{"id":67449,"date":"2006-04-13T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-04-13T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/04\/13\/les-russes-en-iran-complication-de-la-crise\/"},"modified":"2006-04-13T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-04-13T00:00:00","slug":"les-russes-en-iran-complication-de-la-crise","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/04\/13\/les-russes-en-iran-complication-de-la-crise\/","title":{"rendered":"Les Russes en Iran : complication de la crise"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><p>Outre leurs aspects techniques qui sont largement discut\u00e9s et contest\u00e9s du point de vue de leur efficacit\u00e9, les plans d&rsquo;attaque US de l&rsquo;Iran se trouvent devant un probl\u00e8me important : la pr\u00e9sence russe. <\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tDans un <a href=\"http:\/\/atimes.com\/atimes\/Middle_East\/HD13Ak01.html\" class=\"gen\">article<\/a> publi\u00e9 aujourd&rsquo;hui sur le site <em>atimes.com<\/em>, P\u00e9p\u00e9 Escobar pr\u00e9cise les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de cette pr\u00e9sence qui devrait fortement compliquer le travail des planificateurs US,  \u00e0 condition que ceux-ci aient r\u00e9alis\u00e9 l&rsquo;importance, voire l&rsquo;existence de ce facteur :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\t\u00ab <em>Iran is not to be easily intimidated. Few in Tehran take the threat of oil sanctions seriously. Iranians know that even if the US decided to bomb the country&rsquo;s nuclear sites, they are maintained by Russian advisers and technicians; that would mean in effect a declaration of war against Russia. Russia recently closed a US$700 million deal selling 30 Tor M-1 surface-to-air missiles to Iran  very effective against aircraft, cruise missiles and guided bombs. The missiles will be deployed at the nuclear-research center at Isfahan and the Bushehr reactor, which is being built by Russia.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>\tLe facteur russe en Iran confirme que la crise iranienne est effectivement une crise multipolaire notablement diff\u00e9rente de la crise irakienne. La complexit\u00e9 de la crise devrait la rendre beaucoup plus diverse et beaucoup plus impr\u00e9visible. Son \u00e9volution devrait s&rsquo;en ressentir dans les prochains mois et suivre une voie beaucoup moins monolithique que celle qui caract\u00e9risa l&rsquo;avant-guerre de l&rsquo;attaque contre l&rsquo;Irak.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n<p><p>\tMis en ligne le 13 avril 2006 \u00e0 09H20<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Outre leurs aspects techniques qui sont largement discut\u00e9s et contest\u00e9s du point de vue de leur efficacit\u00e9, les plans d&rsquo;attaque US de l&rsquo;Iran se trouvent devant un probl\u00e8me important : la pr\u00e9sence russe. Dans un article publi\u00e9 aujourd&rsquo;hui sur le site atimes.com, P\u00e9p\u00e9 Escobar pr\u00e9cise les \u00e9l\u00e9ments de cette pr\u00e9sence qui devrait fortement compliquer le&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3228,2773,3600,2890],"class_list":["post-67449","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-crise","tag-iran","tag-petrole","tag-russes"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67449","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67449"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67449\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67449"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67449"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67449"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}