{"id":67213,"date":"2006-01-25T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-01-25T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/01\/25\/la-contre-guerilla-ou-la-formidable-re-decouverte-du-fil-a-couper-le-beurre\/"},"modified":"2006-01-25T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-01-25T00:00:00","slug":"la-contre-guerilla-ou-la-formidable-re-decouverte-du-fil-a-couper-le-beurre","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/01\/25\/la-contre-guerilla-ou-la-formidable-re-decouverte-du-fil-a-couper-le-beurre\/","title":{"rendered":"La contre-gu\u00e9rilla, ou la formidable (re-)d\u00e9couverte du fil \u00e0 couper le beurre<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La contre-gu\u00e9rilla, ou la formidable (re-)d\u00e9couverte du fil \u00e0 couper le beurre<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t24 janvier 2006 Plus \u00e7a change, plus c’est la m\u00eame chose, ce fameux proverbe fran\u00e7ais ironiquement affectionn\u00e9 par nombre de critiques et r\u00e9formistes militaires US, et cit\u00e9 toujours en fran\u00e7ais dans leurs textes (am\u00e9ricains), a plus que jamais sa place et son actualit\u00e9. On y songe aussit\u00f4t avec le formidable article du sp\u00e9cialiste des affaires militaires du Washington Post<\/em>, Thomas E. Ricks, le 21 janvier 2006<\/a>. La capacit\u00e9 \u00e0 oublier instantan\u00e9ment tout enseignement, \u00e0 r\u00e9inventer le fil \u00e0 couper le beurre et \u00e0 enfoncer des portes ouvertes des penseurs et doctrinaires militaires am\u00e9ricanistes des milieux conformistes officiels est stup\u00e9fiante. Il s’agit d’une attitude bureaucratique typique grossie jusqu’\u00e0 la monstruosit\u00e9 par l’\u00e9normit\u00e9 du contexte (\u00e9normit\u00e9 du budget, des ambitions, des certitudes am\u00e9ricanistes, de l’isolement par rapport au reste du monde, par rapport \u00e0 l’exp\u00e9rience, etc). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’abord, il faut savoir ceci, nous apprend Ricks, et l’on esp\u00e8re qu’on lira la chose dans les salles de redaction, c\u00e9nacles, instituts, cabinets minist\u00e9riels europ\u00e9ens o\u00f9 la puissance, l’efficacit\u00e9, la modernit\u00e9 et la capacit\u00e9 d’adaptation des forces arm\u00e9es am\u00e9ricanistes sont r\u00e9guli\u00e8rement c\u00e9l\u00e9br\u00e9es : \u00ab The air of hubris that some Army officers displayed just a few years ago, after victories in Panama, Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and Afghanistan (and an outcome in Somalia that they blamed on their civilian overseers in the Clinton administration) has dissipated, replaced by a sense that they have a lot to learn about how to operate effectively in Iraq, and about the cultures and languages there and in other likely hot spots.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t…Et ceci encore, qui nous pr\u00e9cise que l’\u00e9tat d’esprit au sein de l’U.S. Army aujourd’hui reste assez proche de celui qu’on trouvait dans les divisions Patton en Europe, en 1944: \u00ab Officers here said they see a strong cultural shift at work for the Army, whose self-image still sometimes seems based on charging across Europe toward Berlin in 1944 and blasting Saddam Hussein’s tanks in the Arabian Desert 47 years later.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tVoici donc la r\u00e9volution en cours, cela apr\u00e8s trois ans de punching ball<\/em>, voitures-suicide, brute force<\/em> et le reste en Irak : \u00ab A fundamental change overtaking the Army is on display in classrooms across this base <\/em>[U.S. Army, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas], above the Missouri River. After decades of being told that their job was to close in on and destroy the enemy, officers are being taught that sometimes the best thing might be not to attack but to co-opt the enemy, perhaps by employing him, or encouraging him to desert, or by drawing him into local or national politics.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb It is a new focus devoted to one overarching topic: counterinsurgency, putting down an armed and political campaign against a government, the U.S. military’s imperative in Iraq.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSuivent de nombreuses et diverses consid\u00e9rations qui se r\u00e9sument \u00e0 ceci: la guerre qui est en cours en Irak n’est pas une guerre classique. Faire du Patton-1944 ne semble pas \u00eatre la bonne m\u00e9thode. Il faudrait chercher autre chose. Il faudrait se r\u00e9f\u00e9rer \u00e0 certains autres, des non-Am\u00e9ricains (quelle audace), qui semblent en conna\u00eetre un bout. On cite Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice<\/em> (traduction US) de David Galula, officier fran\u00e7ais qui avait fait l’Alg\u00e9rie. On demande leur collaboration aux Britanniques, dont on d\u00e9couvre qu’ils ont une exp\u00e9rience centenaire et au-del\u00e0 de cette sorte de combat douteux. (\u00ab Unusually, the Army and the Marines are collaborating on the new manual and also asking for input from the British army, which has had centuries of experience in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq.<\/em> \u00bb)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBien entendu, tout cela n’est pas vraiment nouveau. Galuda? Le nom est universellement r\u00e9pandu dans les milieux r\u00e9formistes US, ceux que le Pentagone n’\u00e9coute gu\u00e8re. Par exemple, sur le site Defense & National Interest<\/em>, dans un article de Elaine S. Grossman<\/a> du 2 d\u00e9cembre 2004 : \u00ab Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice’ by David Galula. May I suggest that you run not walk to the Pentagon library and get in line for this book, says one retired CIA officer with counterinsurgency experience in Vietnam, who asked not to be named. Finding a copy of the out-of-print 1964 book is almost impossible, but Galula’s writing should be regarded as a primer for how to win in Iraq, says this source.