comportemental behavior<\/em> recommandant aux officiers g\u00e9n\u00e9raux de suivre le mod\u00e8le-Wayne ou le mod\u00e8le-Stallone, selon le type d’op\u00e9rations conduites, pour gagner les curs et les esprits \u00e0 la pointe du M16.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tAper\u00e7u de la chose : \u00ab Brig Alan Sharpe, who worked alongside Americans in Baghdad, said there was a strong streak of Hollywood with officers trying to portray themselves as Sylvester Stallone or John Wayne.<\/em> <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t(…)<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00bb An important part to being a successful American officer was to be able to combine the real and acted heroics of Audie Murphy, the newsreel antics of Gen Douglas MacArthur and the movie performances of Hollywood actors, the brigadier wrote.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00bb While this might look good on television at home, the brigadier suggested that loud voices, full body armour, wrap-around sunglasses, air strikes and daily broadcasts from shoulder-holster wearing brigadier-generals proudly announcing how many Iraqis have been killed by US forces today was no hearts-and-minds winning tool.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tLe brave Daily Telegraph<\/em>, si proche de coeur et de bourse des cousins neocons<\/em> d’outre-Atlantique, remarque avec une l\u00e9g\u00e8re g\u00eane que le rapport, \u00e9tabli dans le cadre probablement surr\u00e9aliste d’une \u00e9tude g\u00e9n\u00e9rale des Britanniques sur la fa\u00e7on dont ils influencent les Am\u00e9ricains au travers de leurs special relationships<\/em>, \u00ab is likely to strain the special relationship’ further, coming after other British officers’ criticism of the American approach<\/em> \u00bb.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tApr\u00e8s avoir fait discr\u00e8tement et a contrario<\/em> l’\u00e9loge de la m\u00e9thode britannique (flegme, politesse, se d\u00e9placer sympathiquement au milieu des indig\u00e8nes \u00e0 pied plut\u00f4t qu’\u00e0 bord d’une Humvee<\/em> \u00e0 80 miles par heure, ne pas trop rouler des m\u00e9caniques, ne pas en liquider trop, essayer de parler avec les gens comme on parle \u00e0 des \u00eatres humains et ainsi de suite), Sharpe termine sur une anecdote qui lui vaudra, indeed<\/em>, une deuxi\u00e8me et super-Siver Star<\/em> de ses cousins \u00e9tats-uniens :<\/p>\n<\/p>\n\t\u00ab Brig Sharpe gave the last word to an anecdote about a subjugated Iraqi just before his release from detention. The Ba’athist was loudly lectured by an American officer, who was accompanied by a quiet British brigadier, on the dangers of returning to his previously nefarious ways. As the Iraqi left he said: Hey, Mr American, next time before you shout so much you should speak to him. He is British they know how to invade a country.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 20 avril 2005 \u00e0 17H24<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Le tr\u00e8s s\u00e9rieux et britannique brigadier g\u00e9n\u00e9ral Alan Sharpe, 46 ans, porteur de m\u00e9dailles telles que la OBE \u00e9videmment britannique et la Bronze Star am\u00e9ricaine, a \u00e9crit un rapport critique \u00e9tonnant sur ses fr\u00e8res d’armes, les g\u00e9n\u00e9raux am\u00e9ricains. Sharpe s’est battu \u00e0 leurs c\u00f4t\u00e9s, en Irak. Il qualifie le r\u00e9gime mis en place par les… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[857,3961,5308,5309,4400],"class_list":["post-67479","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-irak","tag-john","tag-sharpe","tag-stallone","tag-wayne"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67479","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67479"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67479\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67479"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67479"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67479"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}