{"id":67463,"date":"2006-04-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-04-16T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/04\/16\/liran-sans-plan-b\/"},"modified":"2006-04-16T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-04-16T00:00:00","slug":"liran-sans-plan-b","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/04\/16\/liran-sans-plan-b\/","title":{"rendered":"L’Iran sans \u201cplan B\u201d<\/em><\/strong>"},"content":{"rendered":"

L’Iran sans plan B<\/h2>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\t16 avril 2006 Est-ce une surprise? On tendrait plut\u00f4t \u00e0 offrir le constat d’une tendance habituelle, type warstrike as usual<\/em>, dans le Washington de GW Bush. Julian Borger \u00e0 Washington pour le Guardian<\/em> (15 avril<\/a>), constate que les Am\u00e9ricains n’ont pas de plan B pour l’Iran.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSituation int\u00e9ressante:<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• D\u00e8s le d\u00e9but de ce qu’on d\u00e9signe comme la crise iranienne, Washington a occup\u00e9 une position radicale, d’abord discr\u00e8tement puis avec une vocif\u00e9ration grandissante. En un mot : les USA ne croient pas \u00e0 une solution diplomatique (ce qu’on pourrait d\u00e9signer par Plan A).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Plus encore, ils font beaucoup, sinon tout pour emp\u00eacher une \u00e9ventuelle r\u00e9ussite de cette option (r\u00e9ussite de plus en plus probl\u00e9matique par ailleurs, ceci expliquant en partie cela).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t• Pourtant, constate Borger apr\u00e8s une enqu\u00eate \u00e0 Washington, l’administration n’a pas de plan B, d’alternative \u00e0 cette solution diplomatique. On fait des plans de guerre, certes, mais ces plans en eux-m\u00eames ne sont pas une politique ni une strat\u00e9gie :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The White House, for the last 15 months, has been engaged in plan A, the diplomatic route backed up, if necessary, by sanctions. But Iran once more rebuffed diplomatic overtures this week, and is unlikely to be troubled by sanctions if China and Russia do not participate.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb That leaves the question of what the Bush administration would do next. Colonel Sam Gardiner, a retired air force colonel and expert on targeting at the National Defence University (NDU), said: I have a terrible feeling they are taking this one day at a time. They have a plan A but not a plan B.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The US state department and the Foreign Office, in spite of public statements that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable, privately discuss what the Middle East landscape would look like if Iran acquires a nuclear bomb: there is a tacit acceptance of what may turn out to be the reality.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb But the White House does not accept this. Col Gardiner said: At one time there was a paper floating around, produced by the NDU, on how to live with a nuclear armed Iran. But they [the administration] are so negative about that. There is no serious discussion about it other than among academics.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Flynt Leverett, formerly a Middle East specialist in Mr Bush’s national security council, said: The policy line is that Iran should not have a fuel cycle and that the number of centrifuges [used to enrich uranium] should be zero. But they have ruled out direct diplomacy with Iran, or any kind of grand bargain that would encompass the nuclear issue.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Col Gardiner, who oversaw an independent war game study for Atlantic Monthly magazine two years ago, found that the use of a military option rarely left the US in a better position, after likely retaliations and international reaction were taken into account. But he said, it was the Pentagon’s job to think up war plans and pass them up the chain of command, gathering momentum along the way. At that level, the administration would have to factor in the scale and nature of Iranian retaliation, which Robert Baer, a former CIA covert agent in the Middle East, believes would be ferocious. The Iranians are smarter than anyone in this whole equation. Their intelligence service is very good. They know they could do an enormous amount of damage in Iraq, in Lebanon, in the whole region, Mr Baer said.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb The administration is realising that there are serious drawbacks with the military option,\u00a0\u00bb Mr Leverett said. \u00a0\u00bbIf you strike at the nuclear infrastructure, the chance you’re not going to hit everything you need to hit is high. Second of all, you’re going to make Iranian decision-makers all the more determined to make a bomb. The blowback would be devastating. And if the US, as it’s coming out more and more, may have to use nuclear penetrating warheads to get after the facilities then the international political blowback is enormous.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais pourtant… On fait des plans de guerre, certes, mais ces plans en eux-m\u00eames ne sont pas une politique ni une strat\u00e9gie, \u00e9crivons-nous, est-ce bien s\u00fbr ? Les analystes et commentateurs remarquent souvent que la p\u00e9riode actuelle ressemble \u00e0 s’y m\u00e9prendre \u00e0 la p\u00e9riode pr\u00e9c\u00e9dant la guerre en Irak, quant \u00e0 la tactique de la mont\u00e9e de la tension, de sabotage de la diplomatie, etc. On r\u00e9torquerait : il n’y a pas trente-six mani\u00e8res de pr\u00e9parer une guerre pr\u00e9ventive, o\u00f9 il s’agit par tous les moyens de renforcer la tension pour justifier l’attaque. L\u00e0 o\u00f9 l’on trouve une similitude tr\u00e8s sp\u00e9cifique avec l’Iran, c’est bien dans l’absence de Plan B ; c’est-\u00e0-dire dans la conviction que l’attaque militaire, au bout du compte, se suffira \u00e0 elle-m\u00eame.