{"id":67012,"date":"2005-11-15T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-11-15T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/11\/15\/la-parabole-de-loignon\/"},"modified":"2005-11-15T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2005-11-15T00:00:00","slug":"la-parabole-de-loignon","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2005\/11\/15\/la-parabole-de-loignon\/","title":{"rendered":"La parabole de l’oignon<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La parabole de l’oignon<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t15 novembre 2005 L’autre jour (le 9 novembre), dans l’antre des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, l’American Enterprise Institute, un digne gentleman britannique, Andrew Garfield, officier de l’arm\u00e9e de terre et analyste de renseignement, s’exprimait sur la question de l’actuelle situation en Irak. Defense News<\/em> du 11 novembre<\/a> nous en fait un bref rapport. Il y a pourtant suffisamment pour trouver un vaste int\u00e9r\u00eat \u00e0 l’intervention de Andrew Garfield.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tDefense News<\/em> titre sobrement : \u00ab U.K. Expert Urges U.S. Military To Learn From N. Ireland Campaign<\/em> \u00bb. Nous d\u00e9velopperions plut\u00f4t notre titre de cette fa\u00e7on: La parabole de l’oignon, ou comment vous n’avez aucune chance de gagner la guerre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGarfield explique que les Am\u00e9ricains ne peuvent esp\u00e9rer gagner avec leur approche conventionnelle et ultra-sophistiqu\u00e9e, appuy\u00e9e sur une tactique d’offensive lourde \u00e0 outrance. Il d\u00e9veloppe une analyse de la campagne britannique en Irlande du Nord comme exemple de ce qu’il faudrait faire : \u00ab The British Army in Northern Ireland initially resorted to heavy force as its default reaction to every security situation, he said, and these operations were largely counterproductive. He cited an Irish Republican Army (IRA) chief of staff who said the best recruiting sergeant he had was the British Army, and that a lot of Irish youth joined the IRA not because of any ideology but because of heavy-handed British actions. The British Army had to shift its emphasis from using force to winning the population’s support.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Garfield said Americans should remember that people have long memories. He doesn’t believe American officials credit the Iraqis with feeling the same way about civilian casualties that Americans would in similar situations. The term collateral damage doesn’t explain the emotional damage and animosity that the death of innocent civilians can create. The classic example is the 1972 Bloody Sunday incident, when 13 demonstrators were killed by British soldiers. Garfield said the incident has haunted the British Army and British government for 35 years.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb All operations must be underpinned by the best intelligence available, Garfield said. A counterinsurgency campaign requires heavy intelligence support. In the British Army today, he said, an armored brigade has six or eight intelligence professionals to support each 5,000-man unit. The numbers are similar for U.S. Army brigades. In Northern Ireland, the British had 400 to 500 intelligence professionals to support a brigade-sized force. Those intelligence analysts cannot be on short-term rotations, he said: Most intelligence professionals deployed to Northern Ireland were there for two years on individual, not unit, rotations, so they could build continuity. Many of the intelligence professionals in more sensitive and difficult areas served even longer.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb That dedication of intelligence resources, Garfield said, allowed an intelligence picture to be developed on an adversary that wasn’t nearly as complex or large as the insurgency in Iraq. Developing a clear understanding of the insurgency requires effective coordination of all intelligence at all agency levels, which poses a considerable challenge to the United States because of the sheer size of its intelligence bureaucracy, he said. The British in Northern Ireland had the advantage of being small.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Counterinsurgency warfare requires new skill sets and cultural understanding. The average British officer or soldier did not understand the typical Catholic Irishman though they shared many characteristics certainly more than a U.S. soldier shares with the average Iraqi Sunni.