New York Times<\/a>, fait beaucoup de bruit. Il s’agit surtout du passage o\u00f9 le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Vines avertit que les forces irakiennes qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 constitu\u00e9es (220.000 hommes) pourraient se transformer en milices ou en gangs arm\u00e9s si le gouvernement irakien ne veillait pas \u00e0 leur entretien et \u00e0 leur r\u00e9tribution.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00ab The ability of the ministries to support them, to pay them, to resupply them, provide them with water, ammunition, spare parts and weapons is not as advanced as the competence of the forces in the field, General Vines said at his headquarters here outside of Baghdad, as a new wave of violence gripped Iraq this week. We must make significant progress in that area before they can conduct independent operations.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb General Vines cautioned that other important ministries, like oil and electricity, must also strengthen their operations for the security forces to succeed and for Iraq to prosper politically and economically.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb The reason it’s important to look at areas like governance and infrastructure is because oil is the lifeblood of Iraq, said General Vines, who commands the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, N.C. If they don’t produce enough income to support their security forces, members of those forces could turn to ulterior purposes and could become militias or armed gangs.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tIl s’agit d’un v\u00e9ritable appel de d\u00e9tresse, o\u00f9 la phrase importante est bien: \u00ab We must make significant progress in that area before they can conduct independent operations.<\/em> \u00bb Il semble en effet que ce probl\u00e8me doive \u00eatre r\u00e9gl\u00e9 tr\u00e8s rapidement, avant d’envisager des op\u00e9rations autonomes irakiennes. Il semble m\u00eame que des cas existent d\u00e9j\u00e0 o\u00f9 des unit\u00e9s irakiennes ont un statut tr\u00e8s impr\u00e9cis, \u00e0 mi-chemin entre le cadre l\u00e9gal et un cadre autonome comme celui que craint le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Vines. Cette question de la loyaut\u00e9 des forces r\u00e9guli\u00e8res est fondamentale pour les Am\u00e9ricains. Si elle n’est pas r\u00e9gl\u00e9e tr\u00e8s vite, dans les 3-4 mois qui viennent, les Am\u00e9ricains se retrouveront avec un renforcement notable des forces irr\u00e9guli\u00e8res, qu’ils auraient eux-m\u00eames contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 mettre en place.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 7 janvier 2006 \u00e0 18H05<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
L’interview du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral John R. Vines qui commande l’U.S. Army en Irak, paru le 6 janvier, dans le New York Times, fait beaucoup de bruit. Il s’agit surtout du passage o\u00f9 le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Vines avertit que les forces irakiennes qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 constitu\u00e9es (220.000 hommes) pourraient se transformer en milices ou en gangs arm\u00e9s si… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[857,4966],"class_list":["post-67157","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-irak","tag-vines"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67157","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67157"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67157\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67157"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67157"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67157"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}