-lieutenant-colonel-shaffer","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/19\/linsubordination-du-lieutenant-colonel-shaffer\/","title":{"rendered":"L&rsquo;insubordination du lieutenant-colonel Shaffer"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Officier de renseignement de l&rsquo;U.S. Army et de la DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), le lieutenant-colonel Anthony Schaffer a pris publiquement la parole (The New York <em>Times<\/em> et Fox <em>News<\/em>). Schaffer est la source qui a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 l&rsquo;existence de l&rsquo;unit\u00e9 de renseignement des Special Forces <em>Able Danger<\/em>, dont il \u00e9tait officier de liaison.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;acte public de Shaffer est en soi un acte d&rsquo;insubordination extraordinaire, qui est expliqu\u00e9 ci-dessous par un extrait <a href=\"http:\/\/www.wsws.org\/articles\/2005\/aug2005\/able-a19.shtml\" class=\"gen\">d&rsquo;un article de WSWS.org<\/a> sur l&rsquo;affaire. Il constitue une indication de plus de l&rsquo;atmosph\u00e8re de d\u00e9sordre et de d\u00e9sarroi qui r\u00e8gne aujourd&rsquo;hui \u00e0 Washington dans les milieux de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. Devant le torrents de mensonges et de manipulations de l&rsquo;administration GW ces derni\u00e8res ann\u00e9es, avec les r\u00e9sultats catastrophiques qu&rsquo;on sait, les r\u00e8gles de secret et de devoir de r\u00e9serve sont de moins en moins respect\u00e9es. La hi\u00e9rarchie n&rsquo;a plus aucune autorit\u00e9, li\u00e9e qu&rsquo;elle se trouve elle-m\u00eame par ses compromissions. Bien entendu, d&rsquo;autres Shaffer vont appara\u00eetre \u00e0 leur tour, accentuant la d\u00e9liquescence du climat washingtonien.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t(Dans l&rsquo;extrait ci-dessous, on lit notamment l&rsquo;interpr\u00e9tation de Shaffer sur la d\u00e9cision de l&rsquo;U.S. Army de ne pas communiquer, en 2000, ses informations au FBI. On peut la comparer avec celle qui a \u00e9t\u00e9 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1854\" class=\"gen\">donn\u00e9e par ailleurs<\/a>, pour constater qu&rsquo;elle s&rsquo;en rapproche. Dans le texte <a href=\"http:\/\/www.nytimes.com\/aponline\/national\/AP-Sept-11-Hijackers.html?ex=1125028800&#038;en=082a586f0a9e579d&#038;ei=5070&#038;emc=eta1\" class=\"gen\">du 18 ao\u00fbt du New York Times<\/a>, Shaffer est cit\u00e9 dans ce sens, lorsqu&rsquo;il parle des avocats de SoCom, dont d\u00e9pendait <em>Able Danger<\/em>: \u00ab <em>There was a feeling &#8230; if we give this information to the FBI and something goes wrong, we&rsquo;re going to get blamed for whatever goes wrong.<\/em> \u00bb) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Shaffer said that his unit had contacted the FBI repeatedly during 2000 to warn that a US-based terrorist cell was at work, but three times was forced to cancel meetings to brief the FBI at the instruction of the Strategic Operations Command (SOCOM), the Pentagon unit in charge of all counter-terrorism work.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>He charged that the information withheld might have made it possible to arrest Atta and other terrorists before they could carry out their plans. I was at the point of near insubordination over the fact that this was something important, that this was something that should have been pursued, Shaffer told the Times. He said the Pentagon officials did not want the information circulated because it would reveal the existence of the secret military intelligence project and lead to criticism that the military was collecting information on the American people.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>By his account, Shaffer was not directly involved in data collection or analysis, but served as liaison between Able Danger and the Defense Intelligence Agency, the largest unit of the vast US intelligence apparatus. Defense Department officials did not dispute his version of events, but declined any further comment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Shaffer said he had decided to allow his name to be made public, in violation of normal security procedures, in response to the statement issued last week by Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, the chairman and vice-chairman of the 9\/11 commission. They declared that the panel knew of Able Danger but had never been informed that the project had identified Atta or others of the hijackers in advance of 9\/11.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 19 ao\u00fbt 2005 \u00e0 13H20<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Officier de renseignement de l&rsquo;U.S. Army et de la DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency), le lieutenant-colonel Anthony Schaffer a pris publiquement la parole (The New York Times et Fox News). Schaffer est la source qui a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 l&rsquo;existence de l&rsquo;unit\u00e9 de renseignement des Special Forces Able Danger, dont il \u00e9tait officier de liaison. L&rsquo;acte public de&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4129,4718],"class_list":["post-66719","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-able","tag-danger"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66719","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66719"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66719\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66719"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66719"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66719"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}