{"id":67362,"date":"2006-03-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-03-19T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/03\/19\/les-mauvais-scenars-de-hollywood-on-the-potomac\/"},"modified":"2006-03-19T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-03-19T00:00:00","slug":"les-mauvais-scenars-de-hollywood-on-the-potomac","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/03\/19\/les-mauvais-scenars-de-hollywood-on-the-potomac\/","title":{"rendered":"Les mauvais \u201csc\u00e9nars\u201d de Hollywood-on-the Potomac<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

Les mauvais sc\u00e9nars de Hollywood-on-the Potomac<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t19 mars 2006 Sans doute la massive op\u00e9ration d’assaut a\u00e9rien (assaut a\u00e9ro-terrestre) autour de la ville rebelle de Samarra, d\u00e9sign\u00e9 par le code de Operation Swarmer<\/em>, convient-elle pour f\u00eater \u00e0 la mesure de l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement le troisi\u00e8me anniversaire de la guerre en Irak. L’aspect remarquable de cette affaire est la rapidit\u00e9 de l’usage publicitaire qui en fut fait, et la rapidit\u00e9 \u00e9gale de la mise \u00e0 jour et de la d\u00e9nonciation de cet usage publicitaire. Quarante-huit heures apr\u00e8s son d\u00e9clenchement et sa pr\u00e9sentation comme \u00ab the largest air assault operation since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003<\/em> \u00bb, la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d’une op\u00e9ration militaire faite dans un but principal de relations publiques \u00e9tait largement mise en \u00e9vidence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’un des articles les plus tranchants \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard est celui de Jim Muir, publi\u00e9 par BBC.News<\/a> le 17 mars : \u00ab It was billed by the US military as the largest air assault operation since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, with attack and assault aircraft providing aerial weapons support for 1,500 US and Iraqi commandos moving in to clear a suspected insurgent operating area north-east of Samarra.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The international news agencies immediately rang the urgent bells on the story.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Around the world, programmes were interrupted as screens flashed the news, which dominated the global media agenda for the next 12 hours or more.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb On the New York Stock Exchange, oil prices jumped $1.41 (\u00a30.80) a barrel with a massive US-led air assault in Iraq intensifying jitters about global supplies of crude, as one agency reported it.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb By the middle of Day Two in the ongoing operation, it was clear from both US and Iraqi military sources that the advance had met no resistance.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb There were no clashes with insurgents. No casualties were reported.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb In what was clearly a combing operation using cordon-and-search tactics in a patch of remote desert terrain with scattered farms and homesteads, military spokesmen said the advancing forces uncovered six caches containing arms, explosives and other insurgent material.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb They detained 48 people, of whom 17 were freed without delay. Officials said they did not believe they had captured any significant insurgent leaders. Any leaders there must have seen the forces coming, and escaped, said one senior Iraqi security source.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb By the middle of Day Two, the operation had already been scaled down to 900 men.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Operation Swarmer clearly bore no comparison in scale to the initial attack which brought down Saddam Hussein’s regime, or to the massive assault on the insurgent stronghold in the city of Falluja in November 2004.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuelques commentateurs z\u00e9l\u00e9s se pr\u00e9cipit\u00e8rent pour y voir un \u00e9v\u00e9nement militaire important, voire d\u00e9cisif (a giant end of war thing<\/em>). Fox News se distingue, comme l’a not\u00e9 le site War Hound<\/a> le 17 mars.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, les commentaires vont dans le sens de voir dans cette op\u00e9ration militaire une op\u00e9ration de relations publiques. Avec une prudence toute britannique mais n\u00e9anmoins une fermet\u00e9 du propos qui \u00e9carte l’ambigu\u00eft\u00e9, Jim Muir exprime clairement la th\u00e8se: \u00ab The reasons for it being given such high-profile publicity are clearly open to speculation. The operation came at a time when support at home for President Bush and his campaign in Iraq is running very low, and when the international media were preparing to focus on the third anniversary of the war, just three days later.<\/em> \u00bb Muir observe qu’une r\u00e9elle ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 entretenue sur le sens du terme air assault<\/em>, qui a pu signifier dans un premier temps, pour le public m\u00eame averti, une attaque a\u00e9rienne d’une puissance sans pr\u00e9c\u00e9dent:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The use of the phrase the largest air assault operation was clearly crucial, raising visions of a massive bombing campaign. In fact, all the phrase meant is that more helicopters were deployed to airlift the troops into the area than in previous such operations. The 50 aircraft that had been deployed were not combat jets blasting insurgent targets, but helicopters ferrying in the forces. There was no rocketing or bombing from the sky.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn effort de relations publiques important a \u00e9t\u00e9 accompli pour exploiter l’effet initial obtenu sur la presse. \u00ab Unusually, high-quality photographs and video footage of the initial deployment were made available to the press towards the end of Day One of what was billed as a campaign that would last several days. Some international media were given unusually swift military embeds to the area.