{"id":67371,"date":"2006-03-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-03-21T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/03\/21\/le-terrorisme-revele-la-crise-de-la-psychologie-occidentale\/"},"modified":"2006-03-21T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-03-21T00:00:00","slug":"le-terrorisme-revele-la-crise-de-la-psychologie-occidentale","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/03\/21\/le-terrorisme-revele-la-crise-de-la-psychologie-occidentale\/","title":{"rendered":"Le terrorisme r\u00e9v\u00e8le la crise de la psychologie occidentale"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h3>Le terrorisme r\u00e9v\u00e8le la crise de la psychologie occidentale<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tUn ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne remarquable se manifeste dans l&rsquo;\u00e9volution contradictoire de la guerre contre la terreur (expression plut\u00f4t am\u00e9ricaniste), ou lutte contre le terrorisme (expression plut\u00f4t europ\u00e9enne), et le constat des perceptions US et europ\u00e9ennes (ou US et le reste du monde) du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne. Le texte ci-dessous illustre ce ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne. Venu du Chief European Correspondent de UPI \u00e0 Bruxelles (en date du <a href=\"http:\/\/www.spacewar.com\/reports\/Europe_And_America_At_Odds_On_Terrror_Threat.html\" class=\"gen\">6 mars 2006<\/a>), il signale des interventions r\u00e9centes sur le terrorisme, qui mettent en \u00e9vidence ces diff\u00e9rences.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t(Deux s\u00e9minaires r\u00e9cents [en f\u00e9vrier] sont signal\u00e9s dans ce texte : un organis\u00e9 par l&rsquo; Institut Royal des Relations Internationales [IRRI, ou Royal Institute for International Relations] de Bruxelles et l&rsquo;autre par l&rsquo;Institut italien des Affaires Internationales [Italian International Affairs Institute], en coop\u00e9ration avec le German Marshall Fund am\u00e9ricain. On a lu <a href=\"http:\/\/www.dedefensa.org\/article.php?art_id=2409\" class=\"gen\">r\u00e9cemment<\/a> sur ce site l&rsquo;\u00e9valuation des effets du terrorisme, dont l&rsquo;un des deux auteurs est Rik Coolsaet, directeur du d\u00e9partement S\u00e9curit\u00e9 et Gouvernance globale au m\u00eame IRRI. Coolsaet est cit\u00e9 dans le texte ci-dessous.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe texte ci-dessous nous fait constater \u00e9galement,  chose importante justifiant d&rsquo;en venir \u00e0 des r\u00e9flexions de fond,  que la diff\u00e9rence des conceptions ne cesse de grandir au contact de la r\u00e9alit\u00e9. La crise actuelle est n\u00e9e du choc du 11 septembre et aucun autre choc de cette ampleur, loin de l\u00e0, n&rsquo;est venu soutenir la dramatisation extr\u00eame originelle. On pouvait attendre que, l&rsquo;\u00e9motion pass\u00e9e, la raison reprenne le dessus et rapproche les conceptions (am\u00e9ricaniste et europ\u00e9enne\/reste du monde) puisqu&rsquo;il nous est r\u00e9p\u00e9t\u00e9 que ces conceptions sont similaires. C&rsquo;est le contraire qui est vrai. Les conceptions continuent \u00e0 diverger et cette divergence, par cons\u00e9quent, ne cesse de s&rsquo;accro\u00eetre. On y verra le signe que ce n&rsquo;est pas la r\u00e9alit\u00e9 d&rsquo;un \u00e9v\u00e9nement avec l&rsquo;\u00e9motion qui s&rsquo;y attache qui nous s\u00e9pare mais la perception que nous en avons. Les conceptions suivent cette divergence.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tL&rsquo;int\u00e9r\u00eat du constat est qu&rsquo;il ne fait qu&rsquo;illustrer une situation de divergence constante m\u00eame quand elle ne se signale par aucun acte spectaculaire,  une situation dont on essaie au contraire de dissimuler la manifestation \u00e9pisodique. Il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;une situation dont on est conduit \u00e0 admettre qu&rsquo;elle est de type structurel, et dont nous aurions tendance \u00e0 penser qu&rsquo;elle a \u00e0 voir avec des diff\u00e9rences psychologiques fondamentales. Il s&rsquo;agit moins de diff\u00e9rences d&rsquo;analyse que de diff\u00e9rences de la psychologie appr\u00e9hendant les perceptions et exprimant ces perceptions dans des analyses.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIl y a, entre Europ\u00e9ens et Am\u00e9ricains, une diff\u00e9rence ontologique dans la conceptualisation du terrorisme en tant qu&rsquo;\u00e9v\u00e9nement. Pour les Am\u00e9ricains, c&rsquo;est un acte de guerre parce que les Am\u00e9ricains jugent le terrorisme \u00e0 l&rsquo;aune d&rsquo;un de ses effets qui est l&rsquo;attaque du 11 septembre 2001 ; et cette attaque du 11 septembre ne peut signifier qu&rsquo;une chose : une agression d\u00e9lib\u00e9r\u00e9e contre l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique, avec l&rsquo;intention sans r\u00e9mission de la d\u00e9truire.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLes Am\u00e9ricains per\u00e7oivent cet acte comme fondateur dans les \u00e9v\u00e9nements du monde, et comme la mise \u00e0 jour d&rsquo;une volont\u00e9 mal\u00e9fique de d\u00e9truire l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique. Pour les Am\u00e9ricains, ce qu&rsquo;on nomme le terrorisme a <strong>commenc\u00e9<\/strong> en substance le 11 septembre 2001 ; de ce point de vue, le terrorisme n&rsquo;existait pas avant le 11 septembre 2001 et la riposte doit \u00eatre au niveau de l&rsquo;attaque : absolue, sans concession, parce qu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit bien d&rsquo;une r\u00e9sistance contre quelque chose qui est le Mal.