Antiwar.com<\/a> de ce jour). Pour Napoleoni, le v\u00e9ritable succ\u00e8s d’Al Qa\u00efda depuis le 11 septembre, c’est sa restructuration financi\u00e8re, qui a accompagn\u00e9 et inspir\u00e9 une restructuration op\u00e9rationnelle dont les Occidentaux (les Am\u00e9ricains) ne se sont gu\u00e8re avis\u00e9s. (Il faut dire : l’Irak les passionnait plus.) <\/p>\n<\/p>\n\tDans cet article, Napoleoni donne des pr\u00e9cisions sur les co\u00fbts des grands attentats d’Al Qa\u00efda, qui vont de pair avec leurs modifications op\u00e9rationnelles. Ces derni\u00e8res aboutissent \u00e0 un sch\u00e9ma op\u00e9rationnel qui peut \u00eatre reproduit d’un groupe \u00e0 l’autre, aux moindres frais. De l’attaque de New York de septembre 2001 \u00e0 celle de Londres de juillet 2005, on est pass\u00e9 de $500.000 \u00e0 $1.500, selon Napoleoni.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\t\u00ab Within this scenario, Osama bin Laden does not need to plan, plot, and fund another 9\/11; all he needs to do is issue a call to implement a thousand replicas of such an attack. What changes is the scale of the suicide missions much smaller than the American template, due to financial constraints. A quick look at the cost of jihadist terror attacks from 9\/11 to the London bombing shows the declining expenditures on such operations. The execution of the U.S. attacks cost half a million dollars, the Madrid bombing $10,000, and the July 7 suicide missions less than $1,500.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
\tMis en ligne le 4 mai 2006 \u00e0 09H51<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Loretta Napoleoni, sp\u00e9cialis\u00e9e dans l’aspect financier du terrorisme, donne une r\u00e9flexion sur ce qu’elle nomme le code Al Qa\u00efda ( Al-Qaeda’s Code\u00bb, sur Antiwar.com de ce jour). Pour Napoleoni, le v\u00e9ritable succ\u00e8s d’Al Qa\u00efda depuis le 11 septembre, c’est sa restructuration financi\u00e8re, qui a accompagn\u00e9 et inspir\u00e9 une restructuration op\u00e9rationnelle dont les Occidentaux (les Am\u00e9ricains)… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[3936,5343,4242,3744],"class_list":["post-67523","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-al","tag-comptabilite","tag-qaida","tag-terreur"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67523","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67523"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67523\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67523"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67523"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67523"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}