\t24 f\u00e9vrier 2006 Aujourd’hui, le Guardian<\/a> signale la pr\u00e9sence, depuis le 16 f\u00e9vrier, sur le site outmoderates.org<\/a> de documents (officiels) internes du d\u00e9partement am\u00e9ricain de la d\u00e9fense obtenus sous contrainte du Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Ces documents regroupent des notes de Stephen Cambone, alors adjoint de Rumsfeld et depuis charg\u00e9 du renseignement au DoD, reprenant des instructions de ce m\u00eame Rumsfeld. Ils montrent que le jour m\u00eame de l’attaque du 11 septembre 2001, Rumsfeld d\u00e9signait Saddam Hussein autant que Ben Laden comme un des responsables probables de l’attaque, et plut\u00f4t Saddam que Ben Laden. Il donnait instruction \u00ab to move swiftly<\/em> \u00bb et \u00ab [to] go massive<\/em> \u00bb pour trouver (dans le sens le plus large du mot, n’est-ce pas) une preuve de l’ implication de Saddam dans l’attaque alors que celle de Ben Laden \u00e9tait, elle, document\u00e9e par certains indices. Ces documents confirment une information de CBS.News publi\u00e9e le 9 septembre 2002<\/a> sous le titre de : \u00ab Plans For Iraq Attack Began On 9\/11<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tThad Anderson, l’\u00e9diteur du site outmoderates.org<\/em>, \u00e9crit le 16 f\u00e9vrier: \u00ab On July 23, 2005, I submitted an electronic Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of Defense seeking DoD staffer Stephen Cambone’s notes from meetings with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld on the afternoon of September 11, 2001. Cambone’s notes were cited heavily in the 9\/11 Commission Report’s reconstruction of the day’s events. On February 10, 2006, I received a response from the DoD which includes partially-redacted copies of Cambone’s notes.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe Guardian<\/em> relate de cette fa\u00e7on les trouvailles du site outmoderates.org<\/em>, dans son article du jour : \u00ab Hours after a commercial plane struck the Pentagon on September 11 2001 the US defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was issuing rapid orders to his aides to look for evidence of Iraqi involvement, according to notes taken by one of them. Hard to get good case. Need to move swiftly, the notes say. Near term target needs go massive sweep it all up, things related and not.<\/em> […}<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The Pentagon confirmed the notes had been taken by Stephen Cambone, now undersecretary of defence for intelligence and then a senior policy official. His notes were fulfilling his role as a plans guy, said a spokesman, Greg Hicks. He was responsible for crisis planning, and he was with the secretary in that role that afternoon.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The report said: On the afternoon of 9\/11, according to contemporaneous notes, Secretary Rumsfeld instructed General Myers [the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff] to obtain quickly as much information as possible. The notes indicate that he also told Myers that he was not simply interested in striking empty training sites. He thought the US response should consider a wide range of options. The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time, not only Bin Laden. Secretary Rumsfeld later explained that at the time he had been considering either one of them, or perhaps someone else, as the responsible party.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The actual notes suggest a focus on Saddam. Best info fast. Judge whether good enough [to] hit SH at same time not only UBL [Pentagon shorthand for Usama\/Osama bin Laden], the notes say. Tasks. Jim Haynes [Pentagon lawyer] to talk with PW [probably Paul Wolfowitz, then Mr Rumsfeld’s deputy] for additional support … connection with UBL.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’information diffus\u00e9e par CBS.News en septembre 2002 s’av\u00e8re remarquablement exacte. Les termes m\u00eames des notes de Rumsfeld sont cit\u00e9es exactement. Le texte de CBS.News montre encore plus clairement que Rumsfeld, mis en pr\u00e9sence d’indications pouvant impliquer Ben Laden, \u00e9tait inclin\u00e9 \u00e0 une certaine d\u00e9fiance tandis qu’il insistait pour impliquer Saddam, qu’aucune information n’impliquait dans l’attaque.