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPar simple logique antagoniste, c&rsquo;est le Bien qui r\u00e9siste au Mal et riposte contre lui ; le Bien c&rsquo;est donc l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique. Nous soup\u00e7onnons la logique du jugement qui fait du terrorisme-9\/11 le Mal, d&rsquo;avoir son origine dans la conviction originelle de la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste que l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique c&rsquo;est le Bien. L&rsquo;analyse aurait plut\u00f4t proc\u00e9d\u00e9 de la sorte : puisque l&rsquo;Am\u00e9rique c&rsquo;est le Bien, le terrorisme-9\/11 c&rsquo;est le Mal. Ce n&rsquo;est une conception primaire du monde que dans la mesure o\u00f9 une conception absolue est n\u00e9cessairement primaire. Ce que nous a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 l&rsquo;attaque du 11 septembre, pour ceux qui ne s&rsquo;en doutaient pas encore, ce n&rsquo;est pas une nouvelle sorte de terrorisme, ni m\u00eame une diff\u00e9rence de conceptions entre USA et Europe, sur le terrorisme entre autres,  ceci et cela ne sont que des cons\u00e9quences ; ce que nous a r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9 9\/11, c&rsquo;est combien la psychologie am\u00e9ricaniste est <strong>ontologiquement<\/strong> diff\u00e9rente de la n\u00f4tre.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCes constats expliquent nombre de choses qui nous paraissent incompr\u00e9hensibles selon la logique courante, celle qui ne fait pas l&rsquo;effort d&rsquo;accepter d&rsquo;envisager l&rsquo;illogisme ou l&rsquo;irrationnel du monde. Ils expliquent que l&rsquo;administration GW Bush soit toujours en place, r\u00e9\u00e9lue confortablement, et rarement condamn\u00e9e d&rsquo;une mani\u00e8re fondamentale par les Am\u00e9ricains. GW et sa bande apparaissent finalement pour ce qu&rsquo;ils sont, apr\u00e8s des ann\u00e9es de turpitude : corrompus, m\u00e9diocres, allum\u00e9s, incomp\u00e9tents ; pour autant, ils ne se sont pas tromp\u00e9s le 11 septembre en d\u00e9signant le Diable. Ils ne peuvent \u00eatre compl\u00e8tement mauvais, ils sont am\u00e9ricanistes. Jamais dans l&rsquo;Histoire une construction de l&rsquo;esprit, un artefact id\u00e9ologique n&rsquo;a aussi compl\u00e8tement investi la psychologie que ne l&rsquo;a fait l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme pour la psychologie am\u00e9ricaine. Cela nous conduit souvent \u00e0 sugg\u00e9rer que le domaine explor\u00e9 avec l&rsquo;am\u00e9ricanisme est moins celui de l&rsquo;Histoire que celui de la pathologie (historique, d&rsquo;ailleurs). <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPour la conception europ\u00e9enne du terrorisme, bien s\u00fbr, il n&rsquo;y a pas de r\u00e9elle surprise et beaucoup moins de choses \u00e0 dire de ce point de vue, puisqu&rsquo;il s&rsquo;agit d&rsquo;un point de vue classique selon notre entendement. Le terrorisme est consid\u00e9r\u00e9 \u00e0 la lumi\u00e8re de la relativit\u00e9 du monde, de l&rsquo;exp\u00e9rience historique, de l&rsquo;encha\u00eenement des choses entre causes et effets, etc. Le terrorisme qui a frapp\u00e9 le 11 septembre ne repr\u00e9sente pas une rupture du monde. Le terrorisme existait avant 9\/11 et 9\/11 a des rapports puissants avec ce qui a pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9, dans des \u00e9v\u00e9nements o\u00f9 les responsabilit\u00e9s s&rsquo;entrem\u00ealent, o\u00f9 les causes s&rsquo;av\u00e8rent \u00eatre diverses, complexes, etc. D&rsquo;autre part, si 9\/11 est un \u00e9v\u00e9nement important, voire extraordinaire, ce n&rsquo;est pas seulement \u00e0 cause de l&rsquo;attaque, mais aussi \u00e0 cause de certaines sp\u00e9cificit\u00e9s occidentales (non, am\u00e9ricanistes) qui contribuent d\u00e9cisivement \u00e0 ce caract\u00e8re extraordinaire. 9\/11 est un \u00e9v\u00e9nement historique et nullement un \u00e9v\u00e9nement qui change l&rsquo;Histoire,  comme un \u00e9v\u00e9nement change l&rsquo;Histoire lorsque cet \u00e9v\u00e9nement montre \u00e0 d\u00e9couvert le visage du Mal.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tC&rsquo;est peu de dire que le terrorisme nous r\u00e9v\u00e8le. Il nous \u00e9claire d&rsquo;une lumi\u00e8re crue ; et ce qu&rsquo;il \u00e9claire, bien entendu, c&rsquo;est la crise transatlantique en tant que crise fondamentale de la civilisation occidentale. Que cette crise puisse s&rsquo;exprimer au niveau des diff\u00e9rences de la psychologie, cela mesure sa profondeur, son extr\u00eame gravit\u00e9 et l&rsquo;impossibilit\u00e9 o\u00f9 nous sommes d&rsquo;en mesurer les cons\u00e9quences. C&rsquo;est une affaire qui p\u00e8se tragiquement sur le destin du monde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tPar ailleurs, il \u00e9tait temps que la chose nous fut r\u00e9v\u00e9l\u00e9e. C&rsquo;est en cela, dans la chronologie historique d&rsquo;une crise qui demandait \u00e0 s&rsquo;exprimer, que le terrorisme a une fonction r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice fondamentale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<h2 class=\"common-article\">Europe And America At Odds On Terrror Threat<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong>By Gareth Harding, UPI Chief European Correspondent, Brussels (UPI) Mar 06, 2006<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEuropeans and Americans are supposed to be fighting shoulder to shoulder in the so-called war on terror. But how can they beat their common enemy when they have such radically different interpretations of the scale of the threat posed by Jihadi terrorism and the nature of the response needed to defeat it?