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBorger note \u00e9galement : \u00ab The Bush administration has yet to decide on a clear plan B for Iran <\/em>[…] But military planning is progressing to fill that policy vacuum and may create a momentum of its own, former administration officials and political observers said yesterday.<\/em> \u00bb Ce rythme de la planification de l’op\u00e9ration militaire va bient\u00f4t effectivement combler le vide politique, et bient\u00f4t \u00e0 la satisfaction de tous dans l’administration, \u00e0 l’image de GW Bush. De ce point de vue, on retrouve les conditions de l’attaque contre l’Irak. La th\u00e9orie implicite, instinctive, est toujours la m\u00eame : celle du chaos cr\u00e9ateur qui est fondamentalement l’id\u00e9e qui soutint la pr\u00e9paration de l’attaque contre l’Irak, qui semblerait tr\u00e8s vite convenir \u00e0 celle de l’Iran. Toute la beaut\u00e9 de la chose est que cette pr\u00e9paration se d\u00e9finit par son contraire, dans le fait de la non-pr\u00e9paration. Le Plan B est inutile.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tMais va-t-on alors r\u00e9p\u00e9ter l’Irak, r\u00e9p\u00e9ter le d\u00e9sastre irakien? Quel d\u00e9sastre irakien? Le 2 avril, John Steinberg, de Rawstory.com<\/a> observait ceci qui renvoie \u00e9videmment \u00e0 la vision virtualiste du pr\u00e9sident (Steinberg appuie sa remarque en acceptant la logique originelle du d\u00e9sastre irakien qui freinerait l’aventure iranienne, ou bien la d\u00e9couragerait), nous soulignons le constat essentiel: \u00ab George Bush has a far bigger disaster to conjure away. In addition to nearly 3000 dead American soldiers, he has killed tens of thousands of civilians and destroyed a country. But that is not the disaster they are concerned with: One of the reasons President Bush has been so slow to admit failure in Iraq is because, in his mind it still isn’t a failure. As I argued a year and a half ago, the invasion and occupation of Iraq<\/em> was and remains a success in Bush’s view<\/em><\/strong>. Halliburton and oil company profits are up. Bush was re-elected. His endless war has made all of this possible. The only fly in the ointment is the war’s domestic unpopularity. As public opinion has turned, the gravy train is increasingly endangered.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuant \u00e0 l’ultime r\u00e9serve qu’avance Steinberg (l’hostilit\u00e9 de l’opinion publique \u00e0 l’affaire irakienne), une autre beaut\u00e9 de la chose (l’attaque de l’Iran) est qu’elle conduirait, selon les calculs des strat\u00e8ges de la communication de GW, \u00e0 renverser l’opinion g\u00e9n\u00e9rale du public, de la d\u00e9faveur actuelle \u00e0 la faveur pour l’action du Pr\u00e9sident. Le principe est qu’on n’en appelle jamais en vain \u00e0 l’instinct guerrier et patriotique des Am\u00e9ricains quand on attaque un pays \u00e0 10.000 kilom\u00e8tres de distance.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tSur le fond et \u00e0 terme, il n’est pas s\u00fbr que GW rencontre une opposition s\u00e9rieuse de l’establishment<\/em> washingtonien (\u00ab I think there has been an agreement formed in the administration … and the body politic of America a nuclear armed Iranian leadership is unacceptable, said Lawrence Wilkerson, who was chief of staff under the former secretary of state Colin Powell.<\/em> \u00bb) On voit que le probl\u00e8me d\u00e9passe le seul GW Bush. Depuis quelques jours, la fi\u00e8vre monte, le processus virtualiste est en route. La course de Washington semble trac\u00e9e.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tEt, en plus, les militaires, eux, ont un plan B, et sans doute d’autres dans leurs tiroirs, jusqu’\u00e0 la lettre Z ; les militaires ou, dans tous les cas, leurs conseillers \u00e9clair\u00e9s comme le g\u00e9n\u00e9ral \u00e0 la retraite McInerney. Cette sorte de porte-parole officieux de l’USAF<\/a> et n\u00e9o-conservateur quasiment confirm\u00e9, a dans sa besace une alternative<\/a> \u00e0 son plan A, celui-ci baptis\u00e9 Big George<\/em> (cela fera plaisir \u00e0 GW), et c’est le plan B, ou Big Rummy<\/em> (cela fera plaisir \u00e0 Rumsfeld): \u00ab If the president decided to focus solely on Iran’s nuclear and missile sites, McInerney proposed a Plan B version he called Big Rummy.’ Big Rummy’ would be executed in a single night, and would concentrate on 500 aim points. It would require greater assistance from covert operators if the administration’s goal was to provoke regime collapse, McInerney added.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tQuel argument opposer \u00e0 un empressement si r\u00e9confortant?<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

L’Iran sans plan B 16 avril 2006 Est-ce une surprise? On tendrait plut\u00f4t \u00e0 offrir le constat d’une tendance habituelle, type warstrike as usual, dans le Washington de GW Bush. Julian Borger \u00e0 Washington pour le Guardian (15 avril), constate que les Am\u00e9ricains n’ont pas de plan B pour l’Iran. Situation int\u00e9ressante: • D\u00e8s le… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[10],"tags":[3109,2773,4569,2681],"class_list":["post-67463","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-faits-et-commentaires","tag-b","tag-iran","tag-mcinerney","tag-plan"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67463","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67463"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67463\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67463"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67463"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67463"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}