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCes informations diverses et qui se recoupent toutes permettent de confirmer de fa\u00e7on pr\u00e9cise que Saddam Hussein \u00e9tait, d\u00e8s le 11 septembre 2001, l’objectif privil\u00e9gi\u00e9 de Rumsfeld (et du reste de la direction am\u00e9ricaniste) alors qu’aucune indication ne justifiait cette orientation. (Comme l’on sait, rien n’est venu alimenter, depuis, un quelconque lien de Saddam avec l’attaque du 11 septembre 2001.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe cas d’une volont\u00e9 arr\u00eat\u00e9e de l’administration d’attaquer l’Irak avant m\u00eame l’attaque du 11 septembre est largement renforc\u00e9, sinon confirm\u00e9. Comme l’on sait, cette th\u00e8se est bien plus que sp\u00e9culative puisqu’elle a \u00e9t\u00e9 fortement illustr\u00e9e par le t\u00e9moignage du secr\u00e9taire au tr\u00e9sor O’Neill selon lequel il existait une volont\u00e9 tr\u00e8s forte d’attaquer l’Irak d\u00e8s l’entr\u00e9e en fonction de l’administration (O’Neill l’avait constat\u00e9 lors des premi\u00e8res r\u00e9unions du cabinet). Le probl\u00e8me pendant \u00e9tait le pr\u00e9texte. 9\/11 fit l’affaire. R\u00e9pondant \u00e0 son instinct, Rumsfeld d\u00e9signa aussit\u00f4t Saddam le jour de l’attaque (\u00ab The secretary said his instinct was to hit Saddam Hussein at the same time, not only Bin Laden<\/em> \u00bb).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tCes confirmations diverses font bien plus que confirmer un point d’histoire d’ores et d\u00e9j\u00e0 largement acquis malgr\u00e9 la for\u00eat de mensonges \u00e9difi\u00e9e par l’administration GW. Elles renforcent notablement, voire d\u00e9cisivement, la th\u00e8se d’une attaque li\u00e9e \u00e0 la d\u00e9cision de Saddam de passer du dollar \u00e0 l’euro, th\u00e8se qui a toute son actualit\u00e9 puisqu’elle est reprise pour l’Iran, avec la cr\u00e9ation attendue de l’IOB le 20 mars<\/a>. De m\u00eame, et de fa\u00e7on encore plus significative, elle renforce cette th\u00e8se dans le cadre du discours de Ron Paul<\/a> le 15 f\u00e9vrier, devant la Chambre des Repr\u00e9sentants.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tPour rappel, le passage du discours de Ron Paul qui nous int\u00e9resse : \u00ab In November 2000 Saddam Hussein demanded Euros for his oil. His arrogance was a threat to the dollar; his lack of any military might was never a threat. At the first cabinet meeting with the new administration in 2001, as reported by Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, the major topic was how we would get rid of Saddam Hussein though there was no evidence whatsoever he posed a threat to us. This deep concern for Saddam Hussein surprised and shocked O’Neill.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb It now is common knowledge that the immediate reaction of the administration after 9\/11 revolved around how they could connect Saddam Hussein to the attacks, to justify an invasion and overthrow of his government. Even with no evidence of any connection to 9\/11, or evidence of weapons of mass destruction, public and congressional support was generated through distortions and flat out misrepresentation of the facts to justify overthrowing Saddam Hussein.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb There was no public talk of removing Saddam Hussein because of his attack on the integrity of the dollar as a reserve currency by selling oil in Euros. Many believe this was the real reason for our obsession with Iraq. I doubt it was the only reason, but it may well have played a significant role in our motivation to wage war. Within a very short period after the military victory, all Iraqi oil sales were carried out in dollars. The Euro was abandoned.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb In 2001, Venezuela’s ambassador to Russia spoke of Venezuela switching to the Euro for all their oil sales. Within a year there was a coup attempt against Chavez, reportedly with assistance from our CIA.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb After these attempts to nudge the Euro toward replacing the dollar as the world’s reserve currency were met with resistance, the sharp fall of the dollar against the Euro was reversed. These events may well have played a significant role in maintaining dollar dominance.