{"id":67233,"date":"2006-01-31T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-01-31T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/01\/31\/le-discours-sur-letat-de-gw\/"},"modified":"2006-01-31T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-01-31T00:00:00","slug":"le-discours-sur-letat-de-gw","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/01\/31\/le-discours-sur-letat-de-gw\/","title":{"rendered":"Le discours sur l’\u00e9tat de GW<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Le discours sur l’\u00e9tat de GW<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t31 janvier 2006 GW est plus que jamais GW, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 n’a qu’\u00e0 s’y faire : voil\u00e0 ce qu’a montr\u00e9 la derni\u00e8re m\u00e9saventure de cette chose qu’on pourrait qualifier de doctrine GW Bush’, qui consiste \u00e0 crier D\u00e9mocratie! D\u00e9mocratie! D\u00e9mocratie! quand tous les autres mensonges ont \u00e9chou\u00e9. Le probl\u00e8me d\u00e9j\u00e0 bien connu et en constante aggravation est que cette pression exerc\u00e9e sur la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 continue \u00e0 accro\u00eetre le d\u00e9sordre et \u00e0 renforcer des tensions internes, lesquelles sont toujours plus difficiles \u00e0 dissimuler. (Voir l’affaire Hansen<\/a>.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn signe de cet \u00e9tat des choses peut \u00eatre trouv\u00e9 dans l’article du 30 janvier de Anatol Lieven dans The International Herald Tribune<\/a>. Le dernier paragraphe de l’article est r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur du fait qu’on ne discute plus tant des politiques sp\u00e9cifiques de l’administration mais de l’\u00e9tat structurel de l’administration dont t\u00e9moignent ces politiques : <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab In fact, the distance between Bush administration rhetoric and observable reality in some areas is beginning to look almost reminiscent of Soviet Communism. And as in the Soviet Union, this gap is also becoming more and more apparent to the rest of the world<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tC’est un autre fait r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur qu’un collaborateur d’un journal aussi conformiste et am\u00e9ricaniste que l’IHT conclue son article sur une comparaison entre le r\u00e9gime am\u00e9ricaniste et le r\u00e9gime sovi\u00e9tique sur le d\u00e9clin, \u00e0 l’\u00e8re du brejn\u00e9visme. (Lieven<\/a> est Britannique et historien. Sa vision de l’Am\u00e9rique est devenue extr\u00eamement audacieuse, comme on le lit par exemple dans un article du 29 novembre 2005<\/a> du Financial Times<\/em>. Sa pr\u00e9sence r\u00e9guli\u00e8re dans les colonnes de l’IHT n’en est que plus significative.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t L’Am\u00e9rique de GW devient une \u00e9norme g\u00e9rontocratie fard\u00e9e en jeunette. Dans ce cas, il n’est pas question d’\u00e2ge en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral car, entre le body-building<\/em> et le bidouillage esth\u00e9tique, on pourrait croire qu’on fait bonne figure, non, plut\u00f4t une question de scl\u00e9rose de l’esprit, de scl\u00e9rose de l’imagination, de noyade dans le mensonge automatique, le scandale \u00e0 peine relev\u00e9, la corruption ad usual<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tOn n’a m\u00eame plus le cur de s’\u00e9bahir, de rire ou de s’effrayer de la psychologie faith-based<\/a> de GW, ni de GW et de sa consid\u00e9rable m\u00e9diocrit\u00e9 non plus. Le discours annuel du Pr\u00e9sident sur l’\u00e9tat de l’Union de ce soir est attendu par George F. Will (voir plus loin) comme le discours sur l’\u00e9tat de notre cynisme, et le d\u00e9couragement de Will le d\u00e9sormais bien mal nomm\u00e9 est exemplaire. Mais GW, plein d’allant, avec cette esp\u00e8ce d’alacrit\u00e9 des simples d’esprit irresponsables, reste exemplaire \u00e0 sa fa\u00e7on et a toutes les chances de susciter bien d’autres catastrophes, gr\u00e2ce \u00e0 une bureaucratie dont la servilit\u00e9 commence \u00e0 appara\u00eetre, elle aussi, comme exemplaire. Que de situations exemplaires dans notre \u00e9poque \u00e9trange.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAnatol Lieven, d\u00e9j\u00e0 cit\u00e9, \u00e9gr\u00e8ne les erreurs de l’administration GW d’une fa\u00e7on qui ne peut plus nous \u00e9tonner. Il est extraordinaire qu’il faille encore \u00e9crire des choses pareilles, que leur \u00e9nonc\u00e9 se r\u00e9v\u00e8le utile et n\u00e9cessaire pour tenter de faire envisager par ceux qui font la grande politique une inflexion n\u00e9cessaire : \u00ab The most important lesson of the <\/em>[Palestinian] elections is that the United States cannot afford to use the rhetoric of spreading democracy as an excuse for avoiding dealing with pressing national grievances and wishes. If the United States pursues or supports policies that are detested by a majority of ordinary people, then these people will react accordingly if they are given a chance to vote.