Nombre d’articles et d’analyses s’attachent, aujourd’hui, \u00e0 une question simple : sommes-nous \u00e0 la fin du processus de globalisation ? Ce serait historiquement la seconde fois. De fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s caract\u00e9ristique et somme toute logique, le d\u00e9bat sur la fin de la (seconde) globalisation (version XXI\u00e8me si\u00e8cle) se r\u00e9f\u00e8re historiquement aux \u00e9v\u00e9nements qui ont caus\u00e9 la fin de la (premi\u00e8re) globalisation, avec l’accent mis sur une loi pass\u00e9e au printemps 1930 aux Etats-Unis, alors que ce pays entrait, ou allait entrer, c’est le fond de ce d\u00e9bat historique, dans la Grande D\u00e9pression.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tOn appr\u00e9ciera les diff\u00e9rences d’interpr\u00e9tation importantes dans deux articles parus \u00e0 trois jours d’intervalle les 10 et 13 avril (avec republication le 20 avril pour le second)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t• Le 10 avril 2006, dans le Los Angeles Times<\/a>, l’historien anglais Niall Ferguson publie : \u00ab Globalization’s second death? U.S. protectionist measures helped wreck the world economy in the ’30s. We can’t let that happen again.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t• Le 13 avril 2006, sur le site YaleGlobal.Online<\/a>, l’\u00e9conomiste Thomas Palley publie : \u00ab Could Globalization Fail? Policies that spawn economic inequality rather than free trade could bring about an economic crisis<\/em> \u00bb. (Signe particuli\u00e8rement r\u00e9v\u00e9lateur: l’article de Palley est repris dans l’International Herald Tribune<\/em> de ce jour<\/a>)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tFerguson pr\u00e9sente de cette fa\u00e7on la fin de la premi\u00e8re globalisation : \u00ab The last time globalization died, some historians say, it was an American backlash that killed it. A century ago, the world economy was in many ways just as integrated as it is today. Migration rates were comparably high, as was trade in relation to output. Capital flows today are bigger in relative terms, but a century ago they were more evenly distributed between rich and poor countries. After 1914, however, globalization fell apart, and by the 1930s the world economy had fragmented with disastrous consequences for growth and employment.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The great disruption caused by World War I certainly did a large part of the damage, sinking thousands of tons of merchant shipping and severing international telegraph cables. Even before war came, however, globalization was already dying the death of a thousand legislative cuts. As early as 1882, the United States had introduced the Chinese Exclusion Act, the first of a series of measures designed to restrict immigration to white Europeans. Quotas for other ethnic groups were introduced between the wars so that by the mid-1930s, the flow of new immigrants to the U.S. had all but dried up.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb The same was true of trade. Never wholly committed to free trade in the 19th century, the United States sharply raised tariffs between the wars. The protectionist Smoot-Hawley trade bill that was enacted in June 1930 dealt a lethal blow to business confidence, compounding the damage done by the Wall Street crash.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tThoma Palley, maintenant (il est int\u00e9ressant de noter que le paragraphe ci-apr\u00e8s figure dans la version initiale, le texte de YaleGlobal Online<\/em>, mais pas dans la version parue dans l’International Herald Tribune<\/em>):<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00ab Finally, if the global economy crashes, it will be important to correctly identify the economic causes. The Smoot-Hawley tariff was passed in June 1930. Its economic effects were minor for the US given the pre-existing high tariff structure and the minimal extent of US engagement in trade. Indeed, those effects may even have been beneficial in that spending switched from imports to domestically produced goods. Yet, for 75 years, free traders have sought to blame Smoot-Hawley for the Depression and thereby make a case for free trade. The rooster crows at dawn, but does not cause the sunrise. Smoot-Hawley did not cause the Depression. Likewise, trade stalemate and failure of the Doha trade round will not cause the next economic crisis. However, they may coincide, in which event rest assured that globalization boosters will argue causation.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 20 avril 2006 \u00e0 07H01<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Nombre d’articles et d’analyses s’attachent, aujourd’hui, \u00e0 une question simple : sommes-nous \u00e0 la fin du processus de globalisation ? Ce serait historiquement la seconde fois. De fa\u00e7on tr\u00e8s caract\u00e9ristique et somme toute logique, le d\u00e9bat sur la fin de la (seconde) globalisation (version XXI\u00e8me si\u00e8cle) se r\u00e9f\u00e8re historiquement aux \u00e9v\u00e9nements qui ont caus\u00e9 la… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3083,4048,2632,2891,5306,2804],"class_list":["post-67475","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-depression","tag-ferguson","tag-globalisation","tag-grande","tag-palley","tag-usa"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67475","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67475"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67475\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67475"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67475"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67475"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}