{"id":66944,"date":"2005-10-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-10-21T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/10\/21\/si-nous-partons-nous-devrons-revenir\/"},"modified":"2005-10-21T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-10-21T00:00:00","slug":"si-nous-partons-nous-devrons-revenir","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/10\/21\/si-nous-partons-nous-devrons-revenir\/","title":{"rendered":"Si nous partons, nous devrons revenir"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Partir d&rsquo;Irak? Sempiternelle question Le colonel Wilkerson, ancien chef de cabinet de Powell et l&rsquo;homme qui fait scandale \u00e0 Washington par la violence de sa d\u00e9nonciation <a href=\"http:\/\/www.washingtonpost.com\/wp-dyn\/content\/blog\/2005\/10\/20\/BL2005102001131_pf.html\" class=\"gen\">de la cabale Cheney-Rumsfeld<\/a>, apporte une lumi\u00e8re nouvelle sur le d\u00e9bat de la pr\u00e9sence US en Irak. C&rsquo;est la partie la moins cit\u00e9e de son discours sur la \u00ab <em>bastardization<\/em> \u00bb de Washington (n\u00e9ologisme int\u00e9ressant sur lequel nous allons revenir)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWilkerson est favorable au maintien des forces US en Irak, il est m\u00eame raisonnablement optimiste sur la situation irakienne en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral (ce qui montre bien que l&rsquo;homme n&rsquo;est pas un de ces dissidents, adversaires acharn\u00e9s de la politique am\u00e9ricaniste; son jugement g\u00e9n\u00e9ral sur Washington et l&rsquo;administration GW est d&rsquo;autant plus int\u00e9ressant). Sa logique pour le maintien des troupes est par contre plut\u00f4t pessimiste puisqu&rsquo;elle revient \u00e0 dire : si nous partons, nous devrons revenir et ce sera pire qu&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tVoici le passage, tel que le rapporte <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Front_Page\/GJ21Aa02.html\" class=\"gen\">Jim Lobe<\/a>: <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>On Iraq, <\/em>[Wilkerson] <em>said he was guardedly optimistic because we may have reached the point where we are actually listening to the Iraqis. US troops will likely have to remain in Iraq for between five to eight years, however, because it is strategic in the sense that Vietnam was not. He predicted that a precipitous withdrawal without leaving something behind we can trust, we will mobilize the nation, with 5 million men and women under arms to go back and take the Middle East within a decade, due to the US dependence on the region&rsquo;s energy sources.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 21 octobre 2005 \u00e0 17H30<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Partir d&rsquo;Irak? Sempiternelle question Le colonel Wilkerson, ancien chef de cabinet de Powell et l&rsquo;homme qui fait scandale \u00e0 Washington par la violence de sa d\u00e9nonciation de la cabale Cheney-Rumsfeld, apporte une lumi\u00e8re nouvelle sur le d\u00e9bat de la pr\u00e9sence US en Irak. C&rsquo;est la partie la moins cit\u00e9e de son discours sur la \u00ab&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1094,1391,4791],"class_list":["post-66944","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-lobe","tag-powell","tag-wilkerson"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66944","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66944"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66944\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66944"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66944"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66944"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}