{"id":66883,"date":"2005-10-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-10-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/10\/02\/labsence-de-debat-sur-lirak-aux-usa-la-legitimite-et-lexistence-du-systeme-sont-directement-en-cause\/"},"modified":"2005-10-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-10-02T00:00:00","slug":"labsence-de-debat-sur-lirak-aux-usa-la-legitimite-et-lexistence-du-systeme-sont-directement-en-cause","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/10\/02\/labsence-de-debat-sur-lirak-aux-usa-la-legitimite-et-lexistence-du-systeme-sont-directement-en-cause\/","title":{"rendered":"L’absence de d\u00e9bat sur l’Irak aux USA : la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 et l’existence du syst\u00e8me sont directement en cause<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’absence de d\u00e9bat sur l’Irak aux USA : la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 et l’existence du syst\u00e8me sont directement en cause<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t2 octobre 2005 Un article du 24 septembre de William S. Lind<\/a>, que nous avons souvent cit\u00e9 (voir par exemple notre F&C du 11 ao\u00fbt<\/a>), s’av\u00e8re d’un prodigieux int\u00e9r\u00eat. Il est bas\u00e9 sur une id\u00e9e qu’on retrouve souvent chez Lind, une id\u00e9e particuli\u00e8rement riche. Son article la rappelle et cite une intervention qui se rapproche de sa propre r\u00e9flexion. Il s’agit de la mise en cause fondamentale de la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me US par la guerre en Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLind cite un article de Georgie Ann Geyer, dans le Washington Times<\/em> du 17 septembre : \u00ab In her column, Miss Geyer quoted at length the remarks of former Ambassador Charles W. Freeman, Jr., who represented the United States in Riyadh during the First Gulf War:<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The Anglo-American invasion of Iraq cost my country thousands of lives, eroded the American military and destroyed the Iraqi state . . . It has generated at least three different insurgencies and, by some estimates, multiplied our enemies 10 times. Look at the resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan Iraq is becoming the cause of the very problems it was supposed to control . . .<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Moreover, he said, we have gotten mired down in Iraq in fourth-generation warfare, simply warfare between wildly asymmetric forces, such as the formal and structured American military against the footloose insurgents or guerrillas. What fourth-generation warfare has as its dominant character is its objective being to influence the mind of the leader, i.e. the U.S., and to convince the leader that his objectives are unattainable by at least reasonable amounts of force, he continued. This kind of warfare is one that we’ve never won.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tS’il est d’accord sur l’analyse g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, Lind ne l’est pas sur l’interpr\u00e9tation fondamentale que Freeman fait de la guerre en Irak (la guerre de la quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration): \u00ab But in his remarks on Fourth Generation war, the ambassador seems to have fallen into two common misconceptions. Fourth Generation war is asymmetrical, but it is asymmetrical on a much broader scale than simply the pitting of a conventional army against guerillas. The larger asymmetry is political. Fourth Generation was pits a state, or alliance of states, against a shifting mass of opponents of wildly varying motives and goals. Among the problems that presents is that the state has no one to talk to about making peace. Who does Mr. Kissinger sit down with in Paris this time?<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGeorgie Ann Geyer poursuit et Lind la suit \u00e0 la trace. Finalement, il redresse en partie son appr\u00e9ciation initiale, ou ce qu’a pu faire croire la r\u00e9serve qu’il a \u00e9mise. Voici ce qui le fait partiellement changer d’avis (citation de Georgie Ann Geyer dans son texte du 17 septembre): \u00ab Then Ambassador Freeman . . . came to the core of the problem. The party adversary system in America has broken down. Patriotism’ is confused with accepting whatever policy the government lays down. There is no national discussion on the war at all. More telling was the lack of debate even in Congress over the war: This is not, he averred strongly, just a political problem; it is a systemic breakdown in America.s <\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLind retrouve sa propre pens\u00e9e principale, \u00e0 savoir que c’est la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 du syst\u00e8me qui est ici en cause. (M\u00eame si Lind d\u00e9finit la guerre de la quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration comme une attaque contre la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 de l’\u00c9tat adverse, c’est bien de syst\u00e8me qu’il faut parler et non d’\u00c9tat.) La conclusion de l’article de Lind vaut alors d’\u00eatre cit\u00e9e in extenso<\/em>, tant elle s’av\u00e8re d’une r\u00e9elle richesse pour mieux mesurer l’avancement de la r\u00e9flexion sur la profondeur de la crise aux Etats-Unis : \u00ab That is just what Fourth Generation opponents strive for, a systemic breakdown in their state adversary. The danger sign in America is not a hot national debate over the war in Iraq and its course, but precisely the absence of such a debate which, as former Senator Gary Hart has pointed out, is largely due to a lack of courage on the part of the Democrats. Far from ensuring a united nation, what such a lack of debate and absence of alternatives makes probable is a bitter fracturing of the American body politic once the loss of the war becomes evident to the public. The public will feel itself betrayed, not merely by one political party, but by the whole political system.