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOu bien, en remontant encore le temps, faut-il rappeler le grand cas (en ao\u00fbt 2003) qu’on fit au Pentagone du film la bataille d’Alger<\/a>, qui devait donner, dans sa description de l’action des forces fran\u00e7aises, un bon aper\u00e7u de la lutte contre la gu\u00e9rilla urbaine? On peut \u00e9galement se reporter \u00e0 une \u00e9tude<\/a> dans Parameters<\/em> (printemps 2004), de Robert R. Tomes, sous le titre : \u00ab Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare<\/em> \u00bb. On y apprend que l’U.S. Army a d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 commenc\u00e9 \u00e0 se restructurer, que les r\u00e9f\u00e9rences de l’\u00e9cole fran\u00e7aise sont d\u00e9j\u00e0 l\u00e0 (Tomes cite Roger Trinquier, colonel commandant un r\u00e9giment de la 10\u00e8me division de parachutistes de Massu en Alg\u00e9rie en 1956-58 et auteur th\u00e9orique sur la contre-gu\u00e9rilla ; autre favori des Am\u00e9ricains avec Galula), et ainsi de suite :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Pitting a traditional combined armed force trained and equipped to defeat similar military organizations against insurgents reminds one of a pile driver attempting to crush a fly, indefatigably persisting in repeating its efforts. In Indochina, for example, the French tried to drive the Vietminh into a classic pitched battle, the only kind [they] knew how to fight, in hope that superiority in material would allow an easy victory. The only way to avoid similar pitfalls, according to Trinquier, is to fight the specially adapted organization that is common to almost all subversive, violent movements seeking to overthrow the status quo. In October 2003 it appeared the United States was creating its own special organization to combat Iraqi insurgents: Task Force 121, a new joint strike unit reportedly composed of American Special Forces units and Army Rangers.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Presumably steeped in counterinsurgency warfare, Task Force 121 and other units operating against Iraqi resistance have learned the lessons of past modern wars. They will not simply sweep towns. This won’t defeat an organized insurgency. Instead, the enemy’s organization must be targeted to defeat the clandestine organization attempting to impose its will on the Iraqi people. Four elements typically encompass an insurgency: cell-networks that maintain secrecy; terror used to foster insecurity among the population and drive them to the movement for protection; multifaceted attempts to cultivate support in the general population, often by undermining the new regime; and attacks against the government. Only by identifying and destroying the infrastructure of the subversive organization can the fledgling government persevere. Stated another way, just as the traditional war is not fought with the individual soldier or platoon in mind but rather the state’s capacity and will to continue hostilities, modern war seeks to destroy the organization as a whole and not simply its violent arm or peripheral organs.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa question coule de source: pourquoi ne fait-on pas venir la Task Force 121 \u00e0 Fort Leavenworth pour enseigner la contre-gu\u00e9rilla? Elle expliquera aux jeunes t\u00eates blondes de l’U.S. Army comment, depuis l’automne 2003, elle fait un travail si efficace en Irak, dont on voit le r\u00e9sultat chaque jour Bref, bref Les militaires US sont-ils capables, non pas de se r\u00e9former, mais d’accepter l’id\u00e9e qu’une r\u00e9forme implique quelque chose de diff\u00e9rent de ce qu’ils font? On a l’impression que chaque r\u00e9forme se termine par un engloutissement de l’objet de la r\u00e9forme dans le moule de l’ American Way of War<\/em>. (En remontant le temps, on peut rappeler qu’en 1961-62, avec l’adoption de la strat\u00e9gie de la riposte gradu\u00e9e par l’administration Kennedy, l’U.S. Army avait ouvert une \u00e9cole de contre-gu\u00e9rilla \u00e0 Eglin, en Floride. Le r\u00e9sultat : le Viet-n\u00e2m.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe destin de cette nouvelle r\u00e9forme d\u00e9crite par Ricks est bien entendu r\u00e9gl\u00e9 d’avance. Le degr\u00e9 de bureaucratisation atteint par les forces arm\u00e9es US les rend incapables d’accepter un enseignement du r\u00e9el qui ne corresponde pas aux int\u00e9r\u00eats et aux conceptions internes de la bureaucratie. La psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste, fortement influenc\u00e9e, peut-\u00eatre m\u00eame form\u00e9e par cet esprit bureaucratique, et renvoyant \u00e9galement \u00e0 des constantes historiques des USA, joue \u00e9galement un r\u00f4le important dans cette impuissance. Les remarques r\u00e9centes du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral britannique Nigel Aylwin-Foster, qui ont fait beaucoup de vagues, sont l\u00e0 pour nous renforcer dans cette analyse.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t(Nous mettons en ligne en m\u00eame temps<\/a> que cet article un extrait de la rubrique Journal<\/em> de notre Lettre d’Analyse de defensa<\/em> qui rapporte et commente cette intervention, un article dans Military Review<\/em> de Nigel Aylwin-Foster.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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La contre-gu\u00e9rilla, ou la formidable (re-)d\u00e9couverte du fil \u00e0 couper le beurre 24 janvier 2006 Plus \u00e7a change, plus c’est la m\u00eame chose, ce fameux proverbe fran\u00e7ais ironiquement affectionn\u00e9 par nombre de critiques et r\u00e9formistes militaires US, et cit\u00e9 toujours en fran\u00e7ais dans leurs textes (am\u00e9ricains), a plus que jamais sa place et son actualit\u00e9.… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[5024,5025,3194,3320,5023,4449],"class_list":["post-67213","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-contre-guerilla","tag-galuda","tag-pentagone","tag-reforme","tag-ricks","tag-trinquier"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67213","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67213"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67213\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67213"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67213"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67213"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}