Antiwar.com<\/a>, met en \u00e9vidence les difficult\u00e9s nouvelles auxquelles se heurte l’accord nucl\u00e9aire USA-Inde. La ratification par le Congr\u00e8s (le S\u00e9nat) est en cause. Si cette ratification n’a pas lieu, l’abandon du trait\u00e9, \u00e0 cause de l’importance consid\u00e9rable qu’il tient dans les nouvelles relations strat\u00e9giques USA-Inde, \u00e9touffera dans l’oeuf toutes les perspectives de ces nouvelles relations. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00ab In the US, opposition to the agreement, which permits India to keep and further build its nuclear weapons arsenal, and allows civilian nuclear trade with it to be resumed, is becoming increasingly vocal. Highly placed Indian diplomatic sources have been quoted as saying the passage of the special waiver legislation through the US Congress will be very difficult.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb This is a dramatic change from the situation just two weeks ago, when supporters of the deal were extremely upbeat and expected it to sail through the US Senate. Their optimism was high partly because the Indian government has engaged not one, but two, major public relations firms in Washington as lobbyists and because the India caucus in the US Congress, the largest country-specific group of legislators, is considered powerful, says K.P. Fabian, a former Indian ambassador and senior diplomat. But now, it is clear that the road ahead will be thorny. If the deal doesn’t go through quickly, it may collapse altogether.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLa situation est arch\u00e9typique des difficult\u00e9s et de la paralysie int\u00e9rieures \u00e0 Washington. Les causes de la brutale aggravation de la situation de l’accord sont diverses mais renvoient toutes \u00e0 cette situation int\u00e9rieure.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t• Les d\u00e9mocrates, qui sont assez favorables au trait\u00e9, reviennent sur leur soutien initial parce qu’ils ne veulent pas donner une grande victoire de politique ext\u00e9rieure \u00e0 Bush avant les \u00e9lections de novembre. (Les r\u00e9publicains sont divis\u00e9s et, de toutes les fa\u00e7ons, un tel trait\u00e9 a besoin d’un soutien bipartisan.)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t• Les lobbies<\/em> pro-isra\u00e9liens et anti-castristes s’opposent \u00e0 ce trait\u00e9 \u00e0 moins que l’Inde ne change d’une fa\u00e7on radicale sa politique ext\u00e9rieure indienne dans les domaines qui les int\u00e9ressent. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t• L’establishment<\/em> US, y compris les experts nucl\u00e9aires, est furieux de la fa\u00e7on dont cet accord a \u00e9t\u00e9 conclu, sans consultations pr\u00e9alables de l’administration et dans des conditions qui avantagent consid\u00e9rablement l’Inde.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tPour obtenir une ratification sans heurts, GW devrait s’investir \u00e0 fond dans un lobbying<\/em> au S\u00e9nat. Mais son actuelle impopularit\u00e9 et l’ind\u00e9pendance grandissante du Congr\u00e8s lui laissent peu de chances de r\u00e9ussite. Au mieux, on peut esp\u00e9rer une ratification avec des amendements importants au texte. En retour, l’Inde, o\u00f9 l’accord rencontre une forte opposition m\u00eame dans sa forme actuelle, devrait refuser cette nouvelle version.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 8 avril 2006 \u00e0 09H08<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
L’excellent article de Praful Bidwai, aujourd’hui sur le site Antiwar.com, met en \u00e9vidence les difficult\u00e9s nouvelles auxquelles se heurte l’accord nucl\u00e9aire USA-Inde. La ratification par le Congr\u00e8s (le S\u00e9nat) est en cause. Si cette ratification n’a pas lieu, l’abandon du trait\u00e9, \u00e0 cause de l’importance consid\u00e9rable qu’il tient dans les nouvelles relations strat\u00e9giques USA-Inde, \u00e9touffera… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5267,5266,3378,3004,2804],"class_list":["post-67435","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-accord","tag-bidwai","tag-inde","tag-nucleaire","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67435","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67435"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67435\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67435"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67435"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67435"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}