{"id":67553,"date":"2006-05-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-05-12T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/05\/12\/le-nucleaire-contre-liran-le-pentagone-semble-ne-pas-etre-chaud-du-tout\/"},"modified":"2006-05-12T00:00:00","modified_gmt":"2006-05-12T00:00:00","slug":"le-nucleaire-contre-liran-le-pentagone-semble-ne-pas-etre-chaud-du-tout","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/2006\/05\/12\/le-nucleaire-contre-liran-le-pentagone-semble-ne-pas-etre-chaud-du-tout\/","title":{"rendered":"Le nucl\u00e9aire contre l’Iran? Le Pentagone semble ne pas \u00eatre chaud du tout"},"content":{"rendered":"

C’est une intervention int\u00e9ressante que celle de Linton Brooks, undersecretary of energy for nuclear security au Pentagone, lors d’une rencontre avec le Defense Writers Group le 11 mai. Nous empruntons au Daily Report<\/em> de Air Force Association (AFA) du m\u00eame jour<\/a> le rapport de deux des principaux axes de cette intervention. Nous en donnons ensuite une rapide interpr\u00e9tation.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00ab The Hardest Targets.<\/em><\/strong> It is very clear that there are underground structures in the world that are beyond the limits of US power to destroy, said Linton Brooks, undersecretary of energy for nuclear security, in a meeting with the Defense Writers Group Thursday. Deterrence is improved if nations know they are not sheltered from US retaliation, he asserted, adding that nuclear weapons are not to be taken lightly. I don’t think there is any question that there is a military requirement to hold these underground facilities at risk, he said. A national debate centers on whether nuclear weapons should be developed for this purpose. So far, Congress has said no and has refused to allow the development of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\t\u00bb Big Sticks.<\/em><\/strong> If the US does eventually develop penetrating nuclear weapons capable of knocking out buried military sites, don’t expect the weapons to be neat. There is certainly no way to avoid a large amount of radioactive fallout if an earth penetrating nuclear weapon is delivered through traditional delivery modes, Linton Brooks told defense reporters Thursday. Shaping or hardening the case of an existing weapon would only allow the weapon to plow a few meters into the earth. It would still, essentially, be a surface burst. The undersecretary of energy for nuclear security said use of a penetrating weapon would allow a given target to be attacked with a smaller warhead, but the choice is between lots of fallout and even more fallout. The notion of a surgical nuclear war is a fallacy, said Brooks, adding, The idea that the use of nuclear weapons is other than unimaginably destructive is not a helpful idea. He continued, If you want to use brute force, then nuclear weapons are attractive, but the best solution is to find ways to hold underground facilities at risk through conventional means.<\/em> \u00bb<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tLe premier point (The Hardest Targets.<\/em><\/strong>) est un classique: il s’agit de convaincre le Congr\u00e8s, par l’interm\u00e9diaire des m\u00e9dias, de l’importance consid\u00e9rable des syst\u00e8mes nucl\u00e9aires de destruction par p\u00e9n\u00e9tration. Argumentation classique de type bureaucratique, rien \u00e0 redire. Pour autant Le deuxi\u00e8me point (Big Sticks<\/em><\/strong>) nous para\u00eet beaucoup plus int\u00e9ressant, en m\u00eame temps qu’il constitue une argumentation en partie contraire \u00e0 la promotion que fait Brooks dans son premier argument.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tBrooks s’\u00e9chine \u00e0 avertir les journalistes, par cons\u00e9quent le Congr\u00e8s, le public, etc. : les armes nucl\u00e9aires de p\u00e9n\u00e9tration selon l’utilisation envisag\u00e9e actuellement (entr\u00e9e dans le sol par le haut) restent des armes nucl\u00e9aires avec tous les effets secondaires et collat\u00e9raux catastrophiques. Il s’agit de syst\u00e8mes du plus haut degr\u00e9 de destruction intervenant dans des domaines d\u00e9stabilisants (radiations notamment), ouvrant la voie \u00e0 l’inconnu en mati\u00e8re de conflit comme il n’a jamais \u00e9t\u00e9 exp\u00e9riment\u00e9 auparavant (les deux bombes atomiques contre le Japon ont \u00e9t\u00e9 utilis\u00e9es en p\u00e9riode de monopole US, ce qui n’est plus le cas aujourd’hui).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tNotre interpr\u00e9tation de ce deuxi\u00e8me point, notamment la v\u00e9h\u00e9mence implicite de la plaidoirie de Brooks (\u00ab The notion of a surgical nuclear war is a fallacy, said Brooks, adding, The idea that the use of nuclear weapons is other than unimaginably destructive is not a helpful idea<\/em> \u00bb), est qu’il refl\u00e8te l’extr\u00eame r\u00e9ticence du Pentagone devant certaines id\u00e9es d’emploi du nucl\u00e9aire contre l’Iran. (Brooks insiste m\u00eame sur le fait que la meilleure solution demeure de rechercher la destruction de l’objectif through conventional means<\/em>.) Il s’agit de contrer les arguments de certains neocons<\/em> particuli\u00e8rement allum\u00e9s, tel Michael Ledeen, selon lesquels une intervention nucl\u00e9aire chirurgicale, sans effets catastrophiques, est possible.<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

\tPar le fait m\u00eame, l’argument comme nous l’interpr\u00e9tons serait la confirmation qu’effectivement un tel emploi est envisag\u00e9. Il donne un certain cr\u00e9dit \u00e0 diverses informations, dont celles de Seymour Hersh<\/a>, selon lesquelles l’opposition des militaires \u00e0 une telle option prendrait des formes concr\u00e8tes (menaces de d\u00e9mission).<\/p>\n<\/p>\n

<\/p>\n

\tMis en ligne le 12 mai 2006 \u00e0 14H26<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

C’est une intervention int\u00e9ressante que celle de Linton Brooks, undersecretary of energy for nuclear security au Pentagone, lors d’une rencontre avec le Defense Writers Group le 11 mai. Nous empruntons au Daily Report de Air Force Association (AFA) du m\u00eame jour le rapport de deux des principaux axes de cette intervention. Nous en donnons ensuite… <\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"","ping_status":"","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"neve_meta_sidebar":"","neve_meta_container":"","neve_meta_enable_content_width":"","neve_meta_content_width":0,"neve_meta_title_alignment":"","neve_meta_author_avatar":"","neve_post_elements_order":"","neve_meta_disable_header":"","neve_meta_disable_footer":"","neve_meta_disable_title":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[2],"tags":[4740,4180,2773,3004,3194],"class_list":["post-67553","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bloc-notes","tag-brooks","tag-hersh","tag-iran","tag-nucleaire","tag-pentagone"],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67553","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=67553"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/67553\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=67553"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=67553"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/new.dedefensa.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=67553"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}