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLieven est d’ailleurs si convaincu que sa critique n\u00e9cessaire n’aura aucun effet qu’il annonce d\u00e9j\u00e0 les futures catastrophes. L’Iran est, bien entendu, en t\u00eate de liste : \u00ab Above all, U.S. policy makers must understand that other peoples have their own national pride and national interests, which they expect their governments and representatives to defend. In Russia in the 1990s, the liberals helped to destroy their electoral chances by giving Russian voters the impression that they put deference to American wishes above the interests of Russia.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Today, Americans who want to support liberal revolution in Iran as a way of making Iran more responsive to U.S. and Israeli demands are making the same mistake. And in order to understand this, it is hardly necessary to study Russia or Iran. In the United States, if a political party were supported by a foreign country, and gave the impression of serving that country’s interests, would it stand any chance of being elected to anything?<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But in truth, the present centrality of the democratization idea to administration rhetoric does not come from any study of the Middle East, or of reality in general. Rather, the Bush administration has fallen back on this rhetoric in part because all other paths and justifications have failed or been rejected. The administration desperately needed some big vision that would give the American people the impression of a plan for the war on terror, promising something beyond tighter domestic security and endless military operations.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBien entendu, ces conseils sont inutiles parce que, plus que jamais, GW vit dans sa bulle ferm\u00e9e \u00e0 double tour, il est compl\u00e8tement adepte et membre de la faith-based community<\/em>. Il est intouchable et sa bureaucratie est d\u00e9sormais engag\u00e9e pour une seule mission, extraordinaire quand on songe \u00e0 ce que devrait \u00eatre pour un haut fonctionnaire la mission de protection du bien public, comme dit le chef des relations publiques de la NASA George Deutsch<\/a> : \u00ab Mr. Deutsch said his job was to make the president look good and that as a White House appointee that might be Mr. Deutsch’s priority.<\/em> \u00bb C’est une r\u00e9ussite, finalement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tAh oui, l’\u00e9tat de l’Union<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCitons, en passant, l’excellent James Carroll<\/a> terminer son oraison ricanante et d\u00e9sesp\u00e9r\u00e9e par ces mots, qui concernent le pr\u00e9sident GW Bush: \u00ab In each case, Bush is presiding over a self-serving delusion, in concert with a self-emasculating Congress, his partners as would-be war profiteers. Anticipating tomorrow night, one could say Bush will, on this question, be lying to the American people again. But that would presume he is not first lying to himself. State of war? No. State of the Union? Catastrophe, pure and simple.<\/em> \u00bb <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEt puis laissons les derniers mots \u00e0 un commentateur qui fut pourtant du parti de la guerre en Irak (il a chang\u00e9), de GW (il a sans doute chang\u00e9 sans qu’il se l’avoue), de l’am\u00e9ricanisme triomphant (il n’a pas chang\u00e9 mais on sent poindre le d\u00e9couragement), c’est-\u00e0-dire le commentateur George F. Will<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe titre de son texte nous en dit long : \u00ab The State Of Our Cynicism.<\/em> \u00bb Et puis, pour r\u00e9sumer : \u00ab Tonight, on the 1,050th day of the Iraq war (the 912th day of American participation in World War II was D-Day), the nation needs an adult hour, including a measured meditation on overreaching, from the Middle East to Medicare’s prescription drug entitlement. But in State of the Union addresses, rarely is heard a discouraging word.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEnfin, allons nous coucher tranquillement. Nous ne saurons rien de plus demain que nous ne sachions d\u00e9j\u00e0.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Le discours sur l’\u00e9tat de GW 31 janvier 2006 GW est plus que jamais GW, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 n’a qu’\u00e0 s’y faire : voil\u00e0 ce qu’a montr\u00e9 la derni\u00e8re m\u00e9saventure de cette chose qu’on pourrait qualifier de doctrine GW Bush’, qui consiste \u00e0 crier D\u00e9mocratie! D\u00e9mocratie! D\u00e9mocratie! quand tous les autres mensonges ont \u00e9chou\u00e9. Le probl\u00e8me… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[2631,3756,3198,4419,4049,963,4200],"class_list":["post-67233","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-de","tag-etat","tag-gw","tag-lunion","tag-lieven","tag-urss","tag-will"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67233","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67233"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67233\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67233"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67233"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67233"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}