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThis question was left lingering at the end of two recent conferences in Brussels on international terrorism  one organized by the Royal Institute for International Relations in Belgium and the other by the Italian International Affairs Institute, in association with the German Marshall Fund of the United States.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEver since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks the Bush administration has viewed the struggle against terrorist groups like the Taliban and al-Qaida as a war that can be won in the mountains of the Hindu Kush and the deserts of the Sunni triangle. Europeans, on the other hand, remain deeply uncomfortable with the term war on terror, with many asking how it is possible to wage war on an abstract noun.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe United States talks of a war against terror, said one senior European Union official at the GMF conference. We don&rsquo;t subscribe to that view in the European Union. Speaking at the same event, which observed &lsquo;Chatham House&rsquo; rules of anonymity, a NATO official said the 26-member military bloc also preferred to talk about the fight against terror.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tIt is more than a semantic issue. The Bush administration  and many ordinary Americans  see their country at war with terrorism, and argues trenchantly that U.S. troops in Iraq are part of this effort. There is no such feeling in Europe, partly because European nations have lived with terrorist attacks on their soil for decades, if not centuries.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe European Union sees terrorism through the prism of the past, the United States as a new threat, said one participant at the Italian institute&rsquo;s meeting, adding that the two transatlantic powers are divided over both the nature of the threat faced and the best means of tackling it.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tA country that sees itself at war is more likely to take extreme measures to protect its population, even if this leads to an erosion of civil liberties such as the right to privacy, free speech and a fair trial. Gerhart Baum, a prominent German human rights lawyer and former interior minister, told the Belgian institute&rsquo;s conference last month that the United States had crossed the border between criminal law and war law in its fight against Jihadi terrorism, resulting in the sanctioning of torture and targeted assassinations.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe fight against terrorism should be compatible with human rights, but clearly it is not (in this case), said Baum.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tCalls from traditionally pro-American EU leaders, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi, for the United States to close its internment camp at Guantanamo Bay highlight the gaping divide between Washington and European capitals when it comes to finding the right balance between using state power against terrorist groups and protecting civil liberties.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tAnother major difference between the two sides concerns the scale of the threat posed by al-Qaida and its offshoot organizations. The Bush administration believes Osama bin Laden is comparable to Adolf Hitler or Joseph Stalin and that al-Qaida poses as great a menace to Western free-market democracies today as the Nazis did in the 1930s.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEuropeans are in no doubt about the lethal threat posed by Jihadi terrorism  after all, they were the prime victims of it in Madrid, London and Istanbul  but there is a growing body of opinion that argues the real danger is no longer posed by al-Qaida, but by the freelance franchises the terrorist grouping has spawned.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tI do not believe that we are confronted with a formidable global external foe, Rik Coolsaet, a security expert at the Belgian Institute for International Relations, told the Brussels conference on Jihadi terrorism. We must stop behaving as if we were in a permanent state of war with a monolithic authoritarian threat, a successor enemy to Nazism or communism.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDismissing Bin Laden as nothing more than a leader of a sect, Coolsaet added: Unduly stressing the global nature of the threat we boost his appeal to would-be suicide bombers who feel boosted by the worldwide success of a potent al-Qaida the west contributes to magnify.