he U.S. administration never planned for or expected a long-term occupation: The original plan was that American troops would stay for three to four months after the fall of Baghdad and turn the country over to a friendly government that would step into the void left by the departing Hussein regime and keep the country running. U.S. planners seriously underestimated the state of the Iraqi infrastructure and the damage the economy had sustained over 10 years of sanctions.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), never adequately staffed, was plagued with problems from the beginning that were never really resolved <\/em>[…] When U.S. division commanders realized that no help would be forthcoming from the CPA, they undertook reconstruction projects on their own initiative, leading to an uncoordinated and ad hoc reconstruction effort across the country.<\/em> [… t]he U.S. military in Iraq is currently building a lot of schools that then sit empty because there are no students to fill them or teachers to staff them…<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 17 novembre 2005 \u00e0 10H53<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Lors d’une conf\u00e9rence organis\u00e9e d\u00e9but novembre par l’Army War College (U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Combat and Occupation), divers orateurs ont d\u00e9taill\u00e9 les conditions d’impr\u00e9paration et de d\u00e9sordre dans lesquelles s’est \u00e9tablie l’occupation am\u00e9ricaine en Irak. Le plus surprenant est que nombre de ces conditions perdurent, au vu et au su de tout le… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4001,3289,4840,857,4128],"class_list":["post-67018","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-apres-guerre","tag-army","tag-college","tag-irak","tag-war"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67018","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67018"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67018\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67018"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67018"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67018"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}