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tJuan Cole, sp\u00e9cialiste am\u00e9ricain (et notablement dissident) des questions irakiennes, donne sur son site son interpr\u00e9tation<\/a> de cette \u00e9trange op\u00e9ration. Il en fait une initiative du commandement am\u00e9ricain. Voici quelques extraits : \u00ab The US military command in Iraq, perhaps despairing of inaction in Washington, does not seem to have sought the authorization of President Bush for this operation. It does make you wonder what Bush thinks he is doing. After the Samarra shrine bombing, which many Iraqis blamed on the US one way or another, Bush should have been going on Iraqi television and addressing them directly as to what would be done about it. Instead, he kept trying to tell the Americans that things were actually just wonderful in Iraq.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb This Samarra operation is probably mainly a political act. The US generals are attempting to demonstrate to their Shiite allies that they take seriously the terror attack on the Askari Shrine on Feb. 22. Presumably they are also attempting to ensure that if the shrine is rebuilt, it won’t just be blown up again. Short of pulling a Fallujah on Samarra, however– which would involve emptying the city and then destroying it– it is difficult to see how the US\/ Iraqi government forces can prevail. Even then, they would just face sullen suicide bombers thereafter, as has happened in Fallujah, where 2\/3s of the buildings were damaged and a large part of the population permanently dispossessed.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Frankly, the Samarra Operation Swarm’ <\/em>[sic] is probably also meant to give the impression of progress or at least of activity in Iraq, where the political process is stalled and the guerrillas seem to strike at will, with increasing political success.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNotre perception de cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement est diff\u00e9rente de celle de Cole et tend \u00e0 se rapprocher de ce que sugg\u00e8re Jim Muir. Nous nous tournons vers Washington pour en avoir l’explication. Nous reconstituerions le sc\u00e9nario de ce curieux \u00e9pisode de la fa\u00e7on suivante :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Le pouvoir politique (Karl Rove) voulait un gros coup en Irak, au moment du 3\u00e8me anniversaire de la guerre, qui \u00e9clips\u00e2t l’\u00e9pouvantable impression actuelle et les sondages catastrophiques de GW. La demande a \u00e9t\u00e9 adress\u00e9e \u00e0 Rumsfeld, qui l’a r\u00e9percut\u00e9e vers les militaires.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Les militaires se sont ex\u00e9cut\u00e9s en assurant un service minimum : une op\u00e9ration assez banale, mais pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e avec le maximum de publicit\u00e9 et de fanfare. Ils ont choisi un objectif de peu de risque, leur assurant le minimum de pertes (et m\u00eame, pas de pertes du tout), sans d’ailleurs tenter d’en faire plus accroire, le d\u00e9ploiement de mat\u00e9riels restant assez limit\u00e9 par rapport aux moyens disponibles. (Cela, notamment, a contribu\u00e9 \u00e0 alimenter aussit\u00f4t le soup\u00e7on de montage.) Ce fut une sorte d’exercice militaire sur le tas.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tCertaines remarques peuvent \u00eatre propos\u00e9es dans la logique de cette \u00e9valuation. Elles doivent \u00eatre appr\u00e9ci\u00e9es comme une confirmation du climat g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de Washington : la faiblesse du pouvoir central, l’autonomie des autres pouvoirs qui leur permet de se compromettre le moins de possible en restant dans les limites de la l\u00e9galit\u00e9.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La faiblesse du pouvoir central (GW et son \u00e9quipe) est telle qu’il ne parvient plus \u00e0 se d\u00e9gager du fardeau irakien. Notamment, ses projets de faire basculer l’attention vers the Long War<\/a> semblent n’avoir aucun effet. Selon notre hypoth\u00e8se, cette manipulation g\u00e9n\u00e9rale de monter cette Operation Swarmer<\/em> comme op\u00e9ration de diversion de la mauvaise situation irakienne, mais en restant tout de m\u00eame en Irak, mesure cette faiblesse. Le cadre oblig\u00e9 reste l’Irak et la diversion l’est \u00e0 peine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• La manipulation a \u00e9t\u00e9 un \u00e9chec, notamment parce que les acteurs sollicit\u00e9s, les militaires, n’ont pris aucun risque et n’ont song\u00e9 qu’\u00e0 prot\u00e9ger leurs int\u00e9r\u00eats (le moins de pertes et le moins d’affrontement possible en Irak).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• D’une fa\u00e7on g\u00e9n\u00e9rale, on mesure sans aucun doute une perte consid\u00e9rable des capacit\u00e9s de manipulation et de mise en sc\u00e8ne des op\u00e9rations virtualistes de d\u00e9tournement de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9. M\u00eame dans son domaine favori de la tromperie, l’administration GW est en train de s’affaiblir consid\u00e9rablement.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuoiqu’il en soit, quelle que soit la bonne version de cette manipulation, il reste qu’il y a manipulation. Sur ce point, les jugements vont d’une fa\u00e7on presque unanime dans ce sens. C’est le point le plus important pour mesurer la d\u00e9gradation de la vie publique \u00e0 Washington et le climat r\u00e9gnant dans les forces arm\u00e9es. Les op\u00e9rations militaires sont utilis\u00e9es et per\u00e7ues comme des instruments d’une politique plus ou moins int\u00e9rieure (politique int\u00e9rieure \u00e0 Washington m\u00eame, politique int\u00e9rieure \u00e0 Washington par l’interm\u00e9diaire de la politique int\u00e9rieure irako-am\u00e9ricaniste). On en arrive m\u00eame \u00e0 monter des op\u00e9rations militaires dans ce seul but. En plus, on le fait sans beaucoup de brio.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Les mauvais sc\u00e9nars de Hollywood-on-the Potomac 19 mars 2006 Sans doute la massive op\u00e9ration d’assaut a\u00e9rien (assaut a\u00e9ro-terrestre) autour de la ville rebelle de Samarra, d\u00e9sign\u00e9 par le code de Operation Swarmer, convient-elle pour f\u00eater \u00e0 la mesure de l’\u00e9v\u00e9nement le troisi\u00e8me anniversaire de la guerre en Irak. L’aspect remarquable de cette affaire est la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[857,5191,5192,5193],"class_list":["post-67362","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-irak","tag-operation","tag-swarmer","tag-tromperie"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67362","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67362"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67362\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67362"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67362"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67362"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}