\t14 avril 2006 La r\u00e9volte des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux<\/a> a ceci de particulier qu’elle ne comprend aucun g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’USAF et aucun amiral. C’est une affaire fondamentale mais c’est aussi une affaire corporatiste, ou, pour prendre les termes US, une affaire de groupes de pression, de lobbies<\/em>. L’U.S. Army (et le Marine Corps) sont d’abord concern\u00e9s, pas les autres.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tDes deux services qui se tiennent sur la r\u00e9serve, la position de l’USAF est la plus int\u00e9ressante. La raison est que l’USAF ne veut surtout pas se brouiller avec Rumsfeld parce que l’USAF croit tenir aujourd’hui une opportunit\u00e9 en or : l’Iran. Tous les plans convergent vers cette id\u00e9e : l’attaque sera a\u00e9rienne. Traduction : l’USAF se taille la part du lion. On verra les cons\u00e9quences plus loin.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tD’abord, lisez l’article du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral McInerney dans le Weekly Standard<\/em> dat\u00e9 du 24 avril 2006<\/a>. Le brave McInerney est un ancien de l’USAF, un super-faucon, tr\u00e8s proche des n\u00e9o-conservateurs, lesquels sont tr\u00e8s proches de Lockheed Martin<\/a>, lequel est le fournisseur favori de l’USAF. La boucle est d’autant mieux boucl\u00e9e que McInerney est connu comme \u00e9tant l’un des relais de l’USAF vers les milieux civils extr\u00e9mistes et bellicistes.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tL’article de McInerney, c’est un plan d’attaque contre l’Iran. Uniquement a\u00e9rien, bien s\u00fbr, avec le gros du travail effectu\u00e9 par l’USAF. Quelques d\u00e9tails.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab What would an effective military response look like? It would consist of a powerful air campaign led by 60 stealth aircraft (B-2s, F-117s, F-22s) and more than 400 nonstealth strike aircraft, including B-52s, B-1s, F-15s, F-16s, Tornados, and F-18s. Roughly 150 refueling tankers and other support aircraft would be deployed, along with 100 unmanned aerial vehicles for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and 500 cruise missiles. In other words, overwhelming force would be used.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The objective would be, first and foremost, to destroy or severely damage Iran’s nuclear development and production facilities and put them out of commission for at least five years. Another aim would be to destroy the Iranian air defense system, significantly damage its air force, naval forces, and Shahab-3 offensive missile forces. This would prevent Iran from projecting force outside the country and retaliating militarily. The air campaign would also wipe out or neutralize Iran’s command and control capabilities.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb This coalition air campaign would hit more than 1,500 aim points. Among the weapons would be the new 28,000-pound bunker busters, 5,000-pound bunker penetrators, 2,000-pound bunker busters, 1,000-pound general purpose bombs, and 500-pound GP bombs. A B-2 bomber, to give one example, can drop 80 of these 500-pound bombs independently targeted at 80 different aim points.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb This force would give the coalition an enormous destructive capability, since all the bombs in the campaign feature precision guidance, ranging from Joint Direct Attack Munitions (the so-called JDAMS) to laser-guided, electro-optical, or electronically guided High Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM) for suppression of Iranian surface-to-air missiles. This array of precision weapons and support aircraft would allow the initial attacks to be completed in 36 to 48 hours.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The destruction of Iran’s military force structure would create the opportunity for regime change as well, since it would eliminate some or all of Ahmadinejad’s and the mullahs’ ability to control the population. Simultaneously or prior to the attack, a major covert operation could be launched, utilizing Iranian exiles and dissident forces trained during the period of diplomacy. This effort would be based on the Afghan model that led to the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Not only would the overt and covert attacks weaken the ability of Iran’s leaders to carry out offensive operations in retaliation, they would cripple the leaders’ power to control their own people.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tOn a presque l’approbation officielle de l’USAF dans les colonnes du Daily Digest<\/em> de l’Air Force Association (AFA), qui est le lobby<\/em> d’influence directe et de pression de l’USAF. Le Daily Digest<\/em> du 14 avril 2006<\/a> encha\u00eene directement ces deux nouvelles : (1) le chef d’\u00e9tat-major de l’USAF signale que l’USAF est au service (clin d’il) du g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Abizaid, U.S. Army et chef d’\u00e9tat-major de Central Command, pour toute op\u00e9ration hors des deux th\u00e9\u00e2tres actuels (Afghanistan et Irak), notamment (tiens) vers l’Iran. (2) On encha\u00eene sur une mention flatteuse et fort \u00e0 propos de l’article de McInerney dans le Weekly Standard<\/em>. Message sans ambigu\u00eft\u00e9 ni nuance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab Another Front.