{"id":66725,"date":"2005-08-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-08-21T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/21\/les-vertiges-bureaucratiques\/"},"modified":"2005-08-21T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-08-21T00:00:00","slug":"les-vertiges-bureaucratiques","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/08\/21\/les-vertiges-bureaucratiques\/","title":{"rendered":"Les vertiges bureaucratiques"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Parmi les inqui\u00e9tudes \u00e0 propos des structures bureaucratiques du Pentagone qui conduisent \u00e0 l&rsquo;impuissance et \u00e0 la paralysie dans le soutien des forces am\u00e9ricaines, ces remarques de John Hamre, ancien n\u00b02 du Pentagone (sous Clinton) et actuel pr\u00e9sident du CSIS (Center of Strategic and International Studies) de Georgetown University \u00e0 Washington.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tHamre d\u00e9crit un Pentagone \u00e9chouant de fa\u00e7on r\u00e9p\u00e9titive dans ses tentatives d&rsquo;\u00e9tablir des structures capables d&rsquo;alimenter r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement et efficacement les forces am\u00e9ricaines en Irak. Le r\u00e9sultat est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00ab <em>a large, cumbersome acquisition process where no one is responsible for the totality<\/em> \u00bb. Hamre, qui a d\u00e9j\u00e0 <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=887\" class=\"gen\">d\u00e9nonc\u00e9 le processus dit de group-thinking de la bureaucratie de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale<\/a>, d\u00e9crit les structures kafka\u00efesques existantes : \u00ab <em>\u00a0\u00bbYou cannot get complete accountability because the process is fractured between acquisition, budgeting and operational communities<\/em> \u00bb Que faire? \u00ab <em>&#8230;responsibility must be given to the service chiefs. Then, you can put your finger in his chest and say, in one week, I want this fixed. Right now, you can&rsquo;t do that.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCe d\u00e9sordre extraordinaire a abouti \u00e0 une situation (aujourd&rsquo;hui) o\u00f9 existent au Pentagone sept <em>rapid acquisition process<\/em> destin\u00e9s \u00e0 faciliter l&rsquo;acquisition et le transit d&rsquo;\u00e9quipements vers les zones de combat. Ces sept structures se concurrencent, se paralysent les unes les autres et sont impossibles \u00e0 contr\u00f4ler par une autorit\u00e9 centrale. Le CSIS pr\u00e9conise un pot commun de $1 milliard disponible imm\u00e9diatement pour cr\u00e9er une seule organisation capable d&rsquo;organiser rapidement l&rsquo;acquisition et le transfert d&rsquo;\u00e9quipements vers les troupes. La simplicit\u00e9, l&rsquo;efficacit\u00e9 et l&rsquo;\u00e9vidence du rem\u00e8de ont toutes les chances de le condamner par avance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 21 ao\u00fbt 2005 \u00e0 09H36<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Parmi les inqui\u00e9tudes \u00e0 propos des structures bureaucratiques du Pentagone qui conduisent \u00e0 l&rsquo;impuissance et \u00e0 la paralysie dans le soutien des forces am\u00e9ricaines, ces remarques de John Hamre, ancien n\u00b02 du Pentagone (sous Clinton) et actuel pr\u00e9sident du CSIS (Center of Strategic and International Studies) de Georgetown University \u00e0 Washington. Hamre d\u00e9crit un Pentagone&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4722,4144,3194],"class_list":["post-66725","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-group-thinking","tag-hamre","tag-pentagone"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66725","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66725"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66725\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66725"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66725"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66725"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}