Le strat\u00e8ge am\u00e9ricain William S. Lind, non-conformiste typique dans le paysage am\u00e9ricain, est connu pour ses avis originaux sur la situation militaire am\u00e9ricaine, et, d’une fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, sur la situation de la guerre. Lind est le th\u00e9oricien du conflit de quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration. R\u00e9cemment il s’est rendu en Europe et a suivi une sorte de reconstitution de l’offensive allemande de mai-juin 1940, avec une unit\u00e9 de l’U.S. Army. (Il \u00e9crit dans un article publi\u00e9 le 20 octobre sur le site de Defense & National Interest<\/a>: \u00ab Life occasionally offers a chance to make a boyhood dream come true, and I did just that a couple of weeks ago when I joined the Quarterhorse, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, to follow General Heinz Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps’ attack through the Ardennes to Sedan in 1940.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tParmi ses remarques, nous attirons l’attention sur celles qui ont trait au comportement des Fran\u00e7ais durant cette bataille de France de 1940. Il y a notamment sa conclusion que la fortune de cette offensive cruciale a tenu \u00e0 tr\u00e8s peu de choses et aurait pu en fonction de peu d’\u00e9l\u00e9ments tourner au d\u00e9savantage des Allemands. (L’avis de Lind est int\u00e9ressant parce que son jugement technique d’historien militaire est en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral favorable aux Allemands.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab The French were defeated as much by their own doctrine as by the Germans, a point of some relevance since U.S. Army doctrine today remains largely French, especially in its focus on synchronization.<\/em> \u00bb (…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab Our staff ride ended at the heights of Stonne, south of Sedan. Again, until I saw terrain, I did not appreciate how commanding it was. Here, what we learned dispelled one of the myths of the 1940 campaign, that the French did not fight. Stonne was captured and recaptured some seventeen times in one day, in actions where the French fought bitterly and the Germans, especially the Grossdeutschland Regiment, took heavy casualties. At one point, a single French Char B heavy tank entered the village, destroyed thirteen German tanks and then left, intact, despite taking 140 hits. That illustrated both the French superiority in equipment and the rarity of French initiative and cooperation. A bit more of both and the battle for the heights at Stonne could have gone the other way, which might have kept even Hurrying Heinz <\/em>[Guderian] from turning west toward the English Channel and operational victory.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 22 octobre 2005 \u00e0 12H00<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le strat\u00e8ge am\u00e9ricain William S. Lind, non-conformiste typique dans le paysage am\u00e9ricain, est connu pour ses avis originaux sur la situation militaire am\u00e9ricaine, et, d’une fa\u00e7on plus g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, sur la situation de la guerre. Lind est le th\u00e9oricien du conflit de quatri\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9ration. R\u00e9cemment il s’est rendu en Europe et a suivi une sorte de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[1012],"class_list":["post-66948","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-lind"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66948","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66948"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66948\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66948"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66948"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66948"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}