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Garfield said the approach must be to look at the insurgency like an onion. Too often, the thinking in military circles is that the best way to get at the onion’s rotten core is to slice it in half. Instead, the military must peel away the layers of insurgent support until they eventually reach the center, he said. Until you peel away those layers of support, and deal with the perceived and actual grievances of the community, most of your actions are counterproductive.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa parabole de l’oignon est ce qui nous arr\u00eate particuli\u00e8rement, comme un excellent r\u00e9sum\u00e9 de la critique de Garfield : pour arriver \u00e0 son cur, il ne faut pas trancher l’oignon il faut le peler. (\u00ab Too often, the thinking in military circles is that the best way to get at the onion’s rotten core is to slice it in half. Instead, the military must peel away the layers of insurgent support until they eventually reach the center.<\/em> \u00bb) Garfield s’adresse l\u00e0 \u00e0 la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste et lui demande quelque chose d’impossible pour elle: comprendre un probl\u00e8me pour le r\u00e9soudre en douceur. Le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral belge Francis Briquemont, qui commandait pour l’ONU le secteur de Sarajevo en 1994, expliquait \u00e0 un g\u00e9n\u00e9ral am\u00e9ricain la difficult\u00e9 des probl\u00e8mes qui se posaient \u00e0 cause des rapports des communaut\u00e9s ethniques, des jeux politiques des uns et des autres, des coutumes L’autre interrompit cette litanie, visiblement agac\u00e9, et trancha comme on tranche un oignon : \u00ab Nous, en Am\u00e9rique, nous ne r\u00e9solvons pas les probl\u00e8mes, nous les \u00e9crasons.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tGarfield ne sera \u00e9videmment pas entendu. Il demande \u00e0 la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste une double d\u00e9marche qui lui est impossible : d’une part, penser une humanit\u00e9 (une culture, une sociologie, une psychologie, etc.) qui ne soit pas la sienne ; d’autre part, op\u00e9rer vis-\u00e0-vis de cette humanit\u00e9 une approche graduelle bas\u00e9e sur l’aspect qualitatif qui implique la reconnaissance de l’autre, aux d\u00e9pens de l’aspect quantitatif qui conduit \u00e0 l’\u00e9crasement de l’autre (on comprend pourquoi : l’autre per\u00e7u comme probl\u00e8me). Une remarque telle que \u00ab [t]he British in Northern Ireland had the advantage of being small<\/em> \u00bb est quelque chose qui a d\u00fb faire prendre Garfield pour un fou par son auditoire. (Si on ne le lui a pas dit, nous le lui signalons.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est l’orientation compl\u00e8tement inverse que les Am\u00e9ricains suivent et accentuent aujourd’hui en Irak, comme depuis l’origine de la campagne. Il est plus que jamais question de trancher l’oignon dans tous les sens, avec le maximum de violence possible. L’accent est mis sur les moyens offensifs et de haute technologie pour la lutte contre la gu\u00e9rilla<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCet emploi est si intensif que l’espace a\u00e9rien irakien devient trop exigu pour le volume des \u00e9changes d’ondes \u00e9lectromagn\u00e9tiques, et devient un probl\u00e8me grave pour les Am\u00e9ricains, celui-l\u00e0, ils auront de la difficult\u00e9 \u00e0 l’\u00e9craser : \u00ab Even with 21,000 jammers on the battlefield and 1,000 unmanned vehicles in the air, both are still in high demand because of their effectiveness in countering insurgent attacks, so more are on the way. Although he is supportive of both systems, <\/em>[ Lt. Gen. Walter Buchanan, commander of the 9th Air Force and Central Command Air Forces] is worried that a continued lack of organization will lead to losses. I understand we have over 1,000 (unmanned vehicles in Iraq)… with the majority of them flying below 3,000 feet, Buchanan said. That is a very thick environment. We have in fact had occasions where they have run into a helicopter. Thankfully, to my knowledge, we have not hurt anybody yet. He added, I fear that the day will come … when there is a collision with casualties.