<\/em><\/strong> The Air Force has a variety of assets in theater to support Army Gen. John Abizaid, chief of US Central Command, should Abizaid be asked to do something else beyond operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. So said USAF Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley on Tuesday. Moseley declined to describe any options or planning going on in the event the US wishes to take action against Iran, which has proclaimed acceleration of its uranium enrichment program. However, he did say that the US has a variety of weapons that can penetrate a mix of concrete and steelhardened underground facilities, such as those where Iran has secreted much of its nuclear research effort. Whether those weapons would be effective in taking out nukes in the making depends on how deep they are buried, and how the structure is put together, Moseley said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Meet Raptor, Spirit, and Nighthawk. <\/em><\/strong>The bellicose rhetoric of the Iranian government continues unabated, despite international pressure against the country’s desire to produce nuclear weapons. Contrary to what some pundits have said about a lack of effective military options, Ret. Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, who has 17 Air Medals and last served as assistant vice chief of staff, writes in the Weekly Standard that a feasible option does existnamely a powerful air campaign led by approximately 60 stealth aircraft (B-2s, F-117s, F-22s) and more than 400 nonstealth strike aircraft, including B-52s, B-1s, F-15s, F-16s, Tornadoes, and F-18s. McInerney would prefer a diplomatic option, but in his view the Iranian regime will not bow easily to diplomatic pressure, thus he believes the existence of a military option may be the only persuader.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t… En effet (encha\u00eenons aussit\u00f4t), comme le souligne (dans le titre) la deuxi\u00e8me nouvelle d’AFA, le plan McInerney mentionne express\u00e9ment dans l’inventaire qu’il pr\u00e9voit pour l’attaque le F-22 Raptor<\/em>. (Surprise, pas de surprise ? le F-22 est construit par Lockheed Martin.) C’est remarquable, alors que le F-22 commence \u00e0 peine \u00e0 atteindre son statut op\u00e9rationnel. C’est remarquable mais instructif : quel meilleur moyen de prouver l’utilit\u00e9 et la n\u00e9cessit\u00e9 du F-22 que de le faire figurer dans une attaque de l’envergure de celle que projettent les divers experts neocons<\/em> contre l’Iran? On ne doute pas qu’on travaille d\u00e9j\u00e0, dans les bureaux de RP de l’USAF, aux articles qui seront gracieusement communiqu\u00e9s en temps voulu, d\u00e9crivant les capacit\u00e9s du F-22 et, bient\u00f4t, ses exploits dans les cieux iraniens. Le F-22 sortira grandi du blitz<\/em> \u00e9videmment victorieux, et trouvera sa place n\u00e9cessaire dans les effectifs de l’USAF.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tSurprise, pas de surprise? La veille, dans le m\u00eame Daily Digest<\/em> de AFA (lien temporairement indisponible), on trouve une nouvelle o\u00f9 le chef d’\u00e9tat-major de l’USAF, le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Moseley, rappelle l’excellente formule qui, en cas de retard du JSF, et m\u00eame en tout autre cas de n\u00e9cessit\u00e9, permettrait \u00e0 l’USAF de d\u00e9passer la commande de 183 exemplaires du F-22 pour garder la cha\u00eene d’un avion de cinqui\u00e8me g\u00e9n\u00e9rationouverte<\/a>, et cela dans des conditions qui abaisseraient le prix co\u00fbtant de l’avion. Au cas, suppl\u00e9mentaire dans l’argumentation, o\u00f9 la r\u00e9ussite de l’attaque contre l’Iran confirmerait que 183 exemplaires pour le F-22, c’est vraiment trop peu.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Le F-22 vaut bien un blitz contre l’Iran 14 avril 2006 La r\u00e9volte des g\u00e9n\u00e9raux a ceci de particulier qu’elle ne comprend aucun g\u00e9n\u00e9ral de l’USAF et aucun amiral. C’est une affaire fondamentale mais c’est aussi une affaire corporatiste, ou, pour prendre les termes US, une affaire de groupes de pression, de lobbies. L’U.S. Army… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[5289,4843,2773,3501,3502,1104,3411,41],"class_list":["post-67454","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-blitz","tag-f22","tag-iran","tag-lockheed","tag-martin","tag-neocons","tag-stealth","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67454","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67454"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67454\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67454"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67454"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67454"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}