{"id":67267,"date":"2006-02-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-02-11T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/02\/11\/avec-les-menaces-de-bush-cie-le-pire-est-toujours-probable-le-cas-du-nucleaire-iranien\/"},"modified":"2006-02-11T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-02-11T00:00:00","slug":"avec-les-menaces-de-bush-cie-le-pire-est-toujours-probable-le-cas-du-nucleaire-iranien","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/02\/11\/avec-les-menaces-de-bush-cie-le-pire-est-toujours-probable-le-cas-du-nucleaire-iranien\/","title":{"rendered":"Avec les menaces de Bush &amp; Cie, le pire est toujours probable : le cas du nucl\u00e9aire iranien"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Pourquoi les Iraniens envisagent-ils de fabriquer, ou bien ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 lanc\u00e9 la fabrication d&rsquo;une arme nucl\u00e9aire? Paul Pillar, analyste de la CIA, charg\u00e9 de la r\u00e9daction du rapport annuel g\u00e9n\u00e9ral d&rsquo;estimation (NIE pour National Intelligence Estimates) sur l&rsquo;Iran de 2002 \u00e0 2005, rapporte que la crainte d&rsquo;attaques de la part des USA et d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl constitue un facteur important. Pillar: \u00ab <em>Iranian perceptions of threat, especially from the United States and Israel, were not the only factor but were in our judgment part of what drove whatever effort they were making to build nuclear weapons.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDiverses appr\u00e9ciations dans ce sens sont recueillies dans un article de Gareth Porter, sur <a href=\"http:\/\/ipsnews.net\/news.asp?idnews=32068\" class=\"gen\">IPS News<\/a> le 7 f\u00e9vrier. \u00ab <em>Ellen Laipson, now president of the Henry L. Stimson Centre in Washington, managed three or four NIEs on Iran as national intelligence officer for the Near East from 1990 to 1993, and closely followed others as vice chair of the National Intelligence Council from 1997 to 2002.  In an interview with IPS, she said the Iranian fear of an attack by the United States has long been a standard element in NIEs on Iran. Laipson said she was virtually certain the estimates linked Iran&rsquo;s threat perceptions to its nuclear programme. <\/em>[&#8230;]. <em>Laipson said the intelligence analysts had a fairly consistent understanding of Iranian perceptions of threat. We could tell they were afraid of the U.S. both from their behaviour and from their public statements.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLa politique agressive des USA vis-\u00e0-vis de l&rsquo;Iran, notamment avec des d\u00e9clarations publiques (le fameux axe du mal du discours sur l&rsquo;\u00e9tat de l&rsquo;Union de 2002, dans lequel l&rsquo;Iran \u00e9tait compris), a fortement contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 fortifier la volont\u00e9 iranienne de se doter d&rsquo;armes de destruction massive, dont le nucl\u00e9aire. \u00ab <em>A declassified letter from the CIA to Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Bob Graham on Apr. 8, 2002 <\/em>[&#8230;] <em>stated, There appears to be broad consensus among Iranians that they live in a highly dangerous region and face serious external threats to their government, prompting us to assess that Tehran will pursue missile and WMD technologies indefinitely as critical means of national security.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00bb <em>The letter then suggested that the external threats were focused largely on the United States, adding that persistent suspicion of U.S. motives will help preserve the broad consensus among Iran&rsquo;s political elite and public for the pursuit of missile and WMD technologies as a matter of critical national security.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEnfin, dans cette revue d&rsquo;analyses d&rsquo;un bon sens qui semble \u00e9chapper aux Occidentaux, appara\u00eet l&rsquo;id\u00e9e que l&rsquo;absence de menaces et l&rsquo;absence de contraintes sont \u00e9videmment les meilleurs moyens d&rsquo;arr\u00eater l&rsquo;\u00e9volution d&rsquo;un pays, et de l&rsquo;Iran en l&rsquo;occurrence, vers le d\u00e9veloppement du nucl\u00e9aire. \u00ab <em>Joseph Cirincione, a non-proliferation specialist at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, told IPS that an analysis that links Iran&rsquo;s security concerns about the United States have driven its quest for nuclear weapons would be consistent with the history of other nations&rsquo; policies toward acquiring nuclear weapons. No nation has ever been coerced into giving up a nuclear programme, he said, but many have been convinced to do so by the disappearance of the threat.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 11 f\u00e9vrier 2006 \u00e0 15H41<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Pourquoi les Iraniens envisagent-ils de fabriquer, ou bien ont d\u00e9j\u00e0 lanc\u00e9 la fabrication d&rsquo;une arme nucl\u00e9aire? Paul Pillar, analyste de la CIA, charg\u00e9 de la r\u00e9daction du rapport annuel g\u00e9n\u00e9ral d&rsquo;estimation (NIE pour National Intelligence Estimates) sur l&rsquo;Iran de 2002 \u00e0 2005, rapporte que la crainte d&rsquo;attaques de la part des USA et d&rsquo;Isra\u00ebl constitue&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[2773,5084,5085,3004,5086],"class_list":["post-67267","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-iran","tag-menaces","tag-nie","tag-nucleaire","tag-pillar"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67267","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67267"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67267\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67267"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67267"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67267"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}