Les forces et les pens\u00e9es am\u00e9ricanistes ayant montr\u00e9 leur surprenante capacit\u00e9 \u00e0 ordonner l’avenir d’un pays d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 par un changement important (l’Irak d’apr\u00e8s Saddam), Washington s’estime donc investi du devoir (la question du droit n’est m\u00eame pas pos\u00e9e) d’intervenir dans les affaires de tout autre pays plong\u00e9 dans la m\u00eame situation. Le dernier \u00e0 avoir \u00e9t\u00e9 ajout\u00e9 \u00e0 la liste est le Cuba d’apr\u00e8s Castro.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tN’ayant pas r\u00e9ussi \u00e0 liquider Castro en 45 ans et un nombre records de pressions et complots aussi impudents et rocambolesques les uns que les autres, Washington semblerait donc d\u00e9cid\u00e9 \u00e0 s’occuper de l’apr\u00e8s-Castro. La NBC, relayant une information du Financial Times<\/em>, \t\u00ab US planning for Cuba’s transition after the demise of Fidel Castro has entered a new stage, with a special office for reconstruction inside the US State Department preparing for the day after, when Washington will try to back a democratic government in Havana.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab The inter-agency effort, which also involves the Defense Department, recognises that the Cuba transition may not go peacefully and that the US may have to launch a nation-building exercise. Caleb McCarry, the Cuba transition co-ordinator, is working on the project within the Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization, which was established by the Bush administration to prevent and prepare for post-conflict situations.<\/em>\u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab Every six months, the National Intelligence Council revises a secret watchlist of 25 countries in which instability could require US intervention. The reconstruction office, headed by Carlos Pascual a Cuba-born former ambassador was focused on Sudan, Haiti, Congo and Nepal. In a controversial move, Cuba was added to the list.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tD’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0, on rel\u00e8ve diverses r\u00e9ticences \u00e0 propos de cette initiative qui a beaucoup \u00e0 voir avec les groupes de pression cubains en Floride, avec les divers activistes anti-cubains d’extr\u00eame droite \u00e9voluant dans les milieux n\u00e9o-conservateurs et avec la d\u00e9magogie de la campagne \u00e9lectorale pr\u00e9sidentielle de GW en 2004. L’Institute of Peace, qui est financ\u00e9 par le Congr\u00e8s, a \u00e9t\u00e9 approch\u00e9 par le d\u00e9partement d’\u00c9tat pour participer \u00e0 l’exercice et a refus\u00e9 tout net, pour la raison, selon une source, que \u00ab [t]his was an exercise in destabilisation, not stabilisation<\/em> \u00bb. L’avis de Daniel Erikson, de l’institut Inter-American Dialogue: \u00ab The US has a history of not being very successful in achieving desired outcomes in Cuba.<\/em> \u00bb Les militaires et le Pentagone restent tr\u00e8s r\u00e9ticents, parce que l’initiative vient du d\u00e9partement d’\u00c9tat et que les actuelles campagnes dites de nation-building<\/em> (Irak et Afghanistan) semblent amplement leur suffire. Un officier US, cit\u00e9 par NBS, observe : \u00ab The truth is that nobody, including anyone on the island, knows what will happen during a transition. It’s a little like trying to figure out how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tPubli\u00e9 le 1er novembre 2005 \u00e0 10H32<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Les forces et les pens\u00e9es am\u00e9ricanistes ayant montr\u00e9 leur surprenante capacit\u00e9 \u00e0 ordonner l’avenir d’un pays d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 par un changement important (l’Irak d’apr\u00e8s Saddam), Washington s’estime donc investi du devoir (la question du droit n’est m\u00eame pas pos\u00e9e) d’intervenir dans les affaires de tout autre pays plong\u00e9 dans la m\u00eame situation. Le dernier \u00e0 avoir… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-66970","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66970","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=66970"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/66970\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=66970"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=66970"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=66970"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}