{"id":67236,"date":"2006-02-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-02-02T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/02\/02\/irak-bureaucratie-la-coalition-qui-a-vaincu-rumsfeld\/"},"modified":"2006-02-02T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-02-02T00:00:00","slug":"irak-bureaucratie-la-coalition-qui-a-vaincu-rumsfeld","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/02\/02\/irak-bureaucratie-la-coalition-qui-a-vaincu-rumsfeld\/","title":{"rendered":"Irak + bureaucratie, la coalition qui a vaincu Rumsfeld"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>C&rsquo;est la semaine prochaine que la QDR-2005 sera rendue publique. Les grandes lignes en sont d&rsquo;ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 connues. On sait qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;y aura aucun grand changement, que la QDR poursuit <em>grosso modo<\/em> la ligne traditionnelle. Aucun des grands programmes issus de la Guerre froide, dont on sait la compl\u00e8te inutilit\u00e9, n&rsquo;est mis en question.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est une <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=1635\" class=\"gen\">d\u00e9faite personnelle<\/a> de Donald Rumsfeld. Arriv\u00e9 au Pentagone en janvier 2001 avec des id\u00e9es de r\u00e9forme presque r\u00e9volutionnaire, rassembl\u00e9es sous le nom de <em>transformation<\/em>, il voit aujourd&rsquo;hui la derni\u00e8re chance s\u00e9rieuse de tenter d&rsquo;imposer des changements structurels lui \u00e9chapper avec cette QDR des plus conformistes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tRumsfeld a \u00e9t\u00e9 battu par une coalition de circonstance : sa vieille ennemie, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=201\" class=\"gen\">la bureaucratie<\/a> bien entendu, et la guerre en Irak qui l&rsquo;a tenu \u00e9loign\u00e9 de la bataille bureaucratique durant l&rsquo;\u00e9laboration de la QDR. C&rsquo;est ce point que souligne notamment un article du <a href=\"http:\/\/fairuse.100webcustomers.com\/fairenough\/nyt022.html\" class=\"gen\">New York Times<\/a> d&rsquo;aujourd&rsquo;hui : \u00ab <em>One reason this year&rsquo;s review did not make more far-reaching changes seems to be that the conflict in Iraq prevented Mr. Rumsfeld from devoting as much attention to this review as he did in the past.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>In 2001, you couldn&rsquo;t make a major decision without Secretary Rumsfeld in the room, said a former Pentagon official, Michelle Flournoy, who took part in the last review. This time, he didn&rsquo;t take the hands-on role that he did in 2001.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>Mr. Rumsfeld delegated much of the daily work to his aides and to Mr. England, a former weapons industry executive who was Navy secretary before succeeding Paul D. Wolfowitz in April. Several analysts who followed the process closely said that when Mr. England took over the review in early summer, he helped a process that was adrift but that he shied away from far-reaching changes in the priorities of the Army, Navy, Coast Guard and Marines.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>When Mr. Rumsfeld&rsquo;s aides did try to pare down the services&rsquo; wish lists, they were often outmaneuvered, analysts said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tPubli\u00e9 le 2 f\u00e9vrier 2005 \u00e0 09H14<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>C&rsquo;est la semaine prochaine que la QDR-2005 sera rendue publique. Les grandes lignes en sont d&rsquo;ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 connues. On sait qu&rsquo;il n&rsquo;y aura aucun grand changement, que la QDR poursuit grosso modo la ligne traditionnelle. Aucun des grands programmes issus de la Guerre froide, dont on sait la compl\u00e8te inutilit\u00e9, n&rsquo;est mis en question.&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2623,857,4482,569],"class_list":["post-67236","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-bureaucratie","tag-irak","tag-qdr","tag-rumsfeld"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67236","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67236"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67236\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67236"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67236"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67236"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}