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb It’s become clear the U.S. administration was sympathetic to those who plotted the overthrow of Chavez, and was embarrassed by its failure. The fact that Chavez was democratically elected had little influence on which side we supported.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Now, a new attempt is being made against the petrodollar system. Iran, another member of the axis of evil, has announced her plans to initiate an oil bourse in March of this year. Guess what, the oil sales will be priced Euros, not dollars.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tNotre conclusion de ce remarquable raccourci de communication et d’information sera de plusieurs ordres:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t• La communication publique de documents aussi sensibles ne doit pas surprendre. La bureaucratie marche bien lorsqu’il s’agit de son fonctionnement structurel, c’est-\u00e0-dire sans exigence d’efficacit\u00e9 et de productivit\u00e9. Elle archive tout et, quand elle le doit, r\u00e9pond aux lois de la Grande R\u00e9publique, dont un certain nombre concernent la libert\u00e9 d’acc\u00e8s aux documents officiels, nullement par go\u00fbt id\u00e9aliste de la libert\u00e9 mais parce que le syst\u00e8me doit veiller \u00e0 un r\u00e9seau de contr\u00f4le et de surveillance de ses diff\u00e9rents composants pour qu’aucun n’acquiert de pr\u00e9\u00e9minence bureaucratique sur l’autre. Les USA ne sont pas en danger de devenir une dictature ; ils sont une sorte de pouvoir bureaucratique, en voie de devenir totalitaire, conduit par un syst\u00e8me qui \u00e9tablit ses propres r\u00e8gles de fonctionnement et, bien entendu, les respects. Aucune vertu dans cette sorte de libert\u00e9 codifi\u00e9e mais la recherche d’une permanence de la structure machiniste en bon \u00e9tat de marche. Quant au r\u00e9sultat (est-ce pr\u00e9f\u00e9rable \u00e0 une dictature ?), ce sera \u00e0 l’Histoire d’en juger. Les effets sur la situation du monde sont d\u00e9j\u00e0 \u00e9loquents.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00a0Face \u00e0 cette situation, Internet est d\u00e9finitivement install\u00e9 comme un outil central de r\u00e9sistance. Dans le cas pr\u00e9sent, c’est Internet qui a ressorti l’affaire au moment o\u00f9 il importait de le faire. L’information de CBS.News \u00e9tait enterr\u00e9e et non confirm\u00e9e. Le relais de la grande presse se fait maintenant sans coup f\u00e9rir. Le relais du Guardian<\/em> s’est fait sans sollicitation de Thad Anderson, par simple exploitation d’une information dont l’existence avait \u00e9t\u00e9 signal\u00e9e au journal.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00a0Sur le fond de l’affaire, on peut conclure que ces r\u00e9v\u00e9lations (ces confirmations) renforcent l’id\u00e9e que la crise iranienne porterait aussi bien, sinon plus, sur la question du paiement du p\u00e9trole et, plus largement, sur la question strat\u00e9gique centrale de l’h\u00e9g\u00e9monie du dollar. De toutes les fa\u00e7ons, la crise iranienne est beaucoup plus complexe et grave que l’image officielle (le d\u00e9veloppement nucl\u00e9aire de l’Iran) qui en est offerte, et aussi que la crise irakienne qui a pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9 et qui se poursuit.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le jour m\u00eame (9\/11), Rumsfeld veut attaquer l’Irak 24 f\u00e9vrier 2006 Aujourd’hui, le Guardian signale la pr\u00e9sence, depuis le 16 f\u00e9vrier, sur le site outmoderates.org de documents (officiels) internes du d\u00e9partement am\u00e9ricain de la d\u00e9fense obtenus sous contrainte du Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Ces documents regroupent des notes de Stephen Cambone, alors adjoint de… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[4747,3397,60,857,2773,569,981],"class_list":["post-67300","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-9-11","tag-euro","tag-internet","tag-irak","tag-iran","tag-rumsfeld","tag-saddam"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67300","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67300"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67300\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67300"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67300"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67300"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}