{"id":67421,"date":"2006-04-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-04-04T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/04\/04\/la-forteresse-isolationniste-par-la-voie-royale-de-la-securite\/"},"modified":"2006-04-04T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-04-04T00:00:00","slug":"la-forteresse-isolationniste-par-la-voie-royale-de-la-securite","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/04\/04\/la-forteresse-isolationniste-par-la-voie-royale-de-la-securite\/","title":{"rendered":"La forteresse isolationniste par la voie royale de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

La forteresse isolationniste par la voie royale de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

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\t4 avril 2006 L’affaire DPW<\/a> sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des ports am\u00e9ricains, qui s’est termin\u00e9e le 9 mars par le retrait de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9mirati de la gestion des ports am\u00e9ricains, a d\u00e9clench\u00e9 au Congr\u00e8s une vague de l\u00e9gislations diverses qui devraient mettre en place un corset isolationniste aux Etats-Unis. Il faut en effet parler d’isolationnisme (isolationnisme \u00e9conomique, notamment) plus que de protectionnisme, le second \u00e9tant naturellement inclus dans le premier. Les craintes de Francis Fukuyama<\/a> \u00e0 cet \u00e9gard sont non seulement rencontr\u00e9es, on peut avancer qu’elles pourraient \u00eatre, du point de vue de la chronologie, largement pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9es.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tUn texte de l’hebdomadaire Defense News<\/em> du 3 avril<\/a> donne un aper\u00e7u de cette situation, notamment \u00e0 partir de craintes exprim\u00e9es par des associations professionnelles US. Quelques extraits de ce texte :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab Legislation intended to protect the United States against terrorists by curbing foreign ownership of critical U.S. infrastructure might do so at the expense of America’s economic well-being, business organizations are warning Congress. A flock of bills introduced in March to overhaul the Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) risks stifling foreign investment. That would kill U.S. jobs, slow industrial growth and spark economic retaliation, warns the Business Roundtable, which represents such defense giants as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and United Technologies.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb One bill requires that top executives and board members of companies that own critical U.S. infrastructure must be U.S. citizens. If passed, that will be onerous for foreign firms that own defense plants here, said Bruce Josten, government affairs vice president at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The bills were introduced amid the Dubai Ports World controversy, when both parties in Congress joined forces to oppose plans approved by the Bush administration to let a company owned by the United Arab Emirates operate six U.S. ports. Lawmakers were particularly perturbed that administration officials failed to notify Congress of the ports deal.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tRep. Duncan Hunter, House Armed Services Committee chairman, led the race to reform CFIUS. Legislation he introduced March 7 would have blocked Dubai Ports World in particular and set new citizenship requirements for the owners of companies that manage or operate U.S. critical infrastructure.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Hunter’s bill also created new tasks for the U.S. secretaries of defense and homeland security maintaining a list of national defense critical infrastructure. Hunter, R-Calif., said his aim was to ensure that our critical infrastructure, such as ports and energy facilities, is maintained by reliable and trusted American companies. This will reduce exposure to terrorism in some of our most vulnerable facilities.<\/em> (…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The Business Roundtable described Hunter’s legislation as economic isolationism, which would choke growth and job creation. A big problem with Hunter’s proposal: Critical infrastructure is too broadly defined, said Business Roundtable spokeswoman Tita Freeman.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tD’autres l\u00e9gislations sont en cours de d\u00e9bat, avec de fortes chances de devenir des lois dans le climat actuel. Deux de ces l\u00e9gislations sont particuli\u00e8rement importantes dans leurs effets parce qu’elles tendent \u00e0 \u00e9tablir une formidable barri\u00e8re face aux compagnies \u00e9trang\u00e8res voulant investir aux Etats-Unis sous la forme de prises de participation ou de rachats d’entreprises am\u00e9ricaines. Le d\u00e9tail de ces l\u00e9gislations implique deux choses : le passage sous la coupe des organes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale du processus et son contr\u00f4le tr\u00e8s serr\u00e9 par le Congr\u00e8s. Le d\u00e9tail vaut effectivement une lecture attentive : \u00ab Sen. Susan Collins proposes to abolish CFIUS and replace it with a Committee for Secure Commerce. To be blunt, the current process is hopelessly broken, said Collins, R-Maine. The panel would have powerful leadership, with the secretary of homeland security as chairman, the secretaries of defense and treasury vice chairmen, and the director of national intelligence a permanent committee member. In that way, Collins said, foreign investments would be scrutinized for any threat they may pose to U.S. security.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb A third reform bill by Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., would add to CFIUS a new vice chairman’s post to be filled by the defense secretary. Shelby also would make the national intelligence director a permanent member.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The bill was passed by the Senate Banking Committee March 30. The House is scheduled to take it up in late April.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Shelby’s plan would require purchases by foreign governments of firms deemed part of the critical infrastructure to undergo a 45-day national security investigation after an initial 30-day CFIUS review. The probe, Shelby said in a statement, strikes the appropriate balance between national security and our open investment system. Within 10 days of launching the 45-day investigation, CFIUS would have to notify Republican and Democratic leaders of both houses of Congress. CFIUS also would have to alert the Senate Banking Committee, House Financial Services Committee and leaders of other congressional panels with oversight authority, said Shelby, who chairs the Banking Committee.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The reporting and notification process to Congress is just unprecedented, said Josten. CFIUS reviews have been a confidential process for 20 years. There is a lot of classified and proprietary information involved, and companies worry that they will not remain secret if disclosed to leak-prone Capitol Hill, he said.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Shelby also calls for CFIUS to rank countries according to their adherence to nonproliferation controls, their relationships with the United States and the likelihood they would pass militarily sensitive technologies to third countries.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n

