Penaude, l’USAF se pr\u00e9pare \u00e0 aller annoncer au Congr\u00e8s l’affreuse nouvelle : le JSF a augment\u00e9. (Comment est-ce possible<\/a>? Qui l’eut cru<\/a>? Qui s’en serait dout\u00e9<\/a>?) Defense News<\/em> nous donne quelques d\u00e9tails<\/a> de la trag\u00e9die : \u00ab The cost of the U.S. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program has risen to $82.1 million, enough to require the Pentagon to notify Congress, which it has done, according to Air Force officials.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Surging material costs, especially for aluminum and titanium; the addition of another wing production line in Italy; and program restructuring are to blame, according to Air Force sources. The price tag for a single JSF has risen by 33 percent since 2001, when the average plane cost $61.8 million, the sources said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tEncore n’est-ce rien, le plus beau est encore \u00e0 venir. Car, \u00e0 ce prix, l’USAF, qui tient ses comptes au plus juste, juge qu’elle n’a plus assez d’argent pour acheter ce qu’elle a pr\u00e9cis\u00e9ment<\/strong> programm\u00e9 d’acheter. Nous vous laissons donc avec les explications minutieuses de l’USAF qui, bonne m\u00e9nag\u00e8re, nous explique comment elle continuera \u00e0 aller faire ses courses dans ces temps de mis\u00e8re: \u00ab In January, JSF program officials disclosed the total overrun is estimated to be about $19 billion, the sources said. The Air Force portion of that is about $9.3 billion, they said. Another Air Force source called the service’s current funding for the JSF program insufficient to meet all requirements.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb Air Force plans call for buying 1,763 F-35s, but service officials acknowledged they might not be able to afford that many. To make up for the cost overruns, the Air Force is studying how many aircraft it should give up.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n \t\u00bb One option includes cutting 55 aircraft from the Air Force’s proposed buy. Another option could be to acquire 82 fewer aircraft. A third option would have the Air Force buy 89 fewer aircraft.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tNous invitons chaleureusement nos lecteurs \u00e0 aller aux origines, ou \u00e0 certaines d’entre elles, de toutes ces affaires de comptabilit\u00e9. Notamment, le premier expos\u00e9 officiel que nous e\u00fbmes, in illo tempore<\/em>, lors d’une conf\u00e9rence de presse en juillet 2002 du n\u00b03 d’alors du Pentagone, Peter Aldridge, heureusement pass\u00e9 depuis chez Lockheed Martin puis Northrop Grumman, ou bien l’inverse. Alors<\/a>, c’\u00e9tait plut\u00f4t la po\u00e9sie que la comptabilit\u00e9 qui pr\u00e9sidait \u00e0 la planification des commandes : \u00ab The plans are still highly fluid at this point. The estimate in the beginning to establish a unit price for the airplane was 3,000 airplanes.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n \tLe m\u00eame retour en arri\u00e8re nous apprendra qu’en 2002, le prix \u00e9tait ainsi pr\u00e9sent\u00e9 : \u00ab The estimate right now, in 2002 dollars for the conventional airplane is $37 million. For the STOVL [short take-off and vertical landing] version it’s a little more expensive and it will be something around $47 million.<\/em> \u00bb. La version historique in fine<\/em> sur l’\u00e9volution des prix est aujourd’hui celle-ci: \u00ab since 2001, when the average plane cost $61.8 million, the sources said.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \tMis en ligne le 3 ai 2006 \u00e0 11H53<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Penaude, l’USAF se pr\u00e9pare \u00e0 aller annoncer au Congr\u00e8s l’affreuse nouvelle : le JSF a augment\u00e9. (Comment est-ce possible? Qui l’eut cru? Qui s’en serait dout\u00e9?) Defense News nous donne quelques d\u00e9tails de la trag\u00e9die : \u00ab The cost of the U.S. F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program has risen to $82.1 million, enough to… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3242,250,3477,41],"class_list":["post-67521","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-aldridge","tag-jsf","tag-prix","tag-usaf"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67521","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67521"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67521\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67521"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67521"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67521"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}