{"id":67453,"date":"2006-04-14T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-04-14T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/04\/14\/le-vrai-probleme-des-militaires-aujourdhui-cest-largent-parce-quil-y-en-a-trop\/"},"modified":"2006-04-14T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-04-14T00:00:00","slug":"le-vrai-probleme-des-militaires-aujourdhui-cest-largent-parce-quil-y-en-a-trop","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/04\/14\/le-vrai-probleme-des-militaires-aujourdhui-cest-largent-parce-quil-y-en-a-trop\/","title":{"rendered":"Le vrai probl\u00e8me des militaires aujourd&rsquo;hui, c&rsquo;est l&rsquo;argent, \u2014 parce qu&rsquo;il y en a trop"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><h2 class=\"titleset_b.deepblue\" style=\"color:#0f3955;font-size:1.65em;font-variant:small-caps;\">Le vrai probl\u00e8me des militaires aujourd&rsquo;hui, c&rsquo;est l&rsquo;argent, &mdash; parce qu&rsquo;il y en a trop<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>L&rsquo;Occident experte en choses militaires ne cesse de se p\u00e2mer devant l&rsquo;immensit\u00e9 himalayenne du budget du Pentagone. Pour l&rsquo;Europe martiale des bureaucrates des diff\u00e9rents minist\u00e8res de la d\u00e9fense, pour les experts qui tournent autour, la montagne de $milliards du Pentagone est la panac\u00e9e et la recette de la puissance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Voyez le r\u00e9sultat en Irak, en attendant mieux.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Il y a au moins un strat\u00e8ge am\u00e9ricain qui a tout compris, se saisissant d&rsquo;un outil dont la raret\u00e9 fait toute l&rsquo;efficacit\u00e9 : le bon sens. Pour William S. Lind, le vrai probl\u00e8me <strong>c&rsquo;est qu&rsquo;il y a trop d&rsquo;argent<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Dans son plus r\u00e9cent article, sur <a class=\"gen\" href=\"http:\/\/www.defense-and-society.org\/lind\/lind_4_11_06.htm\">le site \u00ab\u00a0Defense &#038; The National Interest\u00a0\u00bb<\/a>Lind rappelle la seule r\u00e9forme r\u00e9ussie du dernier demi-si\u00e8cle dans les forces US, qui est celle du Marine Corps dans les ann\u00e9es 1970-d\u00e9but des ann\u00e9es 1990. Pourquoi ? A cause du processus informel, \u00e9videmment sans interf\u00e9rence budg\u00e9taire, sans grands programmes, sans grosse commande. R\u00e9cit de William S. Lind: &laquo; <em>One of the great intellectual successes of the American military, the Marine Corps&rsquo; development of maneuver warfare doctrine from the 1970s through the early 1990s, offers an interesting contrast. The process was almost all informal. The key people were mostly junior officers. Meetings were after-hours, in someone&rsquo;s living room over beer and pizza. Many outsiders were involved, but none of them were paid. In the end, most of the new manuals were written by a Marine captain, who took them directly to the Commandant for approval. Tellingly, since that time the Marine Corps has formalized its doctrine development process, and the quality of its manuals has declined.<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>La r\u00e9forme informelle a finalement d\u00e9g\u00e9n\u00e9r\u00e9 parce qu&rsquo;elle est devenue formelle, a \u00e9t\u00e9 kidnapp\u00e9e par la bureaucratie, puis est entr\u00e9e dans le <em>pipe-line<\/em> de la programmation co&ucirc;teuse du Pentagone, avec les gros contrats \u00e0 la clef. La conclusion est l&rsquo;\u00e9vidence du bon sens : l&rsquo;argent tue l&rsquo;efficacit\u00e9 militaire. Lind \u00e0 nouveau, \u00e0 m\u00e9diter :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&laquo; <em>Of course, contractors hate informal processes, because they have no role in them. There is no money to be had. In contrast, the current formal process gives them what they seek most, opportunities to kiss the backsides of bigwigs with bucks to obtain still more contracts.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>As I told one senior Marine Corps general last fall, the present system is terminally constipated by too many people and too much money. The money draws contractors the way an outhouse draws other kinds of flies. If the U.S. military wants to start thinking again, it needs to can the senior officer contractors, outlaw PowerPoint and give younger officers time and encouragement to meet in informal seminars, write and publish.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>&raquo; <em>Scharnhorst&rsquo;s Militaerische Gesellschaft, from the time of Napoleon, remains the right model. The problem is that it doesn&rsquo;t cost very much.<\/em> &raquo;<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p><p>Mis en ligne le 14 avril 2006 \u00e0 11H58<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Le vrai probl\u00e8me des militaires aujourd&rsquo;hui, c&rsquo;est l&rsquo;argent, &mdash; parce qu&rsquo;il y en a trop L&rsquo;Occident experte en choses militaires ne cesse de se p\u00e2mer devant l&rsquo;immensit\u00e9 himalayenne du budget du Pentagone. Pour l&rsquo;Europe martiale des bureaucrates des diff\u00e9rents minist\u00e8res de la d\u00e9fense, pour les experts qui tournent autour, la montagne de $milliards du Pentagone&hellip;&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[5288,1012,3572,3194,3320,5287],"class_list":["post-67453","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-dargent","tag-lind","tag-marine","tag-pentagone","tag-reforme","tag-trop"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67453","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67453"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67453\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67453"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67453"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67453"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}