La forteresse cadenass\u00e9e<\/h3>\n<\/p>\n

\tLa description du processus l\u00e9gislatif en cours est r\u00e9v\u00e9latrice. L’acc\u00e8s aux USA des investisseurs industriels non-US, dans quelque domaine que ce soit, devient d\u00e9sormais compl\u00e8tement une mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale. (Il est \u00e9vident que les d\u00e9l\u00e9gu\u00e9s des organes de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale dans le probable futur Committee for Secure Commerce auront tout \u00e0 dire dans les d\u00e9lib\u00e9rations. Ils seront soutenus \u00e0 fond par le Congr\u00e8s.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA proprement parler, il n’y aurait pas dans le sch\u00e9ma qui s’amorce une extension du protectionnisme en g\u00e9n\u00e9ral mais une extension maximale de la cat\u00e9gorie de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale qui, elle, est compl\u00e8tement prot\u00e9g\u00e9e. Le r\u00e9sultat est approchant, il est m\u00eame aggravant. Le protectionnisme devient une mati\u00e8re de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale alors qu’on pouvait admettre qu’il \u00e9tait jusqu’alors, en partie, de type commercial et tarifaire. Il n’est plus question de droits, de tarifs impos\u00e9s, etc., mais tout simplement d’interdiction. Les rapports de commerce et d’investissements industriels du reste du monde avec les Etats-Unis sont promis \u00e0 tous passer sous le contr\u00f4le de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tA c\u00f4t\u00e9 de la fermet\u00e9 extr\u00eame du processus en cours, on trouve comme deuxi\u00e8me obstacle, et sans doute pas le moindre, la mise en place d’un processus d’enqu\u00eates, de v\u00e9rifications, de contr\u00f4le, etc., qui sera impitoyablement complexe du point de vue bureaucratique. C’est un second cadenas, d’une efficacit\u00e9 \u00e9prouv\u00e9e pour d\u00e9courager ceux qui voudraient encore tenter l’aventure am\u00e9ricaine.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’effet principal de cette \u00e9volution devrait \u00eatre effectivement un tr\u00e8s fort mouvement ext\u00e9rieur de freinage, pour cesser de tenter de p\u00e9n\u00e9trer le march\u00e9 US. Cet effet jouera d’abord au niveau psychologique, en d\u00e9courageant nombre de tentatives : l’isolationnisme de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale ainsi institu\u00e9 sera d’abord dissuasif.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBien \u00e9videmment, cette \u00e9volution est l’exact contraire du processus de globalisation. Elle est d’autant plus s\u00e9v\u00e8re et exp\u00e9ditive qu’\u00e9tant plac\u00e9e dans le cadre de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, elle devrait \u00e9chapper \u00e0 l’arbitrage commercial type OMC.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tL’aspect remarquable du ph\u00e9nom\u00e8ne est son caract\u00e8re incontestablement structurel. La tendance actuelle, notamment la consid\u00e9ration de tous les rapports avec l’ext\u00e9rieur du point de vue de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 nationale, est n\u00e9e le 11 septembre 2001. L’affaire DPW\/ports US n’a fait que mettre \u00e0 jour cette tendance. L’arsenal l\u00e9gislatif en cours de constitution va structurer tout cela. L’isolationnisme am\u00e9ricain en cours d’\u00e9dification n’est semblable \u00e0 aucun autre de ceux qui l’ont pr\u00e9c\u00e9d\u00e9 : c’est un isolationnisme d\u00e9fensif, obsessionnel, un isolationnisme de fermeture au reste du monde, un isolationnisme aussi radical que les concepts qui le suscitent indirectement (la guerre contre la terreur, la Longue Guerre, etc.). Autant pour la Commission europ\u00e9enne qui croit encore suivre son mod\u00e8le et son am\u00e9ricanisme en instituant une chasse aux sorci\u00e8res<\/a> des tendances n\u00e9o-protectionnistes europ\u00e9ennes. Dans ce contexte, la croisade de la Commission appara\u00eet \u00e0 la fois d\u00e9risoire et grotesque.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

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La forteresse isolationniste par la voie royale de la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 4 avril 2006 L’affaire DPW sur la s\u00e9curit\u00e9 des ports am\u00e9ricains, qui s’est termin\u00e9e le 9 mars par le retrait de la soci\u00e9t\u00e9 \u00e9mirati de la gestion des ports am\u00e9ricains, a d\u00e9clench\u00e9 au Congr\u00e8s une vague de l\u00e9gislations diverses qui devraient mettre en place un… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[5175,826,1242,2937,4205,5254],"class_list":["post-67421","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-dpw","tag-hunter","tag-isolationnisme","tag-nationale","tag-securite","tag-shelby"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67421","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67421"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67421\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67421"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67421"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67421"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}