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe U.S. administration views terrorism as primarily an external threat emanating from failed states, jihadist groupings and Islamist regimes in the broader Middle East  hence the decision to oust the Taliban in 2001 and, although a belated justification, to invade Iraq in 2003.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEuropean governments, on the other hand, see the threat as largely internal  stemming from extremist sects within their Muslim communities. It is a view drawn from bitter experience. Both the London and Madrid bombings were largely carried out by British and Spanish citizens and the killer of Dutch film-maker Theo van Gogh was a well-integrated, Dutch-speaking citizen of the Netherlands.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tWe have the impression that they are coming to attack us, but in fact it is the other way around, said Olivier Roy, a terrorism expert at the French CNRS institute. Europe is actually exporting jihadis to the Middle East. More Germans and Japanese have joined the jihad in Palestine than second generation European Muslims.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThe Bush administration believes you cannot and should not negotiate with terrorists. But this is precisely what European governments have been doing for decades. Ultimately, Britain came to a negotiated settlement with the Irish Republican Army, just as the Spanish government is trying to do with the Basque terrorist organization ETA. As yet, no one is proposing inviting bin Laden for talks in Camp David, but history is littered with examples of yesterday&rsquo;s terrorists becoming tomorrow&rsquo;s leaders.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tOne area where there does seem to be an increasing convergence in American and European opinions is over the root causes of terrorism.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tMany well-meaning European analysts used to argue that terrorism is flourishing because of the international community&rsquo;s inability to bring closure to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians and the lingering resentment felt towards the rich West by the wretched of the earth.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tThis idea was comprehensively rubbished by European speakers at both recent conferences. None of those responsible for Jihadi attacks suffered from colonial occupation, illiteracy or poverty, Javier Ruperez, the former Spanish diplomat who now heads the U.N. fight against terrorism, told the Belgian institute&rsquo;s Feb. 13 conference. Added Roy: There was never a Palestinian flag flying in the Paris suburb riots in November, but this did not stop the media talking about an intifada. Speaking at the GMF\/Italian institute&rsquo;s seminar last week, an EU diplomat said: It would be a strategic mistake to believe that if we solve the Mideast problem, bin Laden will give up targeting the West.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tEuropean experts such as Roy and Coolsaet are slowly beginning to build up a more subtle profile of the Jihadi terrorist that has little to do with the popular stereotype of the crazed, Madrassa-educated religious fanatic in the pocket of bin Laden. They are almost all Westerners, said Roy, adding: They don&rsquo;t have a traditional religious education. Instead, most European Jihadis are well-educated Muslims who have experienced a personal psychological trauma  such as drug or alcohol addiction  before becoming born-again Islamists.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tJihadi terrorism will only be defeated if Europeans and Americans arrive at a joint understanding of the threat posed by violent Islamist groups and a joint plan of action to eradicate the menace. At present, most experts, analysts and policy practitioners would agree this is far from being the case.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\t<strong><em>[Notre recommandation est que ce texte doit \u00eatre lu avec la mention classique \u00e0 l&rsquo;esprit,  Disclaimer: In accordance with 17 U.S.C. 107, this material is distributed without profit or payment to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving this information for non-profit research and educational purposes only..]<\/em><\/strong> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le terrorisme r\u00e9v\u00e8le la crise de la psychologie occidentale Un ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne remarquable se manifeste dans l&rsquo;\u00e9volution contradictoire de la guerre contre la terreur (expression plut\u00f4t am\u00e9ricaniste), ou lutte contre le terrorisme (expression plut\u00f4t europ\u00e9enne), et le constat des perceptions US et europ\u00e9ennes (ou US et le reste du monde) du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne. Le texte ci-dessous illustre&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[3632,1267,4895],"class_list":["post-67371","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-notes-de-lectures","tag-coolsaet","tag-terrorisme","tag-upi"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67371","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67371"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67371\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67371"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67371"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67371"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}