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb With the jammers, the lack of organization of radio frequency use is causing some friendly systems to jam other friendly systems, known as electronic fratricide, he said. The static is reducing the <\/em>[Unmanned Air Vehicles] Predator’s capabilities as well. In Iraq, the unmanned vehicles have a range of only about 35 miles before their communications with ground controllers are blocked by other radio signals. For comparison in Afghanistan, where there’s far less electronics in play, the Predators have a range of about 120 miles, he said.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa dualit\u00e9 am\u00e9ricaniste, entre d’une part l’\u00e9nonc\u00e9 indiff\u00e9rent des faits de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9, comme si la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 ne pr\u00e9sentait gu\u00e8re d’int\u00e9r\u00eat, et d’autre part l’avanc\u00e9e du progr\u00e8s am\u00e9ricaniste qui est l’essentiel du propos, est mise en \u00e9vidence par cette d\u00e9claration du porte-parole du Pentagone DeRita, le 1er novembre, alors que le mois d’octobre s’est av\u00e9r\u00e9 le 4\u00e8me mois le plus sanglant pour les forces US depuis la victoire d’avril 2003 : \u00ab I think we see an adversary that continues to develop some sophistication on very deadly and increasingly precise standoff weapons, IEDs specifically <\/em>[] but we’re getting better at interrupting the enemy’s decision cycle, and getting better intelligence that is allowing us to stop more of these things, find more of them.<\/em> \u00bb D’une part, on constate que les choses vont de plus en plus mal, avec l’efficacit\u00e9 des attaques en augmentation; d’autre part, on affirme triomphalement que l’on intervient de mieux en mieux et de plus en plus efficacement contre ces attaques. Aucune relation pr\u00e9cise n’est \u00e9tablie entre les deux affirmations, qui tendrait \u00e0 faire consid\u00e9rer avec un scepticisme certain, voire \u00e0 ridiculiser le triomphalisme de la seconde ; ce qui subsiste est bien l’affirmation des progr\u00e8s (technologiques, bien s\u00fbr) de la seconde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEffectivement, ce qui importe \u00e0 la bureaucratie US, c’est le d\u00e9veloppement et la mise en action des syst\u00e8mes dont elle fait la promotion, m\u00eame si la chose n’influe en rien, bien au contraire, sur la situation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale. Il y a une compl\u00e8te d\u00e9connexion, cas d\u00e9sormais courant du virtualisme bureaucratique. La logique interne du syst\u00e8me ne s’int\u00e9resse ni \u00e0 la situation en Irak, ni aux conseils de monsieur Garfield. L’important, pour l’instant, est d’affirmer l’efficacit\u00e9 exceptionnelle de tous ces co\u00fbteux syst\u00e8mes contre les IED (Improvised Explosive Devices, d\u00e9signation bureaucratique des v\u00e9hicules suicides utilis\u00e9s par les insurg\u00e9s en Irak), m\u00eame si les IED explosent et tuent plus que jamais dans la r\u00e9alit\u00e9. L’important est de justifier l’introduction d’un nouveau co\u00fbteux syst\u00e8me de brouillage offensif, le BAE USQ-113 mont\u00e9 \u00e0 bord du EA-6B Prowler<\/em> de guerre \u00e9lectronique si efficace contre les IED ; de justifier \u00e9galement le d\u00e9veloppement, d\u00e9cid\u00e9 il y a quelques semaines, d’un rempla\u00e7ant du EA-6B, le EA-18G Growler<\/em> Et ainsi de suite.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

La parabole de l’oignon 15 novembre 2005 L’autre jour (le 9 novembre), dans l’antre des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, l’American Enterprise Institute, un digne gentleman britannique, Andrew Garfield, officier de l’arm\u00e9e de terre et analyste de renseignement, s’exprimait sur la question de l’actuelle situation en Irak. Defense News du 11 novembre nous en fait un bref rapport. Il… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4835,4834,4836,4684],"class_list":["post-67012","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-ea-18g","tag-ea-6b","tag-garfield","tag-ied"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67012","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67012"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67012\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67012"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67012"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67012"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}