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The primum mobile of Fourth Generation war is a crisis of legitimacy of the state. If the absence of a loyal opposition and alternative courses of action further delegitimizes the American state in the eye of the public, the forces of the Fourth Generation will have won a victory of far greater proportions than anything that could happen on the ground in Iraq. The Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan played a central role in the collapse of the Soviet state. Could the American defeat in Iraq have similar consequences here? The chance is far greater than Washington elites can imagine.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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\tOn observera, pour terminer, plusieurs points qui ressortent de cet article de William S. Lind.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La conjonction d’analyse entre Lind et l’ambassadeur Freeman, sans concertation et m\u00eame \u00e0 partir de pr\u00e9misses diff\u00e9rentes (le r\u00f4le et la substance de la guerre de quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration), est un signe tr\u00e8s impressionnant. Aujourd’hui, une partie non n\u00e9gligeable des \u00e9lites du syst\u00e8me (ou en marge du syst\u00e8me, et devenue clairement adversaire du syst\u00e8me comme Lind) juge que la guerre en Irak avec ses cons\u00e9quences aux USA rec\u00e8le un ferment d’effondrement du syst\u00e8me am\u00e9ricaniste. Il n’est plus question de la possibilit\u00e9 d’une d\u00e9faite type Vi\u00eat-nam mais bien de la possibilit\u00e9 d’un effondrement type-URSS en 1989-91.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le fait de l’absence de d\u00e9bat aux USA, malgr\u00e9 l’existence d’une opposition \u00e0 la guerre et malgr\u00e9 qu’une majorit\u00e9 du public soit contre cette guerre, est une indication particuli\u00e8rement inqui\u00e9tante. C’est le contraire du patriotisme, devenu une caricature de ce qu’il \u00e9tait (Freeman) ; c’est \u00e9videmment le contraire de l’affirmation de l’unit\u00e9 de la nation. \u00ab The danger sign in America is not a hot national debate over the war in Iraq and its course, but precisely the absence of such a debate, <\/em>[…]Far from ensuring a united nation, what such a lack of debate and absence of alternatives makes probable is a bitter fracturing of the American body politic…<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le r\u00f4le du parti d\u00e9mocrate est fondamental, paradoxalement dans un sens n\u00e9gatif pour le syst\u00e8me alors qu’il est compl\u00e8tement align\u00e9 sur le syst\u00e8me (\u00ab …the absence of such a debate which, as former Senator Gary Hart has pointed out, is largely due to a lack of courage on the part of the Democrats<\/em> \u00bb). Le parti d\u00e9mocrate a sauv\u00e9 le syst\u00e8me \u00e0 deux reprises en jouant un r\u00f4le de soupape de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 ; en 1968-72, en donnant, avec en 1968 McCarthy et Robert Kennedy jusqu’\u00e0 son assassinat, et en 1972 McGovern, une forme politique \u00e0 l’int\u00e9rieur du syst\u00e8me \u00e0 l’opposition publique \u00e0 la guerre du Vi\u00eat-nam voulue par le syst\u00e8me ; surtout, en 1933 (la Grande D\u00e9pression), avec Franklin Delano Roosevelt qui, de l’int\u00e9rieur du syst\u00e8me, offrit une alternative r\u00e9formiste radicale, proche d’\u00eatre r\u00e9volutionnaire, \u00e0 une population sur le point \u00e0 la fois de s’effondrer et de se r\u00e9volter. Aujourd’hui, le parti d\u00e9mocrate est incapable de jouer ce r\u00f4le : il a \u00e9t\u00e9 trop perverti par le syst\u00e8me (la pr\u00e9sidence Clinton a une responsabilit\u00e9 historique dans la chose) et le syst\u00e8me est devenu trop aveugle dans son d\u00e9cha\u00eenement pour supporter m\u00eame une opposition de convenance au sein de lui-m\u00eame pour le sauver.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le r\u00f4le de la guerre en Irak est un formidable abc\u00e8s de fixation de la crise. L’\u00e9quivalent n’est d\u00e9cid\u00e9ment pas le Vi\u00eat-nam mais l’Afghanistan pour les Sovi\u00e9tiques. Lind et sans doute Freeman, et d’autres de plus en plus nombreux (\u00e9galement hors des USA, comme Olivier Todd en France), pensent que le r\u00e9gime am\u00e9ricaniste est \u00e0 bout de souffle et que l’Irak est le levier qu’a trouv\u00e9 l’Histoire pour pr\u00e9cipiter sa chute, comme fut l’Afghanistan pour l’URSS (Lind : \u00ab The Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan played a central role in the collapse of the Soviet state. Could the American defeat in Iraq have similar consequences here? The chance is far greater than Washington elites can imagine.<\/em> \u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• On observera encore que ces craintes fondamentales pour le r\u00e9gime\/pour le syst\u00e8me commencent \u00e0 gagner les secteurs les plus mod\u00e9r\u00e9s du syst\u00e8me, les milieux les plus acquis au syst\u00e8me. Le rapport publi\u00e9 le 29 septembre par le professeur Menzie Chinn et endoss\u00e9 par le CFR<\/a> en est un signe.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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L’absence de d\u00e9bat sur l’Irak aux USA : la l\u00e9gitimit\u00e9 et l’existence du syst\u00e8me sont directement en cause 2 octobre 2005 Un article du 24 septembre de William S. Lind, que nous avons souvent cit\u00e9 (voir par exemple notre F&C du 11 ao\u00fbt), s’av\u00e8re d’un prodigieux int\u00e9r\u00eat. Il est bas\u00e9 sur une id\u00e9e qu’on retrouve… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66883","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66883","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66883"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66883\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66883"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66883"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66883"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}